DOI Artikel:
Bakoš, Ján: Úvahy o umeleckohistorickom stanovisku Alberta Kutala
DOI Seite / Zitierlink: https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.51703#0275
143
logical historicity. According to this standpoint, works of art are
not only historical documents since art créâtes history precisely
by creating ever lasting values. Artistic development is socio-
-historically functional precisely in its being immanent, auto-
nomous, independent.
Kutal’s “art history” grew up from the conception of the
“Wiener Schule”. It represents a concretization of V. Kramář’s
transformation of A. Riegl’s, F. Wickhoff’s and M. Dvořák’s
conception. On the otherhand, however, Kutal by his disposition
inclined rather towards Anglo-Saxon empirical rationalism. The
fundamental contradiction in his conception — empirism versus
constructivism — led to the author’s permanent skepsis. It was
a conflict between the belief in the necd and possibility of objective
knowledge (in the real existence of development, adequacy of
historical reconstruction and reality) on theone hand, and a perma-
nent doubt about its adequacy (about the possibility ofapprehend-
ing the unique) on the other hand. Skepsis, however, became an
activating element of his conception, stimulating him to a cons-
tantly renewed effort at knowledge. We witness a remarkable
and rare phenomenon that the autor implicitly applies his gno-
seological theory to himself: He understands his own concepts
as elements in the permanent development of art historical
investigation.
logical historicity. According to this standpoint, works of art are
not only historical documents since art créâtes history precisely
by creating ever lasting values. Artistic development is socio-
-historically functional precisely in its being immanent, auto-
nomous, independent.
Kutal’s “art history” grew up from the conception of the
“Wiener Schule”. It represents a concretization of V. Kramář’s
transformation of A. Riegl’s, F. Wickhoff’s and M. Dvořák’s
conception. On the otherhand, however, Kutal by his disposition
inclined rather towards Anglo-Saxon empirical rationalism. The
fundamental contradiction in his conception — empirism versus
constructivism — led to the author’s permanent skepsis. It was
a conflict between the belief in the necd and possibility of objective
knowledge (in the real existence of development, adequacy of
historical reconstruction and reality) on theone hand, and a perma-
nent doubt about its adequacy (about the possibility ofapprehend-
ing the unique) on the other hand. Skepsis, however, became an
activating element of his conception, stimulating him to a cons-
tantly renewed effort at knowledge. We witness a remarkable
and rare phenomenon that the autor implicitly applies his gno-
seological theory to himself: He understands his own concepts
as elements in the permanent development of art historical
investigation.