DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.25987#0033
OF THE WAR WITH TIPPOO SULTAUN.
Judicious indeed, and provident, was the policy which dictated
the relinquishment of that enterprise; since subsequent discoveries
and events have manifested the great probability, if not absolute
certainty, that the departure of the large force destined lor Manilla,
would have proved a signal to the watchful vengeance of Tippoo
Sultaun, to invade the Carnatic, even without waiting for the aid
of a French force, the assistance of which might not perhaps have
appeared to him necessary during the absence of so considerable
a portion of our army.
But the apprehensions of the designs and movements of the
power of Mysore, had never perhaps been more anxiously, nor
more justly, entertained, than between the months of June and
September, iyq8. It cannot be denied, that during that period
the British interests in India were menaced by a combination of
the most serious dangers. The anxiety hitherto entertained with
regard to the designs of Tippoo Sultaun, was now confirmed by
a certain knowledge of his having actually proposed to the French,
projects of the most extensive hostility against the British posses-
sions in India. The alarm, as well as the danger, were consi-
derably aggravated by the formidable preparations of the French
in the Mediterranean ; by the apparent desperate state of our
alliances in the Decan; by the peculiar situation of the court of
Hydrabad, subjected to the will of a powerful French army and
faction; by the menacing declarations and probable views of
Zemaun Shah; by the distribution of the army of Fort St. George,
throughout various posts in the Carnatic, the island of Ceylon,
and the Eastern islands recently captured from the Dutch; and
above all, by the general persuasion that an early attempt to
assemble or to move that army would serve only as a provocation
B a
Judicious indeed, and provident, was the policy which dictated
the relinquishment of that enterprise; since subsequent discoveries
and events have manifested the great probability, if not absolute
certainty, that the departure of the large force destined lor Manilla,
would have proved a signal to the watchful vengeance of Tippoo
Sultaun, to invade the Carnatic, even without waiting for the aid
of a French force, the assistance of which might not perhaps have
appeared to him necessary during the absence of so considerable
a portion of our army.
But the apprehensions of the designs and movements of the
power of Mysore, had never perhaps been more anxiously, nor
more justly, entertained, than between the months of June and
September, iyq8. It cannot be denied, that during that period
the British interests in India were menaced by a combination of
the most serious dangers. The anxiety hitherto entertained with
regard to the designs of Tippoo Sultaun, was now confirmed by
a certain knowledge of his having actually proposed to the French,
projects of the most extensive hostility against the British posses-
sions in India. The alarm, as well as the danger, were consi-
derably aggravated by the formidable preparations of the French
in the Mediterranean ; by the apparent desperate state of our
alliances in the Decan; by the peculiar situation of the court of
Hydrabad, subjected to the will of a powerful French army and
faction; by the menacing declarations and probable views of
Zemaun Shah; by the distribution of the army of Fort St. George,
throughout various posts in the Carnatic, the island of Ceylon,
and the Eastern islands recently captured from the Dutch; and
above all, by the general persuasion that an early attempt to
assemble or to move that army would serve only as a provocation
B a