Overview
Universitätsbibliothek HeidelbergUniversitätsbibliothek Heidelberg
Metadaten

Beatson, Alexander
A view of the origin and conducts of the war with Tippoo Sultaun: comprising a narrative of the operations of the army under the command of Lieutenant George Harris, and of the Siege of Seringapatam — London, 1800

DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.25987#0089
Overview
Facsimile
0.5
1 cm
facsimile
Scroll
OCR fulltext
OF THE WAR WITH TIPPOO SULTAUN.
every reason to expect that the Paishwah would have made a con-
siderable effort to assist us with a large body of cavalry.
Lieutenant-general Harris was invested with powers fully ade-
quate to the management of these numerous advantages. He was
surrounded by a staff appointed in the most liberal manner, and
uniting evety species of knowledge which could tend to give ad-
ditional force to his own experience and zeal. The object of Iris
operations was single, distinct, and definite; and the means of
attaining it, had been the continual study of himself, and of those
acting under his orders. The enemy's country, the nature of his
resources, the strength of his defences, and the character of his
force, were subjects perfectly familiar to the whole of his staff and
to most of his principal officers. The Sultaun was not likely to
make a movement which they would not anticipate; nor was any
contingency likely to arise, against which they would not have
provided. On the other hand, it was supposed that Tippoo
Sultaun's army had suffered essentially both in numbers and dis-
cipline since the last war: his finances were in disorder, his
councils were perplexed by discordant opinions, and his spirits de-
jected and broken by the disappointment of his hopes of French
assistance, by the retreat of Zemaun Shah, by the failure of his
intrigues at the courts of Poonah and Hyderabad, and by the
unexampled vigour, alacrity, and extent of our military prepa-
rations.
General Harris therefore possessed every advantage which the
most sanguine mind could expect, or the most anxious could de-
sire. With the strength of his army, the cordiality of the allies,
the comparative weakness and dejection of the enemy, were com-
1
 
Annotationen