DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.25987#0296
356' VIEW OF THE ORIGIN AND CONDUCT
exceeded the charges which must have been continued, if the
whole had remained within our own frontier; and when it is
considered, that if the army, with the battering train, had not
moved to Seringapatam, the expensive, but necessary system of
defence already explained, must have been protracted until all
danger from Tippoo Sultaun's connection with the French should
have been averted, it wiil be readily admitted, that the move-
ment of tiie British forces towards the scene of their certain
triumph, was not only the most effectual, but the most economical,
measure which could have been adopted to frustrate the views
of the enemy, and to secure the tranquillity of the Carnatic.
For, on the one hand, no prospect appeared of any practicable
reduction in the expence of a defensive system, during the con-
tinuance of the war between Great Britain and France ; while
every hour of delay in the movement of our army, afforded to
Tippoo Sultaun the means of increasing his strength, of receiving
succours from the French, and, consequently, of aggravating to
the company both the expences and the hazard of the impending
contest.
On the other hand, the state of our army, the arrangements
which had been made for its equipment and supply, in every
department, and the period of the season, left no doubt, that the
great object of the war might be attained in one short campaign.
Nor did this calculation prove to have been, in any degree, san-
guine ; for, as we have already noticed, although an alarm of a
deficiency of grain prevailed in the army before Seringapatam on
the ibth of April, it appeared soon after, upon an accurate exami-
nation, at that time (exclusive of the immense depots established
exceeded the charges which must have been continued, if the
whole had remained within our own frontier; and when it is
considered, that if the army, with the battering train, had not
moved to Seringapatam, the expensive, but necessary system of
defence already explained, must have been protracted until all
danger from Tippoo Sultaun's connection with the French should
have been averted, it wiil be readily admitted, that the move-
ment of tiie British forces towards the scene of their certain
triumph, was not only the most effectual, but the most economical,
measure which could have been adopted to frustrate the views
of the enemy, and to secure the tranquillity of the Carnatic.
For, on the one hand, no prospect appeared of any practicable
reduction in the expence of a defensive system, during the con-
tinuance of the war between Great Britain and France ; while
every hour of delay in the movement of our army, afforded to
Tippoo Sultaun the means of increasing his strength, of receiving
succours from the French, and, consequently, of aggravating to
the company both the expences and the hazard of the impending
contest.
On the other hand, the state of our army, the arrangements
which had been made for its equipment and supply, in every
department, and the period of the season, left no doubt, that the
great object of the war might be attained in one short campaign.
Nor did this calculation prove to have been, in any degree, san-
guine ; for, as we have already noticed, although an alarm of a
deficiency of grain prevailed in the army before Seringapatam on
the ibth of April, it appeared soon after, upon an accurate exami-
nation, at that time (exclusive of the immense depots established