DOI Seite / Zitierlink:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.34827#0084
68
CH. xm.
conquests. At the same time I am not certain that I see any
better way of managing the matter. If we leave Sindia's
government to itself there is the chance of its assuming the
form of a predatory state during the anarchy that would follow
Sindia's death, or even previous to that event—in consequence
of some rebellion or other convulsion; and if we interfere, it
may be questioned whether the subsidiary system is not better
than the one proposed by Stewart; and I know of no third plan
to compare with these two. For my own part, after all its
failures, I am partial to the subsidiary plan ; and I think that,
with a little management, we may hope to see the Nizam, the
(dykwar, the Raja of Mysore, and the remains of Holkar and
the Bosla hold out as long as the Nabobs of Lucknow have
done. In fact, I very much question whether, in the present
state of our power, we can be compelled to extend our territory
faster than we wish. If one of the Governments of India
obliges us to go to war, we may depose the Prince, and perhaps
take a fortress, or some other security; we can always set up
another head, and preserve the state, as was done partially
in the case of Vizier Ali, and still less completely in that of
Mysore. Sooner or later it is probably desirable that we should
have all the country. There will then be less risk from want
of ability, as our politics will be simplified, and less fear of war,
when there are no heads to those who would wish to oppose us.
If we can then manage our native army, and keep out the
Russians, I see nothing to threaten the safety of our empire
until the natives become enlightened under our tuition, and a
separation becomes desirable to both parties. In the mean-
time my principal fear is that, as we are charged with the
maintenance of the peace of all India, our finances will be
exhausted by keeping up the requisite force in a state of pre-
paration ; and that, if we slacken at all, some dashing leader
may gain a temporary success sufficient to gather a predatory
host round his standard, which, if composed, as it would be, of
desperate adventurers, and commanded by a professional Kuz-
zauk (instead of a Brahmin, a coward, an infant, or woman),
might still give us an infinite deal of trouble. The chance of
CH. xm.
conquests. At the same time I am not certain that I see any
better way of managing the matter. If we leave Sindia's
government to itself there is the chance of its assuming the
form of a predatory state during the anarchy that would follow
Sindia's death, or even previous to that event—in consequence
of some rebellion or other convulsion; and if we interfere, it
may be questioned whether the subsidiary system is not better
than the one proposed by Stewart; and I know of no third plan
to compare with these two. For my own part, after all its
failures, I am partial to the subsidiary plan ; and I think that,
with a little management, we may hope to see the Nizam, the
(dykwar, the Raja of Mysore, and the remains of Holkar and
the Bosla hold out as long as the Nabobs of Lucknow have
done. In fact, I very much question whether, in the present
state of our power, we can be compelled to extend our territory
faster than we wish. If one of the Governments of India
obliges us to go to war, we may depose the Prince, and perhaps
take a fortress, or some other security; we can always set up
another head, and preserve the state, as was done partially
in the case of Vizier Ali, and still less completely in that of
Mysore. Sooner or later it is probably desirable that we should
have all the country. There will then be less risk from want
of ability, as our politics will be simplified, and less fear of war,
when there are no heads to those who would wish to oppose us.
If we can then manage our native army, and keep out the
Russians, I see nothing to threaten the safety of our empire
until the natives become enlightened under our tuition, and a
separation becomes desirable to both parties. In the mean-
time my principal fear is that, as we are charged with the
maintenance of the peace of all India, our finances will be
exhausted by keeping up the requisite force in a state of pre-
paration ; and that, if we slacken at all, some dashing leader
may gain a temporary success sufficient to gather a predatory
host round his standard, which, if composed, as it would be, of
desperate adventurers, and commanded by a professional Kuz-
zauk (instead of a Brahmin, a coward, an infant, or woman),
might still give us an infinite deal of trouble. The chance of