DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.45392#0198
Buddha the Gospel of Buddhism
Nibbana.” 1 Since the highest good is a state of mind
(the state of mind of the Arahat, who is delivered from
desire, resentment, and glamour), every ethical activity
must be judged as a means to the attainment of that state.
A bad conscience, then, a state of sin, would be described
by a Buddhist as a state of mind contrary to Nibbana.
It may seem that “ Because of Nibbana ” is not a sufficient
ethical motif. In the same way even the true Buddhist
might fail to understand the force of the Christian “ Thy
will be done,” “Thy way, not mine, O Lord,” or of the
resignation signified in ‘ Islam.’ Yet all these refer to
one and the same inner experience, of which we are
reminded by the Sufi, when he says : “ Whoso hath not
surrendered will, no will hath he.” Most probably the
force of these statements can never be made fully apparent
to those who have not yet in their own consciousness
experienced at least the beginning of the turning of
the personal will from affirmation to denial. But just in
so far as a man allows his thoughts and actions to be
determined by impersonal motive—Anatta or Nibbana
motive, as a Buddhist might say—so far he begins to taste
of a peace that passes understanding. It is this peace
which lies at the heart of all religion, and Buddhism may
well claim that the principle “ Because of Nibbana ” suffices
to settle in the affirmative the question whether or not the
system of Gautama is properly described as a religion
(though this expression suggests rather a Mahayana than
an early mode of thought).
1 Shwe Zan Aung, Buddhist Review, iii, 2, p. 107. Cf. Clive Bell,
Art, ii, iii, and G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica.
Cf. Shikshasamuccaya of Shanti Deva, vv. 21, 23: “Make thy merit
pure by deeds full of the spirit of tenderness and the Void. . . . Increase
of enjoyment is from almsgiving full of the spirit of tenderness and the
Void.”
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Nibbana.” 1 Since the highest good is a state of mind
(the state of mind of the Arahat, who is delivered from
desire, resentment, and glamour), every ethical activity
must be judged as a means to the attainment of that state.
A bad conscience, then, a state of sin, would be described
by a Buddhist as a state of mind contrary to Nibbana.
It may seem that “ Because of Nibbana ” is not a sufficient
ethical motif. In the same way even the true Buddhist
might fail to understand the force of the Christian “ Thy
will be done,” “Thy way, not mine, O Lord,” or of the
resignation signified in ‘ Islam.’ Yet all these refer to
one and the same inner experience, of which we are
reminded by the Sufi, when he says : “ Whoso hath not
surrendered will, no will hath he.” Most probably the
force of these statements can never be made fully apparent
to those who have not yet in their own consciousness
experienced at least the beginning of the turning of
the personal will from affirmation to denial. But just in
so far as a man allows his thoughts and actions to be
determined by impersonal motive—Anatta or Nibbana
motive, as a Buddhist might say—so far he begins to taste
of a peace that passes understanding. It is this peace
which lies at the heart of all religion, and Buddhism may
well claim that the principle “ Because of Nibbana ” suffices
to settle in the affirmative the question whether or not the
system of Gautama is properly described as a religion
(though this expression suggests rather a Mahayana than
an early mode of thought).
1 Shwe Zan Aung, Buddhist Review, iii, 2, p. 107. Cf. Clive Bell,
Art, ii, iii, and G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica.
Cf. Shikshasamuccaya of Shanti Deva, vv. 21, 23: “Make thy merit
pure by deeds full of the spirit of tenderness and the Void. . . . Increase
of enjoyment is from almsgiving full of the spirit of tenderness and the
Void.”
140