DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.73802#0056
goa Introduction
prohibited articles were enumerated in the treaty between James I and
Philip III of Spain, and again, later, in the treaty between Sweden and
the United Provinces.) Accordingly, the action of the English and
others was illegitimate, observes Gentili, when they supplied things
useful for war to the Turks, who were at war with the Emperor. For
like reasons Charles of Burgundy justifiably adopted severe measures
against foreign traders for attempting to carry provisions to his be-
sieged enemy. The guiding rule in all these questions may be expressed
in the form of the universal imperative: 'Do not to others what you
do not wish to have done to you'; and it may be added that this
principle is more applicable than is the positive counterpart to human
society in its juridical relationships.
14. Conclusion
The work of Gentili is of enduring value in the history of the law
of nations, as the preceding account of his position and work amply
attests. He did more than any other writer before him to free inter-
national law from the besetting theological importations and the in-
cubus of scholastic casuistry. In his clear recognition of, and constant
insistence on, the predominant positive aspects of the subject, he fore-
shadowed the modern prevailing view, which realizes that the regula-
tion of interstate relationships is based on binding law and not merely
on voluntary courtesy or concessions to morality. He frequently
appeals to divine law; he is always ready to invoke the authority of
‘ natural reason' or the law of nature, but in doing so his aim is to apply
additional sanctions to, and thereby reinforce, matters that are uni-
versally affirmed by the intuitive juridical consciousness of mankind,1 or
established by express or implied agreement. Metaphysical abstractions
and dialectic subtleties he avoided as a menace to the stability of the
very foundations of the subject, and to its direct compelling force. His
aim is a thoroughly practical one: he considers with the mind of an im-
partial judge—a mind, moreover, swayed by sound common sense rather
than by ancient authority (to which Grotius has paid too great homage)
—the great controversies of the time; and in default of earlier agree-
ment or consistent practice, he briefly suggests definite solutions in
accordance with the behests of justice and humanity. In comparison
with the comprehensive and systematic work of Grotius, the work of
Gentili may seem small and fragmentary; but it is important to remem-
ber in comparing the two that the work of Grotius was a later publica-
tion, and had the great advantage of being modelled on that of Gentili.
No doubt Grotius is superior in philosophic grasp. By virtue of this
1 We know how frequently in the Great War appeals were made not merely to the conventionally
established laws of war, but also to the dictates of the public conscience and the principles of humanity.
prohibited articles were enumerated in the treaty between James I and
Philip III of Spain, and again, later, in the treaty between Sweden and
the United Provinces.) Accordingly, the action of the English and
others was illegitimate, observes Gentili, when they supplied things
useful for war to the Turks, who were at war with the Emperor. For
like reasons Charles of Burgundy justifiably adopted severe measures
against foreign traders for attempting to carry provisions to his be-
sieged enemy. The guiding rule in all these questions may be expressed
in the form of the universal imperative: 'Do not to others what you
do not wish to have done to you'; and it may be added that this
principle is more applicable than is the positive counterpart to human
society in its juridical relationships.
14. Conclusion
The work of Gentili is of enduring value in the history of the law
of nations, as the preceding account of his position and work amply
attests. He did more than any other writer before him to free inter-
national law from the besetting theological importations and the in-
cubus of scholastic casuistry. In his clear recognition of, and constant
insistence on, the predominant positive aspects of the subject, he fore-
shadowed the modern prevailing view, which realizes that the regula-
tion of interstate relationships is based on binding law and not merely
on voluntary courtesy or concessions to morality. He frequently
appeals to divine law; he is always ready to invoke the authority of
‘ natural reason' or the law of nature, but in doing so his aim is to apply
additional sanctions to, and thereby reinforce, matters that are uni-
versally affirmed by the intuitive juridical consciousness of mankind,1 or
established by express or implied agreement. Metaphysical abstractions
and dialectic subtleties he avoided as a menace to the stability of the
very foundations of the subject, and to its direct compelling force. His
aim is a thoroughly practical one: he considers with the mind of an im-
partial judge—a mind, moreover, swayed by sound common sense rather
than by ancient authority (to which Grotius has paid too great homage)
—the great controversies of the time; and in default of earlier agree-
ment or consistent practice, he briefly suggests definite solutions in
accordance with the behests of justice and humanity. In comparison
with the comprehensive and systematic work of Grotius, the work of
Gentili may seem small and fragmentary; but it is important to remem-
ber in comparing the two that the work of Grotius was a later publica-
tion, and had the great advantage of being modelled on that of Gentili.
No doubt Grotius is superior in philosophic grasp. By virtue of this
1 We know how frequently in the Great War appeals were made not merely to the conventionally
established laws of war, but also to the dictates of the public conscience and the principles of humanity.