DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.9550#0212
SECOND DEFENCE OF THE
" If this be your method of reasoning, it would appear
" that your faith is confined to those objects only
" which are evident to your senses." As far as my
recollection goes with respect to the contents of my
publications, both in the native language and in Eng-
lish, I believe I never denied the materiality of God,
on the mere ground of its not being evident to our
senses. The assertion which I quoted, or made use
of in my former treatise, is, that the nature of the God-
head is beyond the comprehension of external and
internal senses ; which, I presume, implies neither the
denial of the materiality of God, on the sole ground
of his being invisible, nor the limitation of my faitb
merely to objects evident to the senses. For many
things that far surpass the limits of our senses to
perceive, or experience to teach, may yet be rendered
credible, or even demonstrated by inferences drawn
from our experience. Such as the mutual gravitation
of the earth and moon towards each other, and of
both to the sun ; which facts cannot be perceivd by
any of our senses, but may be clearly demonstrated
by reasoning drawn from our exprience. Hence it
appears, that a thing is justly denied only when found
contrary to sense and reason, and not merely because
it is not perceptible to the senses.
I have now to notice the friendly advice given me
by the learned Brahmun (in p. 23,1. 16): "But at
" all events, divest yourself of the uneasy sensations
"you profess to experience at witnessing the worship
"paid to idols, prepared at the expense and labour of
"another." In thanking him for his trouble in offering
me this counsel, I must however, beg the learned
" If this be your method of reasoning, it would appear
" that your faith is confined to those objects only
" which are evident to your senses." As far as my
recollection goes with respect to the contents of my
publications, both in the native language and in Eng-
lish, I believe I never denied the materiality of God,
on the mere ground of its not being evident to our
senses. The assertion which I quoted, or made use
of in my former treatise, is, that the nature of the God-
head is beyond the comprehension of external and
internal senses ; which, I presume, implies neither the
denial of the materiality of God, on the sole ground
of his being invisible, nor the limitation of my faitb
merely to objects evident to the senses. For many
things that far surpass the limits of our senses to
perceive, or experience to teach, may yet be rendered
credible, or even demonstrated by inferences drawn
from our experience. Such as the mutual gravitation
of the earth and moon towards each other, and of
both to the sun ; which facts cannot be perceivd by
any of our senses, but may be clearly demonstrated
by reasoning drawn from our exprience. Hence it
appears, that a thing is justly denied only when found
contrary to sense and reason, and not merely because
it is not perceptible to the senses.
I have now to notice the friendly advice given me
by the learned Brahmun (in p. 23,1. 16): "But at
" all events, divest yourself of the uneasy sensations
"you profess to experience at witnessing the worship
"paid to idols, prepared at the expense and labour of
"another." In thanking him for his trouble in offering
me this counsel, I must however, beg the learned