DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.9552#0246
human nature, so the Son of God expresses the nature
of God. Were we to admit the term >l God " as a com-
mon noun, and not a proper name, and Godhead as a
genus like mankind, &c, and that Jesus was actually
begotten of the Deity, this mode of reasoning would
stand good ; but Godhead must in this case be brought
to a level with other genera, capable of performing
animal functions, &c.
Some represent God as a compound substance, con-
sisting of three parts, the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit, a representation in support of which they can
offer no scriptural authority. I would, however, wish to
know, whether these parts (Father, Son and Spirit) are
of the same nature and existence, or each possessed of a
different nature or essence. In the former case, there
would be a total impossibility of composition ; for com-
position absolutely requires articles or parts of different
identity and essence ; nothing being capable of com-
position with itself. Besides, the idea of such a
compound substance is inconsistent with that distinct
personality of Father, Son, and Spirit, which they main-
tain.—In the latter case, ( that is, the Father, the Son
and the Holy Spirit being of different nature,) a com-
position of these three parts is not impossible ; but it
destroys the opinion which they entertain respecting the
Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit being of the
same nature and essence, and of course implies that the
Godhead is liable to divisibility.
The argument so adduced by them would include
in reality a denial of the epithet God to each part of the
Godhead ; for no portion -of an existence, either ideal or
perceptible in a true sense, can be called the existence
of God. Were we to admit the term >l God " as a com-
mon noun, and not a proper name, and Godhead as a
genus like mankind, &c, and that Jesus was actually
begotten of the Deity, this mode of reasoning would
stand good ; but Godhead must in this case be brought
to a level with other genera, capable of performing
animal functions, &c.
Some represent God as a compound substance, con-
sisting of three parts, the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit, a representation in support of which they can
offer no scriptural authority. I would, however, wish to
know, whether these parts (Father, Son and Spirit) are
of the same nature and existence, or each possessed of a
different nature or essence. In the former case, there
would be a total impossibility of composition ; for com-
position absolutely requires articles or parts of different
identity and essence ; nothing being capable of com-
position with itself. Besides, the idea of such a
compound substance is inconsistent with that distinct
personality of Father, Son, and Spirit, which they main-
tain.—In the latter case, ( that is, the Father, the Son
and the Holy Spirit being of different nature,) a com-
position of these three parts is not impossible ; but it
destroys the opinion which they entertain respecting the
Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit being of the
same nature and essence, and of course implies that the
Godhead is liable to divisibility.
The argument so adduced by them would include
in reality a denial of the epithet God to each part of the
Godhead ; for no portion -of an existence, either ideal or
perceptible in a true sense, can be called the existence