DOI Seite / Zitierlink:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.49827#0078
SMRITI FRAGMENTS.
63
Katyayana supplies explanations to difficult technical terms Lecture
used by Briliaspati. Thus the latter refers occasionally to IIL
debts contracted from love or anger. Katyayana explains
what sort of debts are referred to byfthese terms. In several
other cases however Briliaspati in his turn is more
explicit than Katyayana, and the composition of both
works, as pointed out before, must belong very nearly to
the same epoch. *
As for their relation to the Yajnavalkya and Narada Compari-
Smritis, it is quite clear that they must be posterior to ®]°g3gtw0
the former work. Thus in comparing Yajnavalkya’s rules authors
on the Law of Stridhana with those of Manu on the
one hand, and those of Katyayana on the other halid, Narada.
it will be found that Yajnavalkya’s treatment of this part
of the law occupies an intermediate position between the
extremely detailed rules of Katyayana and the scanty
provisions of Manu. Both Katyayana and Briliaspati refer
to several other kind of ordeals, besides the five sorts,
mentioned by Yajnavalkya. Brihaspati speaks of four
and Katyayana of five sorts of sureties instead of the three
sorts of Yajnavalkya. Both authors give a great many
detailed provisions regarding every part of a Judicial
Proceeding, of which the Yajnavalkya-smriti does not
exhibit the slightest trace, etc. The case is not equally
clear as regards the priority of the fragments of Brihaspati
and Katyayana to the Narada-smriti. The older version
of that work in particular contains so many technical
details on proceedings at law, which correspond precisely
to Briliaspati’s and Katyayana’s rules on the same subjects,
that it is necessary to refer its composition to nearly the
same modern epoch. Moreover, the Narada-smriti agrees
with these works in the use of the term Dinara. On the
other side of the question, it may be argued tfyat Brihaspati
and Katyayana define the value of a Dinara ( = 1 Suvarna,)
which shows that they are acquainted wi,th its use as a coin,
whereas Narada seems to refer to Dinaras used as orna-
ments only.1 There are some points, too, such as e. g. the
enumeration of twelve sorts of witnesses and of seven
sorts of private and three sorts of royal documents by
Brihaspati, and the enumeration of a host of incompetent
1 West & Buhler, 47-48 ; Fiihrer, Lehre von. den Schriften in Brihas-
pati’s IlharmaQastra. It may be mentioned in connection with this sub-
ject that Brihaspati refers to the Persians by the name of Para^ikas,
which term does not occur in early Sanskrit Literature.
63
Katyayana supplies explanations to difficult technical terms Lecture
used by Briliaspati. Thus the latter refers occasionally to IIL
debts contracted from love or anger. Katyayana explains
what sort of debts are referred to byfthese terms. In several
other cases however Briliaspati in his turn is more
explicit than Katyayana, and the composition of both
works, as pointed out before, must belong very nearly to
the same epoch. *
As for their relation to the Yajnavalkya and Narada Compari-
Smritis, it is quite clear that they must be posterior to ®]°g3gtw0
the former work. Thus in comparing Yajnavalkya’s rules authors
on the Law of Stridhana with those of Manu on the
one hand, and those of Katyayana on the other halid, Narada.
it will be found that Yajnavalkya’s treatment of this part
of the law occupies an intermediate position between the
extremely detailed rules of Katyayana and the scanty
provisions of Manu. Both Katyayana and Briliaspati refer
to several other kind of ordeals, besides the five sorts,
mentioned by Yajnavalkya. Brihaspati speaks of four
and Katyayana of five sorts of sureties instead of the three
sorts of Yajnavalkya. Both authors give a great many
detailed provisions regarding every part of a Judicial
Proceeding, of which the Yajnavalkya-smriti does not
exhibit the slightest trace, etc. The case is not equally
clear as regards the priority of the fragments of Brihaspati
and Katyayana to the Narada-smriti. The older version
of that work in particular contains so many technical
details on proceedings at law, which correspond precisely
to Briliaspati’s and Katyayana’s rules on the same subjects,
that it is necessary to refer its composition to nearly the
same modern epoch. Moreover, the Narada-smriti agrees
with these works in the use of the term Dinara. On the
other side of the question, it may be argued tfyat Brihaspati
and Katyayana define the value of a Dinara ( = 1 Suvarna,)
which shows that they are acquainted wi,th its use as a coin,
whereas Narada seems to refer to Dinaras used as orna-
ments only.1 There are some points, too, such as e. g. the
enumeration of twelve sorts of witnesses and of seven
sorts of private and three sorts of royal documents by
Brihaspati, and the enumeration of a host of incompetent
1 West & Buhler, 47-48 ; Fiihrer, Lehre von. den Schriften in Brihas-
pati’s IlharmaQastra. It may be mentioned in connection with this sub-
ject that Brihaspati refers to the Persians by the name of Para^ikas,
which term does not occur in early Sanskrit Literature.