DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.48955#0291
or EXPLAINED.
q85
of an object, is termed an idea. And therefore
the precise and accurate definition of an idea in
contradistin&ion to an original perception , is,
44 cies ; that things sensible are perceived and remembered
44 by means of sensible phantasms, and things intelligible by
44 intelligible phantasms ; and that these phantasms have the
44 form of the object without the matter , as the impressiou
44 of a seal upon wax has the sorm of the seal without its
44 matter.” The followers of Aristotle add, 44 That the
44 sensible and intelligible forms os things , are rent forth
44 from the things themielves , and make impressions upon the
44 passive intellech , which impressions are perceived by the
44 aftive intellect.” This notion dissers very little from that
of Epicurus , which is, ” That all things send forth con-
44 stantly and in every d ire fl ion , {lender gholls or films os
44 themselves, (tenuia Jimulacra, as expressed by his commen-
44 tator Lucretius); which siriking upon the mind, are
44 the means of perception, dreaming,” ire. Des Cartes,
bent to oppose Aristotle, rejefls the dossrine os sensible and
intelligible phantasms ; maintaining however the same doc-
trine in effefl , namely , That we perceive nothing external
but by means of some image either in the brain or in the
mind : and these images he terms ideas. According to these
philosophers, we perceive nothing immediately butphari-
tasms or ideas ; and from these we infer , by reasoniug ,
the existence of external objefls. Locke , adopting this doc-
trine , employs almost the whole of his book about ideas.
He holds, that we cannot perceive , remember , nor imagine,
any thing ,■ but by having an idea or image ositinthe mind.
He agrees with Des Cartes , that we can have’ no know-
ledge of things external, but what we acquire by reasoniug
upon their ideas or images in the mind ; taking it for-grant-
ed , that we are consclous of these ideas or images , and of
nothing else. Those who talk the moll intelligibly explain
the doflrine thus : When I see in a mirror a man {landing
q85
of an object, is termed an idea. And therefore
the precise and accurate definition of an idea in
contradistin&ion to an original perception , is,
44 cies ; that things sensible are perceived and remembered
44 by means of sensible phantasms, and things intelligible by
44 intelligible phantasms ; and that these phantasms have the
44 form of the object without the matter , as the impressiou
44 of a seal upon wax has the sorm of the seal without its
44 matter.” The followers of Aristotle add, 44 That the
44 sensible and intelligible forms os things , are rent forth
44 from the things themielves , and make impressions upon the
44 passive intellech , which impressions are perceived by the
44 aftive intellect.” This notion dissers very little from that
of Epicurus , which is, ” That all things send forth con-
44 stantly and in every d ire fl ion , {lender gholls or films os
44 themselves, (tenuia Jimulacra, as expressed by his commen-
44 tator Lucretius); which siriking upon the mind, are
44 the means of perception, dreaming,” ire. Des Cartes,
bent to oppose Aristotle, rejefls the dossrine os sensible and
intelligible phantasms ; maintaining however the same doc-
trine in effefl , namely , That we perceive nothing external
but by means of some image either in the brain or in the
mind : and these images he terms ideas. According to these
philosophers, we perceive nothing immediately butphari-
tasms or ideas ; and from these we infer , by reasoniug ,
the existence of external objefls. Locke , adopting this doc-
trine , employs almost the whole of his book about ideas.
He holds, that we cannot perceive , remember , nor imagine,
any thing ,■ but by having an idea or image ositinthe mind.
He agrees with Des Cartes , that we can have’ no know-
ledge of things external, but what we acquire by reasoniug
upon their ideas or images in the mind ; taking it for-grant-
ed , that we are consclous of these ideas or images , and of
nothing else. Those who talk the moll intelligibly explain
the doflrine thus : When I see in a mirror a man {landing