DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.70303#0090
12 THE HAMMERSMITH GHOSTS,
the very hall in which the Court was sitting, and kill an}*
one in the Court, then he would be guilty of murder. So,
in another case, if a person should shoot at one man and kill
another, he would be equally guilty. The law would con-
sider his disposition of mind, which was evidently to kill,
without having legal authority, just provocation, in self-
defence, or in the absence of his reasoning faculty. There
were grounds of mitigation which would serve to lessen the
crime. His Lordship professed, that he could not, in the
case now before rhe Court for its consideration, distinguish
any one of these features of alleviation or mitigation;
therefore, if the prisoner at tire bar, had taken away the
life of another, without authority, permission, or in de-
fence of his own life, then his offence went to murder.—-
If it was not so, no one person could be safe. It would be
in the power of any one to say, such and such a one has
committed some offence which I think deserves death, and
I will go and dispatch him. It would, indeed, be grievous
if such proceedings were to be tolerated—because some
wicked and malicious person, taking advantage of the cre-
dulity which belonged to a great portion of mankind, had
committed a misdemeanour, in going about in an impious
manner, assuming the appearance of a supernatural agent,
was another person to say, “ I will go and deliberately
shoot that man who frightens the peaceable neighbour-
hood.” Certainly not. All that he could be authorised to
do, would be to apprehend him for that misdemeanour.—-
Even if the very person appearing in this manner as a
ghost had been killed, such killing was murder. But here
a man thought he had a right to go and kill any person he
saw in a light coloured coat. This was actually the casa
with the prisoner at the bar. He went out with a loaded
gun, intending to kill, contrary to law, and killed a man
who was perfectly innocent. ‘£ Gentlemen,” continued
his Lordship, <£ I should be betraying my duty as a Judge,
and
the very hall in which the Court was sitting, and kill an}*
one in the Court, then he would be guilty of murder. So,
in another case, if a person should shoot at one man and kill
another, he would be equally guilty. The law would con-
sider his disposition of mind, which was evidently to kill,
without having legal authority, just provocation, in self-
defence, or in the absence of his reasoning faculty. There
were grounds of mitigation which would serve to lessen the
crime. His Lordship professed, that he could not, in the
case now before rhe Court for its consideration, distinguish
any one of these features of alleviation or mitigation;
therefore, if the prisoner at tire bar, had taken away the
life of another, without authority, permission, or in de-
fence of his own life, then his offence went to murder.—-
If it was not so, no one person could be safe. It would be
in the power of any one to say, such and such a one has
committed some offence which I think deserves death, and
I will go and dispatch him. It would, indeed, be grievous
if such proceedings were to be tolerated—because some
wicked and malicious person, taking advantage of the cre-
dulity which belonged to a great portion of mankind, had
committed a misdemeanour, in going about in an impious
manner, assuming the appearance of a supernatural agent,
was another person to say, “ I will go and deliberately
shoot that man who frightens the peaceable neighbour-
hood.” Certainly not. All that he could be authorised to
do, would be to apprehend him for that misdemeanour.—-
Even if the very person appearing in this manner as a
ghost had been killed, such killing was murder. But here
a man thought he had a right to go and kill any person he
saw in a light coloured coat. This was actually the casa
with the prisoner at the bar. He went out with a loaded
gun, intending to kill, contrary to law, and killed a man
who was perfectly innocent. ‘£ Gentlemen,” continued
his Lordship, <£ I should be betraying my duty as a Judge,
and