192
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE:
Khan
Bahadur
Haulm
Sar far az
Hosein Khan.
31 Jan., 1908.
Babu Ambica
Charan
Mazumdar.
3 Feb., 1908.
19137. Would they prefer if they could settle their
payments locally?—They would like it, but the big
zamindars would not like it.
19138. (Sir. Steyning Edgerley.) Has the Chairman
delegated to you all his powers ?—All excepting the
power of appointment and dismissal, and as to con-
tracts above Rs. 100 ; the chairman keeps the general
powers of supervision.
19139. Otherwise, you are practically Chairman,
subject to those limitations ?—Subject to those limita-
tions ; of course, it depends upon the individual
Chairman how much he interferes.
19140. Why should the Commissioner sanction re-
appropriations within the budget ?—So that he should
have full knowledge of matters and that the Municipal
Commissioners may not make mistakes.
19141. You do not think they are fit to be trusted
to re-appropriate within the budget ?—It is not a
question of trusting ; they would make mistakes. I
am speaking of Patna.
19142. Would they not make fewer mistakes as they
learnt ?—It is not a very serious question.
(The witness withdrew.)
Adjourned.
THIRTY-EIGHTH D A Y— (continued).
Calcutta, Monday, 3rd February, 1908.
Present :
C. E. H. Hobhouse, Esq., M.P., Under-Secretary of State for India, Chairman.
Sir Frederic Lely, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.
Sir Steyning Edgerley, K.C.V.O., C.I.E., I.C.S.
R. C. Dutt, Esq.. C.I.E.
W. S. Meyer, Esq., C.I.E.
W. L. Hichens, Esq.
Babu Ambica Charan Mazumdar was called and examined.
19143. (Chairman.) What is your profession?—I
am a pleader and a landholder. I reside at Faridpur.
I have been Chairman of the Faridpur municipality
for 16 years; I was a member of the Faridpur
District Board for about 17 years ; before that I was
Vice-Chairman of the District Road Cess Committee,
and I was a member of the Bengal Legislative Council.
No larger powers, relating to either financial or
administrative policy, should be given to provincial
Governments, particularly to that of Bengal, nor
should theacontrol exercised over them by the Supreme
Government be either removed or relaxed. The
Government of the country is bureaucratic in its
character, and so long as the people have little or no
voice in the administration, the decentralization of
Local Governments, however agreeable it may be for
the ease and convenience with which affairs may be
carried on in the provinces, can never be good for the
people. Decentralization ought to begin from the
bottom and not from the top, so as to afford a proper
training both for the people as well as the officials and
furnish a popular and substantial basis for independent
local administrations, and the District Boards and the
municipalities ought to form the ground-work in any
such scheme. Speaking of the Governments of Bengal
and Eastern Bengal and Assam, their financial policy
should be subject to the control of the Imperial
Government so long as these Governments are not
constituted on a popular representative basis. It is
hardly possible to effect a complete separation between
the imperial and rhe provincial finances. It may be
possible to make over certain sources of revenues with
their improvements entirely to Local Governments
and to mark out others as wholly imperial. But even in
these cases the policy of the Local Governments should
be laid down and controlled by the Imperial Government.
It is not desirable to invest Local Governments
with power to borrow in the market. Whatever
advantage it may secure to them is likely to be lost in
the heavier rate of interest.
There should be a pecuniary limit to the power of
the provincial Governments in creating new appoint-
ments which may not exceed Rs. 100. But all new
appointments above that and all enhancement of
salaries should be subject to the sanction of the
Imperial Government.
The general lines of policy laid down by the
Government of India should be applied to local
conditions by that Government only, and when so
applied the Local Government concerned may be
required to see that the policy is properly carried out.
The enlargement of the powers of Local Governments
in this direction has not been productive of happy
results in either Bengal or Eastern Bengal and Assam.
If the Governments in Bengal can be made to conform
in their constitution to the Government in Bombay a
general Act of Delegation, such as Act V. of 1868 in
regard to the Commissioner in Sindh, may with
advantage be availed of to relieve the Local Govern-
ment of much of the administrative details now
imposed upon it.
I do not understand how the Directors and
Inspectors-General recently created under the Govern-
ment of India are necessary adjuncts to the adminis-
tration. If they are to exist and become useful the
Local Governments ought to be relieved of the
departments for which they are created.
I am not aware of a single instance in which any
popular measure of reform has been initiated by the
Local Government of Bengal. On the contrary,
instances are not wanting where retrogade measures
have had their origin in that Government. All
important administrative reforms have generally
emanated from the Government of India.
I am not at all in favour of curtailing the right of
appeal either in respect of administrative action or
against orders affecting officers of Government
personally. It would not be desirable either to limit
the number of such appeals or to make them contingent
upon certificates granted by officers whose orders may
be appealed against. Any curtailment of this right of
appeal will take away one of the safeguards and
attractions of the Public Service.
The triple authority of the Board of Revenue, the
Commissioner and the Collector is unnecessary. In
Bombay and Madras there are only two. The office
of the Commissioners in Bengal is very much like a
post-office, and it may safely be dispensed with, his
functions being distributed between the Board and the
Collector. The financial and administrative powers of
Collectors might be advantageously enlarged by autho-
rising them to sanction temporary settlements up to a
rental of Rs. 1,000 instead of Rs. 500 as at present;
to sanction suspension and abatement of land revenue
of temporarily settled estates on account of such
irremediable circumstances as diluvion, etc.; to suspend
realisation of agricultural and other loans in seasons of
drought, scarcity or other extraordinary calamity, and
to remit or write off irrecoverable loans up to a certain
limit. The Commissioners are primarily Revenue
Officers and a good deal of complication has already
been introduced by vesting them with some sort of
supervision over judicial and other matters. They
should be relieved of these burdens.
Collectors should be empowered to transfer from
one head to another in their sanctioned budget
estimates, and to employ temporary hands on urgent
occasions as at the time of the kists. I am not in
favour of allowing the delegation of powers vested in
Local Governments to Commissioners of divisions or
other subordinate authorities.
The new Court of Wards Act has already armed
the Courts with extraordinary powers, and these
powers are distributed between the Collector, the
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE:
Khan
Bahadur
Haulm
Sar far az
Hosein Khan.
31 Jan., 1908.
Babu Ambica
Charan
Mazumdar.
3 Feb., 1908.
19137. Would they prefer if they could settle their
payments locally?—They would like it, but the big
zamindars would not like it.
19138. (Sir. Steyning Edgerley.) Has the Chairman
delegated to you all his powers ?—All excepting the
power of appointment and dismissal, and as to con-
tracts above Rs. 100 ; the chairman keeps the general
powers of supervision.
19139. Otherwise, you are practically Chairman,
subject to those limitations ?—Subject to those limita-
tions ; of course, it depends upon the individual
Chairman how much he interferes.
19140. Why should the Commissioner sanction re-
appropriations within the budget ?—So that he should
have full knowledge of matters and that the Municipal
Commissioners may not make mistakes.
19141. You do not think they are fit to be trusted
to re-appropriate within the budget ?—It is not a
question of trusting ; they would make mistakes. I
am speaking of Patna.
19142. Would they not make fewer mistakes as they
learnt ?—It is not a very serious question.
(The witness withdrew.)
Adjourned.
THIRTY-EIGHTH D A Y— (continued).
Calcutta, Monday, 3rd February, 1908.
Present :
C. E. H. Hobhouse, Esq., M.P., Under-Secretary of State for India, Chairman.
Sir Frederic Lely, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.
Sir Steyning Edgerley, K.C.V.O., C.I.E., I.C.S.
R. C. Dutt, Esq.. C.I.E.
W. S. Meyer, Esq., C.I.E.
W. L. Hichens, Esq.
Babu Ambica Charan Mazumdar was called and examined.
19143. (Chairman.) What is your profession?—I
am a pleader and a landholder. I reside at Faridpur.
I have been Chairman of the Faridpur municipality
for 16 years; I was a member of the Faridpur
District Board for about 17 years ; before that I was
Vice-Chairman of the District Road Cess Committee,
and I was a member of the Bengal Legislative Council.
No larger powers, relating to either financial or
administrative policy, should be given to provincial
Governments, particularly to that of Bengal, nor
should theacontrol exercised over them by the Supreme
Government be either removed or relaxed. The
Government of the country is bureaucratic in its
character, and so long as the people have little or no
voice in the administration, the decentralization of
Local Governments, however agreeable it may be for
the ease and convenience with which affairs may be
carried on in the provinces, can never be good for the
people. Decentralization ought to begin from the
bottom and not from the top, so as to afford a proper
training both for the people as well as the officials and
furnish a popular and substantial basis for independent
local administrations, and the District Boards and the
municipalities ought to form the ground-work in any
such scheme. Speaking of the Governments of Bengal
and Eastern Bengal and Assam, their financial policy
should be subject to the control of the Imperial
Government so long as these Governments are not
constituted on a popular representative basis. It is
hardly possible to effect a complete separation between
the imperial and rhe provincial finances. It may be
possible to make over certain sources of revenues with
their improvements entirely to Local Governments
and to mark out others as wholly imperial. But even in
these cases the policy of the Local Governments should
be laid down and controlled by the Imperial Government.
It is not desirable to invest Local Governments
with power to borrow in the market. Whatever
advantage it may secure to them is likely to be lost in
the heavier rate of interest.
There should be a pecuniary limit to the power of
the provincial Governments in creating new appoint-
ments which may not exceed Rs. 100. But all new
appointments above that and all enhancement of
salaries should be subject to the sanction of the
Imperial Government.
The general lines of policy laid down by the
Government of India should be applied to local
conditions by that Government only, and when so
applied the Local Government concerned may be
required to see that the policy is properly carried out.
The enlargement of the powers of Local Governments
in this direction has not been productive of happy
results in either Bengal or Eastern Bengal and Assam.
If the Governments in Bengal can be made to conform
in their constitution to the Government in Bombay a
general Act of Delegation, such as Act V. of 1868 in
regard to the Commissioner in Sindh, may with
advantage be availed of to relieve the Local Govern-
ment of much of the administrative details now
imposed upon it.
I do not understand how the Directors and
Inspectors-General recently created under the Govern-
ment of India are necessary adjuncts to the adminis-
tration. If they are to exist and become useful the
Local Governments ought to be relieved of the
departments for which they are created.
I am not aware of a single instance in which any
popular measure of reform has been initiated by the
Local Government of Bengal. On the contrary,
instances are not wanting where retrogade measures
have had their origin in that Government. All
important administrative reforms have generally
emanated from the Government of India.
I am not at all in favour of curtailing the right of
appeal either in respect of administrative action or
against orders affecting officers of Government
personally. It would not be desirable either to limit
the number of such appeals or to make them contingent
upon certificates granted by officers whose orders may
be appealed against. Any curtailment of this right of
appeal will take away one of the safeguards and
attractions of the Public Service.
The triple authority of the Board of Revenue, the
Commissioner and the Collector is unnecessary. In
Bombay and Madras there are only two. The office
of the Commissioners in Bengal is very much like a
post-office, and it may safely be dispensed with, his
functions being distributed between the Board and the
Collector. The financial and administrative powers of
Collectors might be advantageously enlarged by autho-
rising them to sanction temporary settlements up to a
rental of Rs. 1,000 instead of Rs. 500 as at present;
to sanction suspension and abatement of land revenue
of temporarily settled estates on account of such
irremediable circumstances as diluvion, etc.; to suspend
realisation of agricultural and other loans in seasons of
drought, scarcity or other extraordinary calamity, and
to remit or write off irrecoverable loans up to a certain
limit. The Commissioners are primarily Revenue
Officers and a good deal of complication has already
been introduced by vesting them with some sort of
supervision over judicial and other matters. They
should be relieved of these burdens.
Collectors should be empowered to transfer from
one head to another in their sanctioned budget
estimates, and to employ temporary hands on urgent
occasions as at the time of the kists. I am not in
favour of allowing the delegation of powers vested in
Local Governments to Commissioners of divisions or
other subordinate authorities.
The new Court of Wards Act has already armed
the Courts with extraordinary powers, and these
powers are distributed between the Collector, the