Philosophical Brahmanism. 33
merable personal creations by individual souls is not without
its counterpart in European systems1. In India the idea of a
separate spiritual Self combining with a primordial force for
the creation of all things was, as we have seen, of great
antiquity. And notwithstanding the physical and metaphysical
subtleties with which it was connected, the notion of the
universe proceeding from a male principle regarded as a
generator, and a female principle regarded as an eternal
energy or capacity (sakti), commended itself to the popular
mind as harmonizing with the operations and phenomena
everywhere apparent in nature. To this day it is symbolized
all over India by temples dedicated to the male and female
organ (called Linga and Yoni). It is clear that in such a
system there can be no need for the existence of a supreme
eternal Spirit as distinct from the personal spirit, even though
such a supreme Being be theoretically admitted (as in the
Yoga branch of the Sahkhya).
The so-called pantheistic theory of the Vedanta philosophy
is even more attractive to the majority of Hindu thinkers. It
is true that the Sahkhya and Vedanta together underlie
Brahmanism; but the Vedanta is the more orthodox. It is
a belief in the non-duality and non-plurality of Spirit—that
is to say, in one eternal Spirit called Atman2 (nom. Atma) or
Brahman (nom. Brahma, see p. 43) instead of in many,—a belief
in the identification of the human spirit and of all the pheno-
mena of nature with that one Spirit, when enveloped in
illusion. In other words, the separate existence of man's soul
and of all natural phenomena is only illusory.
This doctrine is said to rest on another well-known hymn
of the Veda (X. 90) called the Purusha-sukta. There the
one embodied Spirit is called Purusha (see p. 17), and is
said to be ' everything, whatever is, has been, and shall
be.' The same doctrine is briefly formulated in three
1 The Sankhya has much in common with the Idealism of Berkeley.
2 One etymology given for Atman is an, to breathe. Compare p. 20.
D
merable personal creations by individual souls is not without
its counterpart in European systems1. In India the idea of a
separate spiritual Self combining with a primordial force for
the creation of all things was, as we have seen, of great
antiquity. And notwithstanding the physical and metaphysical
subtleties with which it was connected, the notion of the
universe proceeding from a male principle regarded as a
generator, and a female principle regarded as an eternal
energy or capacity (sakti), commended itself to the popular
mind as harmonizing with the operations and phenomena
everywhere apparent in nature. To this day it is symbolized
all over India by temples dedicated to the male and female
organ (called Linga and Yoni). It is clear that in such a
system there can be no need for the existence of a supreme
eternal Spirit as distinct from the personal spirit, even though
such a supreme Being be theoretically admitted (as in the
Yoga branch of the Sahkhya).
The so-called pantheistic theory of the Vedanta philosophy
is even more attractive to the majority of Hindu thinkers. It
is true that the Sahkhya and Vedanta together underlie
Brahmanism; but the Vedanta is the more orthodox. It is
a belief in the non-duality and non-plurality of Spirit—that
is to say, in one eternal Spirit called Atman2 (nom. Atma) or
Brahman (nom. Brahma, see p. 43) instead of in many,—a belief
in the identification of the human spirit and of all the pheno-
mena of nature with that one Spirit, when enveloped in
illusion. In other words, the separate existence of man's soul
and of all natural phenomena is only illusory.
This doctrine is said to rest on another well-known hymn
of the Veda (X. 90) called the Purusha-sukta. There the
one embodied Spirit is called Purusha (see p. 17), and is
said to be ' everything, whatever is, has been, and shall
be.' The same doctrine is briefly formulated in three
1 The Sankhya has much in common with the Idealism of Berkeley.
2 One etymology given for Atman is an, to breathe. Compare p. 20.
D