DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.636#0143
i Vaishnavism. Madhva Sect. 131
was that his first axiom asserted categorically that there
are two separate eternal principles (instead of three, as
asserted by Ramanuja, p. 119), and that these two are related
as independent and dependent, as master and servant, as king
and subject. The one is the independent principle, God
(identified with Vishnu), the other is the dependent principle
consisting of the human soul, or rather souls, for they are
innumerable.
It was Madhva's unqualified denial of the unity of the
Supreme and human spirits which made him the opponent
of the followers of Sankara.
The Vedantists maintained, as we have seen, that the dif-
ference between one thing and another and between one soul
and another was wholly illusory and unreal. Madhva affirmed
that a real and inextinguishable duality was to be proved both
by perception and by inference \
' The Supreme Lord,' said Madhva, ' differs from the in-
dividual soul because he is the object of its obedience. A
subject who obeys a king differs from that king. In their
eager desire to be one with the Supreme Being, the followers
of Sankara lay claim to the glory of his excellence. This is a
mere mirage. A man with his tongue cut off might as well
attempt to enjoy a large plantain.'
Again, according to Madhva the Vedic text, ' This is Self—
That art thou,' points to similarity, not identity.
' Like a bird and the string; like the juices of various trees;
like rivers and the sea; like fresh and salt water; like a
robber and the robbed; like a man and his energy; so are
soul and the Lord diverse and for ever different.' (Translation.)
Nor have these two principles a qualified unity comparable
to the union of soul and body, as affirmed by Ramanuja.
They are absolutely distinct. With regard to the visible
world, he taught that its elements existed eternally in the
1 See pp. 88, 90 of Cowell and Gough's ' Sarva-darsana-saiigraha.'
K a
was that his first axiom asserted categorically that there
are two separate eternal principles (instead of three, as
asserted by Ramanuja, p. 119), and that these two are related
as independent and dependent, as master and servant, as king
and subject. The one is the independent principle, God
(identified with Vishnu), the other is the dependent principle
consisting of the human soul, or rather souls, for they are
innumerable.
It was Madhva's unqualified denial of the unity of the
Supreme and human spirits which made him the opponent
of the followers of Sankara.
The Vedantists maintained, as we have seen, that the dif-
ference between one thing and another and between one soul
and another was wholly illusory and unreal. Madhva affirmed
that a real and inextinguishable duality was to be proved both
by perception and by inference \
' The Supreme Lord,' said Madhva, ' differs from the in-
dividual soul because he is the object of its obedience. A
subject who obeys a king differs from that king. In their
eager desire to be one with the Supreme Being, the followers
of Sankara lay claim to the glory of his excellence. This is a
mere mirage. A man with his tongue cut off might as well
attempt to enjoy a large plantain.'
Again, according to Madhva the Vedic text, ' This is Self—
That art thou,' points to similarity, not identity.
' Like a bird and the string; like the juices of various trees;
like rivers and the sea; like fresh and salt water; like a
robber and the robbed; like a man and his energy; so are
soul and the Lord diverse and for ever different.' (Translation.)
Nor have these two principles a qualified unity comparable
to the union of soul and body, as affirmed by Ramanuja.
They are absolutely distinct. With regard to the visible
world, he taught that its elements existed eternally in the
1 See pp. 88, 90 of Cowell and Gough's ' Sarva-darsana-saiigraha.'
K a