DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.4812#0112
102 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
But as those philosophers, who have endeavoured to point out the na-
ture of the agent which directs these motions, appear to me to have fallen
sliort of their mark, I cannot help venturing one ftep sarther.
SECT. III.
One class of philosophers has supposed that our mind, intimately ac-
quainted with the texture of the body, reasons upon, and thereaster per-
forms the several actions * : Whilst philosophers os another class fuppose the
mind to be the agent, yet deny that me underftands the texture os the
body, and, therefore, make a conclusion, not very intelligible, that the
mind is neceffitated to act in certain ways -s\
As many actions are obedient to our will, we are, at firft sight, very
apt to suppose that our mind is the sple agent in those actions ; and, by an
easy transition, to inser that the mind is the sole agent in all our actions.
But, when we ressect, we sind that we are only conscious of having will-
ed Or wiihed that a certain action, the bending of the fore-arm, sor in-
slance, were persormed; but without being conscious os the ftructure os
the muscles employed, or even being sensible os any efsort made by our
mind sor the purpofe os determining nervous energy into them. Though,
therefore, the mind is confcious os willing to perform certain motions, yet
there is less certainty than seemed to be at sirft sight, that the nervous e-
nergy is, by our mind alone, thrown into the muscles which are sit for ex-
ecuting thofe motions.
But if we are doubtsul that the mind is the sole or chies agent in the vo-
luntary actions, we must be slill more so with respect to the spontaneous
actions, as, in moil os these, we are so sar srom willing that certain mo-
tions mould be persormed in a particular way, that we have no know-
ledge of their being at all persormed.
Unless,
* Stahl, and his sollowers.
s Dr Whytt on Vital and Involuntary Motions.
But as those philosophers, who have endeavoured to point out the na-
ture of the agent which directs these motions, appear to me to have fallen
sliort of their mark, I cannot help venturing one ftep sarther.
SECT. III.
One class of philosophers has supposed that our mind, intimately ac-
quainted with the texture of the body, reasons upon, and thereaster per-
forms the several actions * : Whilst philosophers os another class fuppose the
mind to be the agent, yet deny that me underftands the texture os the
body, and, therefore, make a conclusion, not very intelligible, that the
mind is neceffitated to act in certain ways -s\
As many actions are obedient to our will, we are, at firft sight, very
apt to suppose that our mind is the sple agent in those actions ; and, by an
easy transition, to inser that the mind is the sole agent in all our actions.
But, when we ressect, we sind that we are only conscious of having will-
ed Or wiihed that a certain action, the bending of the fore-arm, sor in-
slance, were persormed; but without being conscious os the ftructure os
the muscles employed, or even being sensible os any efsort made by our
mind sor the purpofe os determining nervous energy into them. Though,
therefore, the mind is confcious os willing to perform certain motions, yet
there is less certainty than seemed to be at sirft sight, that the nervous e-
nergy is, by our mind alone, thrown into the muscles which are sit for ex-
ecuting thofe motions.
But if we are doubtsul that the mind is the sole or chies agent in the vo-
luntary actions, we must be slill more so with respect to the spontaneous
actions, as, in moil os these, we are so sar srom willing that certain mo-
tions mould be persormed in a particular way, that we have no know-
ledge of their being at all persormed.
Unless,
* Stahl, and his sollowers.
s Dr Whytt on Vital and Involuntary Motions.