DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.22140#0138
122 INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL HISTORY.
the profits of the shareholders were very great, Child being virtu-
ally the autocrat of the directors. As the Company had been
depressed by the Puritans and reinstated by the Cavaliers, the
bias of the directorate was towards the Court party, which after-
wards developed into the Tory party, and Child entered deeply
into the corruption which began with the Pensionary Parliament,
and gathered strength after the Revolution of 1688. The directors
flew at high game, and were found out. They bribed Trevor the
Speaker, Seymour the leader of the Tory party, and the Duke of
Leeds, who had reached to fortune and rank by a few good acts
and much flagitious conduct. Trevor was expelled from the
House, Seymour and Leeds were discredited. They suffered the
penalty of being found out, and I am convinced considered them-
selves ill used. But the disclosure of their practices led to very
serious consequences to the Company, and to the affirmation of a
parliamentary rule of high constitutional significance. I shall
revert to it in a short time, for before it was affirmed another and
a far more distinguished joint-stock company was formed.
Long before the Revolution, the example of the Bank of
Amsterdam—its astonishing success, and the powerful influence
which it wielded—had suggested to English merchants the policy
of founding a public bank. Two projects of this kind had been
discussed and commended during the Protectorate, the leading
idea in both being; that the management of the bank should be.
entrusted to the Corporation of London, as that of Holland was to
the Corporation of Amsterdam. But the two municipalities were
very disferent bodies. The Corporation of London was not then
corrupt, I believe. But it could not resist the depravity of the
Restoration, and some of the most impudent and scandalous jobs
ever perpetrated by that institution — and they have been
numerous—were brought to light after the Revolution, as the
leases of the Conduit Meads, the maladministration of the
orphans' fund, and the embezzlement of the collections made in
aid of the Huguenot clergy. I allow that there were men of great
worth in the Corporation, and that 'for a long time the City
retained some flavour of that spirit which made them so energetic
in defence of the Long Parliament and its policy. Had they
possessed their ancient character, neither Charles nor his tool
the profits of the shareholders were very great, Child being virtu-
ally the autocrat of the directors. As the Company had been
depressed by the Puritans and reinstated by the Cavaliers, the
bias of the directorate was towards the Court party, which after-
wards developed into the Tory party, and Child entered deeply
into the corruption which began with the Pensionary Parliament,
and gathered strength after the Revolution of 1688. The directors
flew at high game, and were found out. They bribed Trevor the
Speaker, Seymour the leader of the Tory party, and the Duke of
Leeds, who had reached to fortune and rank by a few good acts
and much flagitious conduct. Trevor was expelled from the
House, Seymour and Leeds were discredited. They suffered the
penalty of being found out, and I am convinced considered them-
selves ill used. But the disclosure of their practices led to very
serious consequences to the Company, and to the affirmation of a
parliamentary rule of high constitutional significance. I shall
revert to it in a short time, for before it was affirmed another and
a far more distinguished joint-stock company was formed.
Long before the Revolution, the example of the Bank of
Amsterdam—its astonishing success, and the powerful influence
which it wielded—had suggested to English merchants the policy
of founding a public bank. Two projects of this kind had been
discussed and commended during the Protectorate, the leading
idea in both being; that the management of the bank should be.
entrusted to the Corporation of London, as that of Holland was to
the Corporation of Amsterdam. But the two municipalities were
very disferent bodies. The Corporation of London was not then
corrupt, I believe. But it could not resist the depravity of the
Restoration, and some of the most impudent and scandalous jobs
ever perpetrated by that institution — and they have been
numerous—were brought to light after the Revolution, as the
leases of the Conduit Meads, the maladministration of the
orphans' fund, and the embezzlement of the collections made in
aid of the Huguenot clergy. I allow that there were men of great
worth in the Corporation, and that 'for a long time the City
retained some flavour of that spirit which made them so energetic
in defence of the Long Parliament and its policy. Had they
possessed their ancient character, neither Charles nor his tool