DOI Seite / Zitierlink:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.22140#0157
THE JOINT-STOCK PRINCIPLE IN CAPITAL. 141
nership liability had prevailed in them. Undertakings like the
London Water Companies, and the railroads, would have been im-
practicable, if every shareholder was liable for the whole costs of
failure, while his gains were limited of course to his share in the
undertaking. The process adopted in these and analogous cases
was to define the undertaking and the responsibilities of the pro-
moters and subscribers by private Acts of Parliament, and in
consequence great industrial undertakings in the United Kingdom,
have been saddled with enormous initial costs, and under certain
rules of procedure with outrageous subsequent costs. Compen-
sation was awarded to landowners, when private property was
dealt with, on a prodigious scale, and some of the great railways
have never recovered from the pillage. When, however, as in the
case of some among the London Water Companies, the source of
supply was public property—in this case the Thames—the charges
put upon the projectors was trivial. In the case of the railways,
the result has been that the cost of carriage of passengers and goods
has been necessarily increased by this factitious capital, and the
concentration of all public business in the Westminster Parliament
has led to great and unnecessary outlay. In the case of Ireland,
matters were far worse. In that, an agricultural country, the
railways were constructed on a broad-gauge system, in perfect
ignorance, it would seem, of what the natural conditions of the
country -were. And then, the committees gave these trading
companies a grotesque maximum of profit, which the proprietors
have of course interpreted as a guaranteed dividend, and actually
claim compensation for, as a vested interest of the highest class.
These numerous partnerships with limited liability necessarily
went to Parliament. The English law, as law books are fond of
telling us, does not vest the absolutum or directum dominium of
land in any subject whatever, and perhaps it is as well that it does
not. But it does vest the perpetual usufruct, which differs only
metaphysically from the lordship which the law denies. This
usufruct, when honestly acquired, the law rightly confirms to the
owner, and as rightly insists that either Parliament itself or some
authority, the powers ot which are delegated by Parliament, and
can be revoked by the authority which gave them, should possess,
under a just compensation, the privilege of invading such rights
nership liability had prevailed in them. Undertakings like the
London Water Companies, and the railroads, would have been im-
practicable, if every shareholder was liable for the whole costs of
failure, while his gains were limited of course to his share in the
undertaking. The process adopted in these and analogous cases
was to define the undertaking and the responsibilities of the pro-
moters and subscribers by private Acts of Parliament, and in
consequence great industrial undertakings in the United Kingdom,
have been saddled with enormous initial costs, and under certain
rules of procedure with outrageous subsequent costs. Compen-
sation was awarded to landowners, when private property was
dealt with, on a prodigious scale, and some of the great railways
have never recovered from the pillage. When, however, as in the
case of some among the London Water Companies, the source of
supply was public property—in this case the Thames—the charges
put upon the projectors was trivial. In the case of the railways,
the result has been that the cost of carriage of passengers and goods
has been necessarily increased by this factitious capital, and the
concentration of all public business in the Westminster Parliament
has led to great and unnecessary outlay. In the case of Ireland,
matters were far worse. In that, an agricultural country, the
railways were constructed on a broad-gauge system, in perfect
ignorance, it would seem, of what the natural conditions of the
country -were. And then, the committees gave these trading
companies a grotesque maximum of profit, which the proprietors
have of course interpreted as a guaranteed dividend, and actually
claim compensation for, as a vested interest of the highest class.
These numerous partnerships with limited liability necessarily
went to Parliament. The English law, as law books are fond of
telling us, does not vest the absolutum or directum dominium of
land in any subject whatever, and perhaps it is as well that it does
not. But it does vest the perpetual usufruct, which differs only
metaphysically from the lordship which the law denies. This
usufruct, when honestly acquired, the law rightly confirms to the
owner, and as rightly insists that either Parliament itself or some
authority, the powers ot which are delegated by Parliament, and
can be revoked by the authority which gave them, should possess,
under a just compensation, the privilege of invading such rights