DOI Seite / Zitierlink:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.22140#0397
HOME TRADE AND DOMESTIC COMPETITION. 381
come into existence, make desperate efforts to survive, and will
endure a long period of depressive profits before those who are
interested in them are willing to witness a total loss of the capital
which they have invested in the undertaking. I should infer,
therefore, that the power of combination as a check to the reputed
evils of competition is precarious, temporary, and liable to a
ruinous reversal. Nor do I feel entirely convinced that the legis-
lature would, if the consequences became serious, permit the rule
which it still lays down, as to practices which are reputed to be
" in restraint of trade," to be covertly or openly evaded.
We have, it is true, got rid of the statute of Edward VI., first
by the Act of 1772, which referred what were conceived to be
obnoxious practices to the common law, and next by the Act of
1844, which negatived even the common-law doctrine. It is
possible that the courts of law in those days would require abun-
dant proofs before they ruled that a practice was in restraint of
trade. But no such conditions bind the British legislature, and it
is quite possible that unwisdom and the charge of rapacity might
induce the Parliament to interfere with this new development of
laissez faire. The object of laissez fairc is to favour individualism^
as people call it, not to favour combination, still less what might
be held with more or less show of reason to be a conspiracy against
the consumer, and that an unequal conspiracy, in which the profit,,
if any, accrues for a time to the combination, while the loss
falls first on the public, and only subsequently on the pro-
jectors and their creditors. And though it is highly probable
that the British legislature and the courts of law would con-
sider these economic checks quite sufficient to prevent serious
mischief to industry, it is, if we can judge from the practice of
legislature, and especially from a recent act of legislation, by no
means the intention of Parliament to allow laissez faire in com-
bination, or even in the individual, when it is believed that such a
course of action would lead to public or even to grave private incon-
venience. Thus the legislature has fixed a tariff of its own for
the hire of certain public conveyance, in others it trusts so far to
competition that it will allow the trader to fix his price, but con-
strains him under penalties to publish and abide by it, and by
a recent act of legislation has put all railways, especially as con-
come into existence, make desperate efforts to survive, and will
endure a long period of depressive profits before those who are
interested in them are willing to witness a total loss of the capital
which they have invested in the undertaking. I should infer,
therefore, that the power of combination as a check to the reputed
evils of competition is precarious, temporary, and liable to a
ruinous reversal. Nor do I feel entirely convinced that the legis-
lature would, if the consequences became serious, permit the rule
which it still lays down, as to practices which are reputed to be
" in restraint of trade," to be covertly or openly evaded.
We have, it is true, got rid of the statute of Edward VI., first
by the Act of 1772, which referred what were conceived to be
obnoxious practices to the common law, and next by the Act of
1844, which negatived even the common-law doctrine. It is
possible that the courts of law in those days would require abun-
dant proofs before they ruled that a practice was in restraint of
trade. But no such conditions bind the British legislature, and it
is quite possible that unwisdom and the charge of rapacity might
induce the Parliament to interfere with this new development of
laissez faire. The object of laissez fairc is to favour individualism^
as people call it, not to favour combination, still less what might
be held with more or less show of reason to be a conspiracy against
the consumer, and that an unequal conspiracy, in which the profit,,
if any, accrues for a time to the combination, while the loss
falls first on the public, and only subsequently on the pro-
jectors and their creditors. And though it is highly probable
that the British legislature and the courts of law would con-
sider these economic checks quite sufficient to prevent serious
mischief to industry, it is, if we can judge from the practice of
legislature, and especially from a recent act of legislation, by no
means the intention of Parliament to allow laissez faire in com-
bination, or even in the individual, when it is believed that such a
course of action would lead to public or even to grave private incon-
venience. Thus the legislature has fixed a tariff of its own for
the hire of certain public conveyance, in others it trusts so far to
competition that it will allow the trader to fix his price, but con-
strains him under penalties to publish and abide by it, and by
a recent act of legislation has put all railways, especially as con-