DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.39769#0107
THE SECOND LECTURE.
Si
a double share or a half of the property if he has got
both soa and property. The djjfeot of this construction
is, the author points out, to say that one who has not
got a son to share with, takes the who Id property. ‘But
is not this something meaningless?’ says the author
indignantly. For, it is an admitted rule that in cases
of partition* among any relatives, say brothers, if one
has acquired wealth and has no son, he takes a' double
share of his acquisition. Why then this redundant
proposition ragarding the son? In short, s,ays Jimuta-
vahana, if Kafcyayana meant by the expression ‘ fr.om
acquisition of son-property’ to say ‘ from the fact
of having acquired both son and property’ and n*ot
‘ from property acquired by the son,’ .then he would be
guilty of Anarthakya-dosha (fault of redundancy). For.
there is already the general rule that, one takes a double
share who has acquired property ancl »who hfe.s got
relatives to share it with.
• *
Again Jimutavahana in paragraph 79, chapter II
(Colebrooke’s work) says: “Besides, if the mention of
greater or less shares here intend the regulated deduc-
tions, the second verse of the'stanza ‘let him separate
his sons according to his pleasure’ becomes superfluous;
for that, which was to be declared, is fully specified in
three other verses of that text. But, according to our
interpretation, the phrase ‘let him separate his sons ac-
cording to his pleasure’ relates to his own acquired wealth;
while the allotment of the best share, and an equal dis-
tribution, both regard an estate inherited from.the grand-
father. There is consequently nothing superfluous.” 1
Then again in para. 8, section 1, chapter XI he em-
11
Si
a double share or a half of the property if he has got
both soa and property. The djjfeot of this construction
is, the author points out, to say that one who has not
got a son to share with, takes the who Id property. ‘But
is not this something meaningless?’ says the author
indignantly. For, it is an admitted rule that in cases
of partition* among any relatives, say brothers, if one
has acquired wealth and has no son, he takes a' double
share of his acquisition. Why then this redundant
proposition ragarding the son? In short, s,ays Jimuta-
vahana, if Kafcyayana meant by the expression ‘ fr.om
acquisition of son-property’ to say ‘ from the fact
of having acquired both son and property’ and n*ot
‘ from property acquired by the son,’ .then he would be
guilty of Anarthakya-dosha (fault of redundancy). For.
there is already the general rule that, one takes a double
share who has acquired property ancl »who hfe.s got
relatives to share it with.
• *
Again Jimutavahana in paragraph 79, chapter II
(Colebrooke’s work) says: “Besides, if the mention of
greater or less shares here intend the regulated deduc-
tions, the second verse of the'stanza ‘let him separate
his sons according to his pleasure’ becomes superfluous;
for that, which was to be declared, is fully specified in
three other verses of that text. But, according to our
interpretation, the phrase ‘let him separate his sons ac-
cording to his pleasure’ relates to his own acquired wealth;
while the allotment of the best share, and an equal dis-
tribution, both regard an estate inherited from.the grand-
father. There is consequently nothing superfluous.” 1
Then again in para. 8, section 1, chapter XI he em-
11