Sarkar, Kishori Lal: The Mimansa rules of interpretation as applied to Hindu law (Calcutta, 1909)

' THE SECOND LECTURE. 97
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bound to reconcile them somehow or other. I shall
have to discuss the question latter on.
The conflict between two Vedic Vidhis which
necessitate option, that is to say, which in a manner
stultifies both the Vidhis. must be clear and patent. The
conflict must be, in the first place, a direct conflict be-
tween two Vidhis which are of a co-ordinate character.
In the next place, the positive Vidhi must be ona ad-
dressed to the senses. An example of this is given in
the third Adhikarana, Ch. VIII, Bk. X, in the two
texts regarding the use of the shorashi vessel at the
dead of night, in one of which the use of it is enjoined
and in the other prohibited.1 Here, there being a direct
and clear conflict, the one or the other text can be
followed at option.
But this is not the case where the negative Vidhi
does not contain an absolute prohibition (<Pratishedhu?),
but merely a qualified prohibition (Paryudasa) as already
explained. An example of this is given in the first
Adhikarana, Ch. VIII, Bk. X. In this Adhikarana the
text referred to, is one in which the leading clause
contains the general injunction for the performance of a
certain act viz., uttering certain words in a certain trans-
action with a clause added to it prohibiting-that act in
a part of the same transaction,2 This prohibition is a
Paryudasa. In fact it is an exception as we understand
the term. Thus there is no conflict so as to lead to' an
option.
Jaimini X. viii. Adhi. 3. t
2 wfirrmra.if ffd ^Trlct_wptvt%
WFTf* l S a vara Bhashya X. viii Adhi 1.