DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.39769#0161
THE SECOND LECTURE,
135
the question, they were obliged to resort to rules of
construction, such as Linga, V&kya &c. in order to cons-
truct a definite rule on the subject.
No doubt, in the passage “after the [death of the]
father and mother, the brethren being assembled, must
divide equally the paternal estate : for they have no
power over it, while their parents live,” Manu asserts
the proprietory right of the father during his life-time ;
but this is but an indirect proposition. A literal cons-
truction of it does not conclude the question, specially
as there is the text of Yajnavalkya with some other
such similar texts to the effect that neither the father
nor the grandfather is master of the whole immoveable
estate. But such texts also are not explir.it and direct
on the point. Hence both Vijnaneswara and Jimutava-
bana had to resort to the various critical rules of ‘cons-
truction in order to settle the points. Although these
two authors arrive at different conclusions, the process
by which they worked out the question is of the same
character. This process, in short, involves what Jaimini
called Linga, Vakya and Prakarana.
3. The Vakya Principle.
Vakya cited as a rule of construction is not exactly
the same thing as a Vakya in its usual sense of a pro-
position or sentence. It is defined by Jaimini himself
as follows:
“ The unity of idea constitutes the unity of a
V&kya ; if it be divided, then one part becomes, as if
pressing for another.”1 ’
He explains that Vakyas (propositions) become
different, when one co-ordinate proposition begins and
another ends.
1 sfi* cfnej 1 Jaimini III. iii. 44.
Vijt.aneswara
and Jimuta-
vahana.
Vakya
defined
and illustrat-
ed.
135
the question, they were obliged to resort to rules of
construction, such as Linga, V&kya &c. in order to cons-
truct a definite rule on the subject.
No doubt, in the passage “after the [death of the]
father and mother, the brethren being assembled, must
divide equally the paternal estate : for they have no
power over it, while their parents live,” Manu asserts
the proprietory right of the father during his life-time ;
but this is but an indirect proposition. A literal cons-
truction of it does not conclude the question, specially
as there is the text of Yajnavalkya with some other
such similar texts to the effect that neither the father
nor the grandfather is master of the whole immoveable
estate. But such texts also are not explir.it and direct
on the point. Hence both Vijnaneswara and Jimutava-
bana had to resort to the various critical rules of ‘cons-
truction in order to settle the points. Although these
two authors arrive at different conclusions, the process
by which they worked out the question is of the same
character. This process, in short, involves what Jaimini
called Linga, Vakya and Prakarana.
3. The Vakya Principle.
Vakya cited as a rule of construction is not exactly
the same thing as a Vakya in its usual sense of a pro-
position or sentence. It is defined by Jaimini himself
as follows:
“ The unity of idea constitutes the unity of a
V&kya ; if it be divided, then one part becomes, as if
pressing for another.”1 ’
He explains that Vakyas (propositions) become
different, when one co-ordinate proposition begins and
another ends.
1 sfi* cfnej 1 Jaimini III. iii. 44.
Vijt.aneswara
and Jimuta-
vahana.
Vakya
defined
and illustrat-
ed.