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Sarkar, Kishori Lal
The Mimansa rules of interpretation as applied to Hindu law — Calcutta, 1909

DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.39769#0233
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THE THIRD LECTURE,

207

in modern legislation when a general Act is expressly
incorporated into a special one this corresponds to an
Atidesha by Sruti. That in working out such Atidesha,
certain adjustments are to be made is indicated by
Maxwell as follow's :
Where a general Act is incorporated into a special
one, the provisions of the latter would prevail over any
of the former with which they were inconsistent. It
may be added, also, that when an Act on one subject,
such as highways, incorporates some of the provisions
comprised in another relating to a different subject,
such as poor rates, it does not thereby incorporate the
modifications of those provisions which are subsequently
made in the latter.”1
)
Now, this subject of Atidesha immediately leads
to the two other principles of Uha and Badha. They
are respectively treated in the ninth and tentli books.' (
Uha Principle (the principle of adaptation.)
The expression UhaVich&ra (discussion on shastric
data) occurs very copiously in shastric books. Accord- Sc^ej>f the
ing to the Sankhya Philosophy,' the inclination to
discuss on the basis of authoritative principles, is treated
as one of the functions of the mind. And this perhaps
is not very objectionable; for, the habit of thinking
freely, or in other words, to indulge in free thinking, is
properly distinguishable from the habit of thinking on
fixed data. In the world of law, judicial reasoning as
distinguished from popular reasoning would correspond
to Uha Vich&ra. Jaimini uses the word “ Uhafor
the first time in sutra 52, chapter II, Book I. W,here

1 Maxwell, 3rd edition, p. 254.
 
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