Sarkar, Kishori Lal: The Mimansa rules of interpretation as applied to Hindu law (Calcutta, 1909)

THE FIFTH LECTURE.

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of a text. It may be for the determination of the
meaning of a text where it is doubtful. In some cases
it is for the purpose of settling whether a clause is to
be taken as a complete simple sentence or it should
be read together, with another clause. In some cases it
is necessary to distinguish between a reciting clause
and an operative clause and also to distinguish between
a subordinate clause and the principal clause. Again
there are maxims based on the recognition of the
difference between the direct, primary law (Sruti)
and the derived common law (Smriti). These and the
like are the various points of view from which the
maxims regarding the interpretation of texts proceed.
Class II. Group A.
The maxims of this group are all’ more or less
directed to prevent interference with literal construc-
tion so far as such construction is , possible. Out of
this group I shall make a few explanatory remarks only
as regards maxims, v. vi. and vii.
The Nishadasthapati maxim has reference to the
interpretation of the clause ‘Nishadasthapati.’ The
question is, does it mean ‘Nishada’ who was ‘Sthapati’
or ‘Sthapati’ of the ‘Nishada’ f The word Sthapati
meaning a priest and Nishada meaning a chandal.
The first construction is adopted as being the simpler
of the two. I shall have occasion liereafter to' show
how Nilakantlia relies on this maxim to support the
right of a Sudra to perform or rather to get performed
the Putreshti Yaga.
The principle of the Arthavada maxim has been
more than once "explained. Here I shall give some

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