DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.39769#0411
THE EIGHTH LECTURE.
385
life and those who were yet to come. Property in the
modern sense of the term could not be asserted, either mode’ra’Von-
of the father or of the other members of the family, ception of
. . ’ , . property.
jointly or severally, according to the state or things
which existed.
No doubt, there vtas a sort of right' of the whole
family to the property as contra-distinguished .from
the claims of any other family. One family could
not interfere with the property of another family.
In this sense, thefe was famfly property, partly
fulfilling the modern idea of property. But still there
was no definite rule as to the manner in which the
right of the family as a unit was to be exercised.
The Smritis show that, though usually the father
represented the family to the outside world, it was not
always so. Then, as regards the brothers, the Smritis
also indicate the same uncertainty. For, although,
generally the eldest brother was declared to have the
managing power almost as a matter of right, but that
was not universal. The fact appears to be that the
relations of the parties were adjusted according to the
circumstances of each case. So, as regards the members
of a family, as ’among themselves, the conception of
property in its modern sensd was not realized. Fortu-
nately questions of internecine claims, as among the
members of the family, scar’cely arose in those times.
At any rate, if such questions did arisq, they had to
be settled not by constituted courts as in recent times,
but by local assemblies; in other words, they were
settled not by persons having the character of judges
but popular bodies who acted practically as jurors. It »
is the judge who requires nice distinctions of general
49
385
life and those who were yet to come. Property in the
modern sense of the term could not be asserted, either mode’ra’Von-
of the father or of the other members of the family, ception of
. . ’ , . property.
jointly or severally, according to the state or things
which existed.
No doubt, there vtas a sort of right' of the whole
family to the property as contra-distinguished .from
the claims of any other family. One family could
not interfere with the property of another family.
In this sense, thefe was famfly property, partly
fulfilling the modern idea of property. But still there
was no definite rule as to the manner in which the
right of the family as a unit was to be exercised.
The Smritis show that, though usually the father
represented the family to the outside world, it was not
always so. Then, as regards the brothers, the Smritis
also indicate the same uncertainty. For, although,
generally the eldest brother was declared to have the
managing power almost as a matter of right, but that
was not universal. The fact appears to be that the
relations of the parties were adjusted according to the
circumstances of each case. So, as regards the members
of a family, as ’among themselves, the conception of
property in its modern sensd was not realized. Fortu-
nately questions of internecine claims, as among the
members of the family, scar’cely arose in those times.
At any rate, if such questions did arisq, they had to
be settled not by constituted courts as in recent times,
but by local assemblies; in other words, they were
settled not by persons having the character of judges
but popular bodies who acted practically as jurors. It »
is the judge who requires nice distinctions of general
49