DOI article:
Essay I: The provice, aim, and methos of the stuy of classical archaeology
DOI Page / Citation link:https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.11444#0035
THE STUDY OF CLASSICAL ARCHAEOLOGY.
observing; the pictorial and the poetic minds are less intuitive,
more reflective and associative.
Hence the plastic mind, in the active sense of the term, comes
to mean the mind which acts through the senses alone, by pure
and simple sensuous observation ; while the pictorial or the
poetic tendency is less intuitive, more reflective and associative.
The word ' plastic' in this active sense has been so long in use in
Germany to express this definite idea, that though less widely
used in England, it becomes a necessity to adopt it in dealing
with the present subject.
The ancient Greeks were thus ' simply' observing and plastic
in mind ; while we of modern times are, so to say, verbal rather
than plastic. The Greeks thought by means of the inner repre-
sentation of the things themselves, while we think by the repre-
sentations of words1; be it in recalling their sound or their written
symbols. We have lost the power of simple observation and our
interest in the things themselves, that is, things independent of
their relation to other things or to us. The Greek carried his
humanity into inanimate nature, endowed it with a self-centred
life of its own ; we draw nature into the sphere of humanity and
regard it in the light of use or conscious pleasure. But to look
at things thus with a view to use implies reflexion and thought
concerning these things, and this counteracts the simple ob-
servation of their form. Hence we are bad observers2. For
1 Besides many causes for this turn of our mind, one of the most manifest is the
multiplication of books, and the prevalence of reading as a means of communicating
thought. In reading the eye is made a mere handmaid for the other sense of
hearing. We do not look at the form for its own sake, but call upon the essential
function of the eye only just enough to stimulate by association the memory of the
sound of words. When once we realise what an amount of this sound and word reading
is done by the average man in our days, as compared with a Greek, we shall no longer
be astonished to find that we are losing the power of observing things; so that modern
philologists and psychologists are not wholly wrong when they consider language to
be the only currency of thought.
2 For several years I have made a point of inquiring into the power or rather
feebleness of observation of people I meet, and it was strange to notice the effect
when their attention was directed to this side of their nature. Unlike the M.
Jourdain who was not aware of a power which he really possessed, they are
astonished to find that they are hardly possessed of a faculty, with which they
were always in the habit of crediting themselves. With a view to testing the above,
I asked one who was present while I was writing these lines the colour of his
observing; the pictorial and the poetic minds are less intuitive,
more reflective and associative.
Hence the plastic mind, in the active sense of the term, comes
to mean the mind which acts through the senses alone, by pure
and simple sensuous observation ; while the pictorial or the
poetic tendency is less intuitive, more reflective and associative.
The word ' plastic' in this active sense has been so long in use in
Germany to express this definite idea, that though less widely
used in England, it becomes a necessity to adopt it in dealing
with the present subject.
The ancient Greeks were thus ' simply' observing and plastic
in mind ; while we of modern times are, so to say, verbal rather
than plastic. The Greeks thought by means of the inner repre-
sentation of the things themselves, while we think by the repre-
sentations of words1; be it in recalling their sound or their written
symbols. We have lost the power of simple observation and our
interest in the things themselves, that is, things independent of
their relation to other things or to us. The Greek carried his
humanity into inanimate nature, endowed it with a self-centred
life of its own ; we draw nature into the sphere of humanity and
regard it in the light of use or conscious pleasure. But to look
at things thus with a view to use implies reflexion and thought
concerning these things, and this counteracts the simple ob-
servation of their form. Hence we are bad observers2. For
1 Besides many causes for this turn of our mind, one of the most manifest is the
multiplication of books, and the prevalence of reading as a means of communicating
thought. In reading the eye is made a mere handmaid for the other sense of
hearing. We do not look at the form for its own sake, but call upon the essential
function of the eye only just enough to stimulate by association the memory of the
sound of words. When once we realise what an amount of this sound and word reading
is done by the average man in our days, as compared with a Greek, we shall no longer
be astonished to find that we are losing the power of observing things; so that modern
philologists and psychologists are not wholly wrong when they consider language to
be the only currency of thought.
2 For several years I have made a point of inquiring into the power or rather
feebleness of observation of people I meet, and it was strange to notice the effect
when their attention was directed to this side of their nature. Unlike the M.
Jourdain who was not aware of a power which he really possessed, they are
astonished to find that they are hardly possessed of a faculty, with which they
were always in the habit of crediting themselves. With a view to testing the above,
I asked one who was present while I was writing these lines the colour of his