DOI article:
Cross, Victoria: Theodora: a fragment
DOI Page / Citation link:https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.21805#0175
By Victoria Cross 171
according to the philosopher’s views, to become a co-worker with
me in carrying out Nature’s aim, as she was fitted to give me as
an individual the strongest personal pleasure.
I remember Schopenhauer does admit that this instinct in man
to choose some object which will best fulfil the duty of the race,
is apt to be led astray, and it is fortunate he did not forget to make
this admission, if his theory is to be generally applied, considering
how very particularly often we are led astray, and that our strongest,
fiercest passions and keenest pleasures are constantly not those
suitable to, nor in accordance with, the ends of Nature. The
sharpest, most violent Stimulus, we may say, the true essence of
pleasure, lies in some gratification which has no claim whatever, in
any sense, to be benehcial or useful, or to have any ulterior motive,
conscious or instinctive, or any lasting result, or any fulfilment of
any object, but which is simple gratification and dies naturally in
its own excess.
As we admit of works of pure genius that they cannot claim
utility, or motive, or purpose, but simply that they exist as joy-
giving and beautiful objects of delight, so must we have done with
utility, motive, purpose, and the aims of Nature, before we can
reach the most absolute degree of positive pleasure. To choose an
admissible instance, a naturally hungry man, given a slice of bread,
will he or will he not devour it with as great a pleasure as the
craving drunkard feels in swallowing a draught of raw brandy ?
In the first case a simple natural desire is gratified, and the aim
of Nature satisfied ; but the individual’s longing and subsequent
pleasure cannot be said to equal the furious craving of the
drunkard, and his delirious sense of gratification as the brandy
burns his throat.
My inclination towards Theodora could hardly be the simple,
natural instinct, guided by natural selection, for then surely I
should
according to the philosopher’s views, to become a co-worker with
me in carrying out Nature’s aim, as she was fitted to give me as
an individual the strongest personal pleasure.
I remember Schopenhauer does admit that this instinct in man
to choose some object which will best fulfil the duty of the race,
is apt to be led astray, and it is fortunate he did not forget to make
this admission, if his theory is to be generally applied, considering
how very particularly often we are led astray, and that our strongest,
fiercest passions and keenest pleasures are constantly not those
suitable to, nor in accordance with, the ends of Nature. The
sharpest, most violent Stimulus, we may say, the true essence of
pleasure, lies in some gratification which has no claim whatever, in
any sense, to be benehcial or useful, or to have any ulterior motive,
conscious or instinctive, or any lasting result, or any fulfilment of
any object, but which is simple gratification and dies naturally in
its own excess.
As we admit of works of pure genius that they cannot claim
utility, or motive, or purpose, but simply that they exist as joy-
giving and beautiful objects of delight, so must we have done with
utility, motive, purpose, and the aims of Nature, before we can
reach the most absolute degree of positive pleasure. To choose an
admissible instance, a naturally hungry man, given a slice of bread,
will he or will he not devour it with as great a pleasure as the
craving drunkard feels in swallowing a draught of raw brandy ?
In the first case a simple natural desire is gratified, and the aim
of Nature satisfied ; but the individual’s longing and subsequent
pleasure cannot be said to equal the furious craving of the
drunkard, and his delirious sense of gratification as the brandy
burns his throat.
My inclination towards Theodora could hardly be the simple,
natural instinct, guided by natural selection, for then surely I
should