DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.47347#0088
72
HISTORICAL ESSAY ON
It lias been further advanced, in contesting the validity
of the abolition of the auto acordado enacted in 1789, that,
at the time when this abolition was decreed by king Charles
IV. and the Cortes, Don Carlos was already born, and that
he consequently possessed the right to the succession to the
throne conferred on him by the auto acordado of 1713, and
of which no human power could deprive him.
It may be seen, at the first glance, that this argument,
the principal, nay the only one, adduced to justify the pre-
tensions of Don Carlos, is grounded on the hypothesis that
the auto acordado is a law really obligatory and valid de
facto and de jure. We have sufficiently demonstrated by
history and by the most conclusive legal arguments, that the
auto acordado is an act absolutely null, which can neither
annihilate rights nor establish them. This single remark
may suffice to prove that acquired rights, or, as people are
pleased to call them, incarnate rights, in the person of Don
Carlos, are wholly out of the question here. Consequently,
so long as it shall not be proved that the auto acordado of
1713 is an act clothed with the legal formalities (a task
which none of the advocates of Don Carlos have been able to
perform, choosing rather to confine themselves to the prefer-
ment of imaginary rights), the principal argument by which
they seek to justify the legitimacy of Don Carlos will be
nugatory, because it rests on an hypothesis which not only is
destitute of proofs, but even the fallacy of which we have
demonstrated.
Nay more; we could give up this argument deduced from
the nullity of the auto acordado ; we could admit that the
auto acordado was a valid law at the birth of Don Carlos;
but let it not thence be concluded that this prince possesses
a birthright which no authority can wrest from him.
We have already observed that the crown of Spain is not the
patrimony of the king or of the royal family, in this sense,
HISTORICAL ESSAY ON
It lias been further advanced, in contesting the validity
of the abolition of the auto acordado enacted in 1789, that,
at the time when this abolition was decreed by king Charles
IV. and the Cortes, Don Carlos was already born, and that
he consequently possessed the right to the succession to the
throne conferred on him by the auto acordado of 1713, and
of which no human power could deprive him.
It may be seen, at the first glance, that this argument,
the principal, nay the only one, adduced to justify the pre-
tensions of Don Carlos, is grounded on the hypothesis that
the auto acordado is a law really obligatory and valid de
facto and de jure. We have sufficiently demonstrated by
history and by the most conclusive legal arguments, that the
auto acordado is an act absolutely null, which can neither
annihilate rights nor establish them. This single remark
may suffice to prove that acquired rights, or, as people are
pleased to call them, incarnate rights, in the person of Don
Carlos, are wholly out of the question here. Consequently,
so long as it shall not be proved that the auto acordado of
1713 is an act clothed with the legal formalities (a task
which none of the advocates of Don Carlos have been able to
perform, choosing rather to confine themselves to the prefer-
ment of imaginary rights), the principal argument by which
they seek to justify the legitimacy of Don Carlos will be
nugatory, because it rests on an hypothesis which not only is
destitute of proofs, but even the fallacy of which we have
demonstrated.
Nay more; we could give up this argument deduced from
the nullity of the auto acordado ; we could admit that the
auto acordado was a valid law at the birth of Don Carlos;
but let it not thence be concluded that this prince possesses
a birthright which no authority can wrest from him.
We have already observed that the crown of Spain is not the
patrimony of the king or of the royal family, in this sense,