DOI article:
Czekalski, Stanisław: Jan Białostocki, Goya's "Third of May", and the aporias of research on the genetic relations of paintings
DOI Page / Citation link:https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.52534#0091
the same should be doně in reference to any other
painting. The initial schéma whose correction resul-
ted in Goya’s représentation of the Madrid massacre
Gombrich found in the etchings of Robert K. Porter
on a similar subject, yet Porter’s etchings do not show
much similarity to Goya’s composition, which makes
their récognition as a pattern rather dubious. For
Gombrich himself, that, however, was no problém -
indeed the fact that “The Third of May” is so diffe-
rent from them seems only to prove his point: the
pattern can be corrected to such an extent that it will
become unrecognizable. What remains a problém,
though, is that such a conclusion actually turns against
the fundamental daims of the author of Art and Illu-
sion concerning the proper duties of art history, since
the key task of art historians which Gombrich spéci-
fiés, i.e. the identification of genetic relationships be-
tween paintings, would turn out impossible. The more
the artist would be allowed to differ from the initial
schéma, which would result in diminishing similarity
between it and its corrected version, the wider would
become the range of free, unverifiable spéculations
on probable patterns. If a painting resulting from
a far-reaching correction of the used schéma does not
hâve to be particularly similar to it, the suggestions
as regards that schéma can be multiplied virtually ad
infinitum. Gombrich, who adopted Karl Popper’s prin-
ciple of the falsification of scientific propositions by
trial and error also in respect to the évolution of illu-
sion in art (a schéma of représentation corresponded
to an adopted hypothesis, while a correction corre-
sponded to its falsification on the basis of the visual
expérience), did not critically consider the légitima-
tion of his daims concerning the genetic relationships
between spécifie paintings, such as the influence of
Porter’s etchings on “The Third of May”.
The neglect of the overly optimistic author of Art
and Illusion was corrected after fifteen years by Göran
Hermerén. Hermerén’s 1975 book, Influence in Art
and Literatuře, challenged Gombrich’s optimism and
questioned the approach deriving works of art and
literatuře from their antécédents. The Swedish Scho-
lar penetratingly analyzed the idea of artistic influ-
ence, examined its logical premises and implications.
9 See HERMEREN, G.: Influence in Art and Literatuře. Prince-
ton 1975, pp. 308-309.
On the one hand, he was interested in the rules of
proving and questioning daims of influence, adopt-
ed in practice by art and literary historians, on the
other, he focused on the relationship between such
arguments and the logic of cause and effect which
the idea of influence implies. According to Hermerén,
no matter how legitimately dubious that idea may be
when it is interpreted in terms of simple détermina-
tion of the work Y by another work X, in fact ail the
genetic relationships, supplemented by other concepts
stressing the author’s créative contribution to the use
of a given model, such as, for instance, allusion, inter-
prétation, paraphrase, etc., can be reduced to influ-
ence precisely.9 Whenever the goal is to identify
a genetic relationship between two works, that rela-
tionship is of a causal character, that is, the maker of
the work Y used in it solution a as a resuit (under the
influence) of his contact with the work X. Understood
in such terms, the influence as a situation when X be-
comes a stimulus (a cause) to form Y in some a aspect
of its structure, is a foundation of ail historical rela-
tionships between paintings or texts, and every attempt
to reconstruct them must take it into account.10
The cause-and-effect logic of the influence of X
on Yæ makes X a necessary precondition of Yîz, which
means that without the presence of X in the process
of création the solution of Y« as it is would not be-
come possible. By the same token, Y a becomes a trace
of the influence of X, which is how one may under-
stand the usual treatment of similarities between
works as features pointing to their genetic relation-
ship. A daim about the influence of the work X upon
Y would not make sense, if it were not possible to
indicate spécifie traces of that influence, i.e. to recog-
nize in Y a its effect.11 If scholars notice that Y is sim-
ilar to X in respect to a, they are likely to treat that
similarity as an objective feature inherent in the struc-
ture ofY as index of the influence of X.12 Thus, Her-
merén shows how dubious and insufficient the crite-
rion of similarity is as a basis of the reconstruction of
the work’s genealogy. First, an actual influence does
not necessarily hâve to mean visible similarity. Ar-
tists, particularly the outstanding ones, may trans-
form their inspirations to such an extent, that no sim-
10 Ibidem, pp. 51,93,95, 105.
11 Ibidem, pp. 93-96.
89
painting. The initial schéma whose correction resul-
ted in Goya’s représentation of the Madrid massacre
Gombrich found in the etchings of Robert K. Porter
on a similar subject, yet Porter’s etchings do not show
much similarity to Goya’s composition, which makes
their récognition as a pattern rather dubious. For
Gombrich himself, that, however, was no problém -
indeed the fact that “The Third of May” is so diffe-
rent from them seems only to prove his point: the
pattern can be corrected to such an extent that it will
become unrecognizable. What remains a problém,
though, is that such a conclusion actually turns against
the fundamental daims of the author of Art and Illu-
sion concerning the proper duties of art history, since
the key task of art historians which Gombrich spéci-
fiés, i.e. the identification of genetic relationships be-
tween paintings, would turn out impossible. The more
the artist would be allowed to differ from the initial
schéma, which would result in diminishing similarity
between it and its corrected version, the wider would
become the range of free, unverifiable spéculations
on probable patterns. If a painting resulting from
a far-reaching correction of the used schéma does not
hâve to be particularly similar to it, the suggestions
as regards that schéma can be multiplied virtually ad
infinitum. Gombrich, who adopted Karl Popper’s prin-
ciple of the falsification of scientific propositions by
trial and error also in respect to the évolution of illu-
sion in art (a schéma of représentation corresponded
to an adopted hypothesis, while a correction corre-
sponded to its falsification on the basis of the visual
expérience), did not critically consider the légitima-
tion of his daims concerning the genetic relationships
between spécifie paintings, such as the influence of
Porter’s etchings on “The Third of May”.
The neglect of the overly optimistic author of Art
and Illusion was corrected after fifteen years by Göran
Hermerén. Hermerén’s 1975 book, Influence in Art
and Literatuře, challenged Gombrich’s optimism and
questioned the approach deriving works of art and
literatuře from their antécédents. The Swedish Scho-
lar penetratingly analyzed the idea of artistic influ-
ence, examined its logical premises and implications.
9 See HERMEREN, G.: Influence in Art and Literatuře. Prince-
ton 1975, pp. 308-309.
On the one hand, he was interested in the rules of
proving and questioning daims of influence, adopt-
ed in practice by art and literary historians, on the
other, he focused on the relationship between such
arguments and the logic of cause and effect which
the idea of influence implies. According to Hermerén,
no matter how legitimately dubious that idea may be
when it is interpreted in terms of simple détermina-
tion of the work Y by another work X, in fact ail the
genetic relationships, supplemented by other concepts
stressing the author’s créative contribution to the use
of a given model, such as, for instance, allusion, inter-
prétation, paraphrase, etc., can be reduced to influ-
ence precisely.9 Whenever the goal is to identify
a genetic relationship between two works, that rela-
tionship is of a causal character, that is, the maker of
the work Y used in it solution a as a resuit (under the
influence) of his contact with the work X. Understood
in such terms, the influence as a situation when X be-
comes a stimulus (a cause) to form Y in some a aspect
of its structure, is a foundation of ail historical rela-
tionships between paintings or texts, and every attempt
to reconstruct them must take it into account.10
The cause-and-effect logic of the influence of X
on Yæ makes X a necessary precondition of Yîz, which
means that without the presence of X in the process
of création the solution of Y« as it is would not be-
come possible. By the same token, Y a becomes a trace
of the influence of X, which is how one may under-
stand the usual treatment of similarities between
works as features pointing to their genetic relation-
ship. A daim about the influence of the work X upon
Y would not make sense, if it were not possible to
indicate spécifie traces of that influence, i.e. to recog-
nize in Y a its effect.11 If scholars notice that Y is sim-
ilar to X in respect to a, they are likely to treat that
similarity as an objective feature inherent in the struc-
ture ofY as index of the influence of X.12 Thus, Her-
merén shows how dubious and insufficient the crite-
rion of similarity is as a basis of the reconstruction of
the work’s genealogy. First, an actual influence does
not necessarily hâve to mean visible similarity. Ar-
tists, particularly the outstanding ones, may trans-
form their inspirations to such an extent, that no sim-
10 Ibidem, pp. 51,93,95, 105.
11 Ibidem, pp. 93-96.
89