DOI article:
Czekalski, Stanisław: Jan Białostocki, Goya's "Third of May", and the aporias of research on the genetic relations of paintings
DOI Page / Citation link:https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.52534#0092
pie visual analogies are traceable.13 Besicles, the in-
fluences of different works may overlap and mutual-
ly distort one another.14 Next to the influence which
Hermerén calls "positive" and which is expressed in
the adaptation of borrowed solutions, there is also
a "negative" one, consisting in the artist’s reaction
against someone else’s solution and its révision.15
Usually, the graspable similarities between some as-
pects of works are more or less intensely combined
with différences, which makes the former not obvious
or even dubious.16 Second, it is a debatable issue whe-
ther in a given case there is a similarity — depending
on one’s individual approach, one may either notice
it clearly or, on the contrary, prefer to see the blur-
ring différences.17 The similarity of two works is ex-
perienced in the recipient’s perception, which yields
a persuasive effect of resembling one work by ano-
ther, but the classification of that effect as an objec-
tive feature of the structures in question turns out
uncertain and unverifiable by simple observation,
unless it seems obvious to a given individual.18 For
any similarity to be doubtless, it must refer to an ex-
ceptionally large part of the structure of the works
compared and remain particularly exact, which in
practice happens quite rarely, since artists often free-
ly transform available models.19 Normally, when the
analogous features are blurred by différences, which
provokes doubts, there are two ways to substantiate
the claim of similarity: by persuading ail the uncon-
vinced to notice it, or by demonstrating by compari-
son that there is no other work as similar in respect
to a to the analyzed work Y as the work X.20 Third,
just the similarity of two works, even though as usual
it makes a starting point of the reconstruction of
a genetic relationship, it by no means implies an in-
fluence or, more so, its spécifie character. It only makes
possible a range of hypothèses explaining noticeable
analogies between X and Y. One must take into con-
sidération factors other than direct influence: an indi-
rect influence via some third work, reproduction, etc.
(there may be more than one such mediating element),
an independent influence of the work Z on X and Y
(in such a case, there is no genetic relationship between
X and Y, but only between X and Z and Y and Z), the
variant of a common origin plus éléments of indirect
influence of Z on Y on the one hand, and Z on X on
the other, and finally, sheer coincidence as a resuit of
which Y resembles X, although there are no relations
between them.21 At any rate, when a scholar points to
the similarity to the work Y to X in respect to a as
probable evidence of their genetic relationship, but does
not demonstrate an essential advantage of that analo-
gy over other similarities which may be noticed not
between Y and X, but between Y and U, W or Z as
alternative influences, then the very possibility of re-
ferring to alternatives is a sufficient ground to chal-
lenge the claim about the influence of X upon Y.22
Since to prove the influence of one work on an-
other it is not enough to claim the similarity of Y and
X, scholars hâve been proposing other arguments to
legitimate their daims of this kind. The logic of the
causal relationship makes it necessary to confïrm the
contact (either direct or indirect, for instance via some
reproduction) of the maker of Y with the work X,
which, of course, must hâve taken place before the
coming of Y into being.23 As in most cases the en-
counters of artists with works by others are not re-
corded, it is wrong to reduce everything that a given
artist might hâve seen to whatever has been acciden-
tally preserved as records of particular instances.
Under such circumstances, scholars must in one way
or another estimate the probability of a given encoun-
12 Ibidem, pp. 177-178.
13 Ibidem, pp. 232-233.
14 Ibidem, pp. 268-270.
18 Ibidem, pp. 197-200, 204-205.
19 Ibidem, pp. 207-209-
20 Ibidem, pp. 200, 207.
15 Ibidem, pp. 42, 308-309.
21 Ibidem, pp. 218-223.
16 Ibidem, pp. 183-
22 Ibidem, p. 218.
17 Ibidem, pp. 183-184. In this context, Hermerén makes
a reference to a controversy between Walter Friedlaender and
Kurt Badt as regards the influence of Raphael on Poussin.
23 Ibidem, pp. 164-167.
90
fluences of different works may overlap and mutual-
ly distort one another.14 Next to the influence which
Hermerén calls "positive" and which is expressed in
the adaptation of borrowed solutions, there is also
a "negative" one, consisting in the artist’s reaction
against someone else’s solution and its révision.15
Usually, the graspable similarities between some as-
pects of works are more or less intensely combined
with différences, which makes the former not obvious
or even dubious.16 Second, it is a debatable issue whe-
ther in a given case there is a similarity — depending
on one’s individual approach, one may either notice
it clearly or, on the contrary, prefer to see the blur-
ring différences.17 The similarity of two works is ex-
perienced in the recipient’s perception, which yields
a persuasive effect of resembling one work by ano-
ther, but the classification of that effect as an objec-
tive feature of the structures in question turns out
uncertain and unverifiable by simple observation,
unless it seems obvious to a given individual.18 For
any similarity to be doubtless, it must refer to an ex-
ceptionally large part of the structure of the works
compared and remain particularly exact, which in
practice happens quite rarely, since artists often free-
ly transform available models.19 Normally, when the
analogous features are blurred by différences, which
provokes doubts, there are two ways to substantiate
the claim of similarity: by persuading ail the uncon-
vinced to notice it, or by demonstrating by compari-
son that there is no other work as similar in respect
to a to the analyzed work Y as the work X.20 Third,
just the similarity of two works, even though as usual
it makes a starting point of the reconstruction of
a genetic relationship, it by no means implies an in-
fluence or, more so, its spécifie character. It only makes
possible a range of hypothèses explaining noticeable
analogies between X and Y. One must take into con-
sidération factors other than direct influence: an indi-
rect influence via some third work, reproduction, etc.
(there may be more than one such mediating element),
an independent influence of the work Z on X and Y
(in such a case, there is no genetic relationship between
X and Y, but only between X and Z and Y and Z), the
variant of a common origin plus éléments of indirect
influence of Z on Y on the one hand, and Z on X on
the other, and finally, sheer coincidence as a resuit of
which Y resembles X, although there are no relations
between them.21 At any rate, when a scholar points to
the similarity to the work Y to X in respect to a as
probable evidence of their genetic relationship, but does
not demonstrate an essential advantage of that analo-
gy over other similarities which may be noticed not
between Y and X, but between Y and U, W or Z as
alternative influences, then the very possibility of re-
ferring to alternatives is a sufficient ground to chal-
lenge the claim about the influence of X upon Y.22
Since to prove the influence of one work on an-
other it is not enough to claim the similarity of Y and
X, scholars hâve been proposing other arguments to
legitimate their daims of this kind. The logic of the
causal relationship makes it necessary to confïrm the
contact (either direct or indirect, for instance via some
reproduction) of the maker of Y with the work X,
which, of course, must hâve taken place before the
coming of Y into being.23 As in most cases the en-
counters of artists with works by others are not re-
corded, it is wrong to reduce everything that a given
artist might hâve seen to whatever has been acciden-
tally preserved as records of particular instances.
Under such circumstances, scholars must in one way
or another estimate the probability of a given encoun-
12 Ibidem, pp. 177-178.
13 Ibidem, pp. 232-233.
14 Ibidem, pp. 268-270.
18 Ibidem, pp. 197-200, 204-205.
19 Ibidem, pp. 207-209-
20 Ibidem, pp. 200, 207.
15 Ibidem, pp. 42, 308-309.
21 Ibidem, pp. 218-223.
16 Ibidem, pp. 183-
22 Ibidem, p. 218.
17 Ibidem, pp. 183-184. In this context, Hermerén makes
a reference to a controversy between Walter Friedlaender and
Kurt Badt as regards the influence of Raphael on Poussin.
23 Ibidem, pp. 164-167.
90