DOI Seite / Zitierlink:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.49271#0303
228
W. S. Ferguson
these and other reports it appears that the Zulu generals — either the king in person,
or, more frequently, an induna especially appointed when the army was on the eve of
departure, and who alone was entrusted with knowledge as to its destination159 — gave
much thought and care to the planning of their campaigns. How thoroughly they had
assimilated the doctrine applied in the present war by the German General Staff, that a
war must be waged, not against the armed forces of the enemy alone, but against his
entire moral and material resources, is illustrated by the description given by Isaacs of
the operations of a Zulu army at Port Natal: “The kraal had been burned for fuel; the
cat had been speared and skinned; the ducks were scattered lifeless about the place.
In fact, not a living creature could be found:— all was devastation, and destruction
marked the course of the insatiable warriors, for even the growing corn was levelled in
waste. One thousand of these savage wretches had been bivouacking here for two or
three days, and had left painful demonstrations of their plundering propensities.” 160 It
is not to Sparta that one has to go to find a parallel for such a warfare.
“Of the art of war”, says Aristotle in his Politics, “the art of hunting is a part”.
If we may judge of the matter by the venery still practised in the lands once dominated
by the Zulus, among these people the two were identical: the art of hunting was with
them simply an application to another kind of animal of the art of war. The chief mobi-
lizes his men as for a battle. On their arrival they rush in companies down his kraal, giving
a frenzied exhibition of their swiftness of foot and their skill in stabbing with the assegais.
Then they are drawn up in a circle and have the 'hunt-medicines’ administered; after
which, on the signal’s being given by the chief, they stab “the ground in front of them
with their assagais, making a very loud hurricane of noise and fury, for they added to
several paces till they were able to take a steady aim at their adversaries, and then retreating to their horses — which
are trained to stand perfectly still in the midst of this noise and firing — mounting and loading. On the other hand,
the Zoolus were not able to come sufficiently near to take steady aim with their spears — which on this occasion they
threw — before they were shot. Thus about 500 of them were killed, though some reckoned their loss at 1,000. At
length, the Boers, unable to make their enemy retreat, were obliged to effect a retreat for themselves; which they accom-
plished by directing a fire simultaneously to one point of the ring; and having thus made a lane with their guns through
the Zoolus, they rode over the dead bodies and escaped.” Of the last fight in the campaign of 1838 against Dingaan,
we have from Pretorius, the Boer commander, the following account (ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 235): “Two of Dingaan’s
spies had fallen into our hands, and they used the opportunity to mislead us. They told us that after the battle on
the Sunday [i. e. Blood River], the Zulus had never rallied. They were utterly disheartened, and could not be mus-
tered again; but that countless cattle were in the ravines below. We believed them, and were led into an ambuscade.
Looking down from the heights, we saw countless objects moving in the low ground, which we mistook for cattle.
These were Kafirs. They used the stratagem of creeping on hands and feet through open spaces between the
thickets, having their shields of ox-hide on their backs! This at a great distance, and from above, gave them the
appearance of cattle. We moved down the heights, and had come near the Kafirs before the error was discovered.
The alarm was given, and Landman and others ordered a retreat; but we found ourselves surrounded by thousands
of Kafirs, and had to fight our way through them. We effected this without losing a man. But when we had re-
gained the heights, a throng of Kafirs was still between us and our encampment, then object being to intercept us.”
169 Isaacs, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 180.
160 Isaacs, vol. 2, p. 242.
W. S. Ferguson
these and other reports it appears that the Zulu generals — either the king in person,
or, more frequently, an induna especially appointed when the army was on the eve of
departure, and who alone was entrusted with knowledge as to its destination159 — gave
much thought and care to the planning of their campaigns. How thoroughly they had
assimilated the doctrine applied in the present war by the German General Staff, that a
war must be waged, not against the armed forces of the enemy alone, but against his
entire moral and material resources, is illustrated by the description given by Isaacs of
the operations of a Zulu army at Port Natal: “The kraal had been burned for fuel; the
cat had been speared and skinned; the ducks were scattered lifeless about the place.
In fact, not a living creature could be found:— all was devastation, and destruction
marked the course of the insatiable warriors, for even the growing corn was levelled in
waste. One thousand of these savage wretches had been bivouacking here for two or
three days, and had left painful demonstrations of their plundering propensities.” 160 It
is not to Sparta that one has to go to find a parallel for such a warfare.
“Of the art of war”, says Aristotle in his Politics, “the art of hunting is a part”.
If we may judge of the matter by the venery still practised in the lands once dominated
by the Zulus, among these people the two were identical: the art of hunting was with
them simply an application to another kind of animal of the art of war. The chief mobi-
lizes his men as for a battle. On their arrival they rush in companies down his kraal, giving
a frenzied exhibition of their swiftness of foot and their skill in stabbing with the assegais.
Then they are drawn up in a circle and have the 'hunt-medicines’ administered; after
which, on the signal’s being given by the chief, they stab “the ground in front of them
with their assagais, making a very loud hurricane of noise and fury, for they added to
several paces till they were able to take a steady aim at their adversaries, and then retreating to their horses — which
are trained to stand perfectly still in the midst of this noise and firing — mounting and loading. On the other hand,
the Zoolus were not able to come sufficiently near to take steady aim with their spears — which on this occasion they
threw — before they were shot. Thus about 500 of them were killed, though some reckoned their loss at 1,000. At
length, the Boers, unable to make their enemy retreat, were obliged to effect a retreat for themselves; which they accom-
plished by directing a fire simultaneously to one point of the ring; and having thus made a lane with their guns through
the Zoolus, they rode over the dead bodies and escaped.” Of the last fight in the campaign of 1838 against Dingaan,
we have from Pretorius, the Boer commander, the following account (ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 235): “Two of Dingaan’s
spies had fallen into our hands, and they used the opportunity to mislead us. They told us that after the battle on
the Sunday [i. e. Blood River], the Zulus had never rallied. They were utterly disheartened, and could not be mus-
tered again; but that countless cattle were in the ravines below. We believed them, and were led into an ambuscade.
Looking down from the heights, we saw countless objects moving in the low ground, which we mistook for cattle.
These were Kafirs. They used the stratagem of creeping on hands and feet through open spaces between the
thickets, having their shields of ox-hide on their backs! This at a great distance, and from above, gave them the
appearance of cattle. We moved down the heights, and had come near the Kafirs before the error was discovered.
The alarm was given, and Landman and others ordered a retreat; but we found ourselves surrounded by thousands
of Kafirs, and had to fight our way through them. We effected this without losing a man. But when we had re-
gained the heights, a throng of Kafirs was still between us and our encampment, then object being to intercept us.”
169 Isaacs, ap. Bird, op. cit., p. 180.
160 Isaacs, vol. 2, p. 242.