DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.25987#0129
OF THE WAR WITH TIPPOO SULTAUN1
97
At half past seven this evening, General Floyd's signal guns*
were distinctly heard, by which it was known that he was en-
camped within two marches of Seringapatam.
On the morning of the i^th, the Commander in Chief, accom-
panied by two regiments of cavalry, went towards Cannambaddy,
in expectation of meeting General Floyd with the Bombay army;
it was not, however, until late in the afternoon, that Generals
Floyd and Stuart arrived, and took up their ground in the rear of
our encampment. During their march from Periapatam, the whole
of the enemy's cavalry, under the command of Cummer ud Dien,
with some irregular infantry, which had followed General Floyd,
on the morning of the 7th, attended them closely, but without
being able to make the slightest impression.
Colonel Gent, and the corps of engineers under his command,
had been so assiduous in the preparation of materials, that in six
days there was a sufficiency lor the proposed batteries; and he
reported himself in readiness to commence the siege.
On the morning of the 15th, the enemy had completed their
lines of entrenchment on the western bank of the river, opposite
to the west face of the fort. On the right of this entrenchment,
near the Cauvery, there was an unfinished redoubt, and before the
* 21*772?, and ?2M 772l?r of guns, formed the principle of our signals : for example,
three guns at half past seven, denoted a position two marches from Seringapatam:
two guns at eight, might have denoted any other communication ; and in this
manner may detachments, or armies, on some occasions, communicate intelligence,
which might by messengers be impracticable. To ascertain that the signal of the
Bombay army was understood, it was agreed to hre the same number of guns, in our
camp, ten minutes afterwards.
Q
97
At half past seven this evening, General Floyd's signal guns*
were distinctly heard, by which it was known that he was en-
camped within two marches of Seringapatam.
On the morning of the i^th, the Commander in Chief, accom-
panied by two regiments of cavalry, went towards Cannambaddy,
in expectation of meeting General Floyd with the Bombay army;
it was not, however, until late in the afternoon, that Generals
Floyd and Stuart arrived, and took up their ground in the rear of
our encampment. During their march from Periapatam, the whole
of the enemy's cavalry, under the command of Cummer ud Dien,
with some irregular infantry, which had followed General Floyd,
on the morning of the 7th, attended them closely, but without
being able to make the slightest impression.
Colonel Gent, and the corps of engineers under his command,
had been so assiduous in the preparation of materials, that in six
days there was a sufficiency lor the proposed batteries; and he
reported himself in readiness to commence the siege.
On the morning of the 15th, the enemy had completed their
lines of entrenchment on the western bank of the river, opposite
to the west face of the fort. On the right of this entrenchment,
near the Cauvery, there was an unfinished redoubt, and before the
* 21*772?, and ?2M 772l?r of guns, formed the principle of our signals : for example,
three guns at half past seven, denoted a position two marches from Seringapatam:
two guns at eight, might have denoted any other communication ; and in this
manner may detachments, or armies, on some occasions, communicate intelligence,
which might by messengers be impracticable. To ascertain that the signal of the
Bombay army was understood, it was agreed to hre the same number of guns, in our
camp, ten minutes afterwards.
Q