DOI Seite / Zitierlink:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.45392#0196
Buddha the Gospel of Buddhism
Since Buddhism is essentially a practical system, psycho-
logical and ethical, rather than philosophical or religious,
it may very justly demand to be judged by its fruits, and
it has no need to fear comparisons.
At the same time it will throw some light on Buddhist
thought if we inquire what in Buddhism corresponds to
‘ conscience.’ Conscience—to define the English word
—is an internal moral judgment upon the motives and
actions of the individual, and as such is an undeniable
fact of consciousness ; it automatically and instantly refers
all activities to a moral standard. This moral standard
in a theistic system like the old Semitic is formulated in
a series of commandments: in an atheistic system of self-
assertion such as is implicitly acknowledged in competitive
societies (modern Industrialism) there exist similar com-
mandments, but admittedly man-made and recorded in
legal codes; he who breaks no laws has there a good
conscience. In idealistic systems such as that of Jesus,
the moral standard is resumed in the principle, to love
one’s neighbour as oneself, a position which the monist
justifies by adding, for thy neighbour is thyself indeed.
Thus in its lowest form, conscience, which is already
recognizable in certain of the lower animals, consists in
little more than the fear of punishment, which, however,
for true Buddhists, reason may not be a sufficient sanction. As said
by C. A. F. Rhys Davids (Psalms of the Sisters, p. xxix), “are we sure
we have gauged the working of all human hearts and every touch to
which they will respond?” It is noteworthy that in the thirty-four
edicts of Asoka advocating moral behaviour, there is only one allusion to
the word of the Buddha as such; the only sanction, in the sense of motive
for morality, is the welfare of the individual and the common welfare.
The idea of promoting the welfare of all beings is deeply rooted in Indian
sentiment, and an activity devoted to that end would scarcely have
seemed to require a further motive, whether to Buddhist or Brahman.
138
Since Buddhism is essentially a practical system, psycho-
logical and ethical, rather than philosophical or religious,
it may very justly demand to be judged by its fruits, and
it has no need to fear comparisons.
At the same time it will throw some light on Buddhist
thought if we inquire what in Buddhism corresponds to
‘ conscience.’ Conscience—to define the English word
—is an internal moral judgment upon the motives and
actions of the individual, and as such is an undeniable
fact of consciousness ; it automatically and instantly refers
all activities to a moral standard. This moral standard
in a theistic system like the old Semitic is formulated in
a series of commandments: in an atheistic system of self-
assertion such as is implicitly acknowledged in competitive
societies (modern Industrialism) there exist similar com-
mandments, but admittedly man-made and recorded in
legal codes; he who breaks no laws has there a good
conscience. In idealistic systems such as that of Jesus,
the moral standard is resumed in the principle, to love
one’s neighbour as oneself, a position which the monist
justifies by adding, for thy neighbour is thyself indeed.
Thus in its lowest form, conscience, which is already
recognizable in certain of the lower animals, consists in
little more than the fear of punishment, which, however,
for true Buddhists, reason may not be a sufficient sanction. As said
by C. A. F. Rhys Davids (Psalms of the Sisters, p. xxix), “are we sure
we have gauged the working of all human hearts and every touch to
which they will respond?” It is noteworthy that in the thirty-four
edicts of Asoka advocating moral behaviour, there is only one allusion to
the word of the Buddha as such; the only sanction, in the sense of motive
for morality, is the welfare of the individual and the common welfare.
The idea of promoting the welfare of all beings is deeply rooted in Indian
sentiment, and an activity devoted to that end would scarcely have
seemed to require a further motive, whether to Buddhist or Brahman.
138