DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.48954#0054
38 EMOTIONS AND PASSIONS. Ch, IL
mily from want. Thus actions are qualified by
intention : but they are not qualified by the-
event ; for an aclion well intended gives pleasure,
whatever the event be. Further , human actions,
are perceived to be right or wrong ; and that per-
ception qualisies the pleasure or pain that results
from them
In tracing our emotions and passions to their origin,
my first thought was , that qualities and addons are the
primary causes of emotions ; and that these emotions are
asterward expanded upon the being to which these qua-r
litres and adions belong. But I am now convinced that
this opinion is erroneous. An attribute is not, even in
imagination , separable srom the being to which it be-
longs ; and for that reason , cannot os itsels be the cause
of any emotion. We have, it is true, no knowledge of
any being or substance but by means os its attributes ;
and therefore no being can be agreeable to us otherwise
than by their means. But still , when an emotion is rai-
led, it is the being itself, as we apprehend the matter,
that'raises the emotion ; and it raises it by means of
one or other os its attributes. If it be urged , That
We can in idea abstrad a quality from the thing to
which it belongs ; it might be answered , That such
abstradion may serve the purpoles of reasoning , but is
too faint to produce any sort os emotion. But it is suf-
ficicnt for the present purpose to answer , That the eye
never abstrads : by that organ we perceive things as
they really exist , and never perceive a quality as sepa-
rated from the subjed. Hence it must be evident , that
emotions are rassed, not by qualities abstradly consider-
cd, but bv the substance or body so and so qualified.
mily from want. Thus actions are qualified by
intention : but they are not qualified by the-
event ; for an aclion well intended gives pleasure,
whatever the event be. Further , human actions,
are perceived to be right or wrong ; and that per-
ception qualisies the pleasure or pain that results
from them
In tracing our emotions and passions to their origin,
my first thought was , that qualities and addons are the
primary causes of emotions ; and that these emotions are
asterward expanded upon the being to which these qua-r
litres and adions belong. But I am now convinced that
this opinion is erroneous. An attribute is not, even in
imagination , separable srom the being to which it be-
longs ; and for that reason , cannot os itsels be the cause
of any emotion. We have, it is true, no knowledge of
any being or substance but by means os its attributes ;
and therefore no being can be agreeable to us otherwise
than by their means. But still , when an emotion is rai-
led, it is the being itself, as we apprehend the matter,
that'raises the emotion ; and it raises it by means of
one or other os its attributes. If it be urged , That
We can in idea abstrad a quality from the thing to
which it belongs ; it might be answered , That such
abstradion may serve the purpoles of reasoning , but is
too faint to produce any sort os emotion. But it is suf-
ficicnt for the present purpose to answer , That the eye
never abstrads : by that organ we perceive things as
they really exist , and never perceive a quality as sepa-
rated from the subjed. Hence it must be evident , that
emotions are rassed, not by qualities abstradly consider-
cd, but bv the substance or body so and so qualified.