DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.48954#0067
Parti. EMOTIONS AND PASSIONS. di
sal experience , that a thing which in otir appre-
hension is beyond reach, never is the object of de-
lire ; no man , in his right senses desires to walk
on the clouds, or to descend to the centre of the
earth : we may amuse ourselves in a reverie , with
building castle's in the air , and Wishiiig for what
can never happen; but Inch things never move
desire. And indeed a desire to do what we are
sensible is beyond our power, would be altogether
absurd. In the next place, though the dissiculty
os attainment with resped to things within reach ,
osten inssames desire ; yet where the prospeft of at-
tainment is faint, and the event extremely uncer-
tain , the objeft, however agreeable, seldom rai-
seth any strong desire : thus beauty or any other
good quality in a Woman of rank , seldom raises
love in a man greatly her inserior. In the third
place, disserent objects, equally within reach, raise
emotions in disferent degrees ; and when desire ac-
companies any os tliese emotions, its strength , as
is natural , is proportioned to that os its cause.
Hence the remarkable disserence among desires di-
reded to beings inanimate . animate and rational:
the emotion caused by a rational being, is out of
measure stronger than any caused by an animal
without rcason ; and an emotion railed by such an
animal, is stronger than what is caused by any
thing inanimate. There is a separate rcafon why
desire of which a rational being is the objeftq
should be the strongest : oar desires swcll by par-
D 2
sal experience , that a thing which in otir appre-
hension is beyond reach, never is the object of de-
lire ; no man , in his right senses desires to walk
on the clouds, or to descend to the centre of the
earth : we may amuse ourselves in a reverie , with
building castle's in the air , and Wishiiig for what
can never happen; but Inch things never move
desire. And indeed a desire to do what we are
sensible is beyond our power, would be altogether
absurd. In the next place, though the dissiculty
os attainment with resped to things within reach ,
osten inssames desire ; yet where the prospeft of at-
tainment is faint, and the event extremely uncer-
tain , the objeft, however agreeable, seldom rai-
seth any strong desire : thus beauty or any other
good quality in a Woman of rank , seldom raises
love in a man greatly her inserior. In the third
place, disserent objects, equally within reach, raise
emotions in disferent degrees ; and when desire ac-
companies any os tliese emotions, its strength , as
is natural , is proportioned to that os its cause.
Hence the remarkable disserence among desires di-
reded to beings inanimate . animate and rational:
the emotion caused by a rational being, is out of
measure stronger than any caused by an animal
without rcason ; and an emotion railed by such an
animal, is stronger than what is caused by any
thing inanimate. There is a separate rcafon why
desire of which a rational being is the objeftq
should be the strongest : oar desires swcll by par-
D 2