336 CONG R U 1 T Y Ch. X.
some relation , such as a man and his adions, a
principal and its accessories, a subjed and its or-
naments. We are indeed so framed by nature, as
among things so conneded, to require a certain
suitableness or correspondence , termed congruity
or propriety; and to be displeased when, we sind
the opposite relation of incongruity or impropriety 3.
If things conneded be the subjed os congruity,
it is reasonable besorehand to exped a degree of
congruity proportioned to the degree of the con-
nexion. And upon examination we find our ex-
pedation to be well founded : where the relation
is intimate, as between a cause and its effed , a
3 In the chapter of beauty, qualities are distinguilhed
into primary and secondary; and to clear some obscurity
that may appear in the text, it is'proper to be observed,
that the same distinflion is applicable to relations. Re-
semblance , equality, uniformity, proximity, are relations
that depend not on us, but exist equally whether percei-
ved or not; and upon that account may justly be termed
primary relations. But there are other relations, that on-
ly appear such to us, and that have not any external ex-
igence like primary relations ; which is the case of con-
gruity, incongruity, propriety, impropriety: these may
be properly termed fecondary relations. Thus it appears
srom what is said in the text, that the secondary relations
mentioned , arise from obj'eds conneded by some primary
relation. Property is an example of a secondary relation,
as it exills no where but in the mind. I purchase a fiel^
or a horse: the covenant makes the primary relation';
and the secondary relation built on it, is property.
whole
some relation , such as a man and his adions, a
principal and its accessories, a subjed and its or-
naments. We are indeed so framed by nature, as
among things so conneded, to require a certain
suitableness or correspondence , termed congruity
or propriety; and to be displeased when, we sind
the opposite relation of incongruity or impropriety 3.
If things conneded be the subjed os congruity,
it is reasonable besorehand to exped a degree of
congruity proportioned to the degree of the con-
nexion. And upon examination we find our ex-
pedation to be well founded : where the relation
is intimate, as between a cause and its effed , a
3 In the chapter of beauty, qualities are distinguilhed
into primary and secondary; and to clear some obscurity
that may appear in the text, it is'proper to be observed,
that the same distinflion is applicable to relations. Re-
semblance , equality, uniformity, proximity, are relations
that depend not on us, but exist equally whether percei-
ved or not; and upon that account may justly be termed
primary relations. But there are other relations, that on-
ly appear such to us, and that have not any external ex-
igence like primary relations ; which is the case of con-
gruity, incongruity, propriety, impropriety: these may
be properly termed fecondary relations. Thus it appears
srom what is said in the text, that the secondary relations
mentioned , arise from obj'eds conneded by some primary
relation. Property is an example of a secondary relation,
as it exills no where but in the mind. I purchase a fiel^
or a horse: the covenant makes the primary relation';
and the secondary relation built on it, is property.
whole