DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.68026#0166
Sir Herbert
Risley.
1 Apr.. 1908.
160 MINUTES or
results of the discussion were embodied in the Home
Department Resolution Nos. 224-240, dated the 25th
January 1901, of which I hand in a copyf. By that
Resolution various measures were adopted, and various
suggestions were made to the Local Governments
and Administrations with the object of materially
reducing the number of transfers. These may be
summarised as follows :—
(1) The leave rules were modified to the extent
set forth in paragraph 4 of the Resolution.
(2) It was suggested that the provisions of
articles 197 and 211, Civil Service Regula-
tions, should be strictly enforced.
(3) It was laid down that transfers must not
be made to meet the private wishes of
officers.
(4) The practice of giving acting promotions by
seniority was condemned.
(5) Local Governments were instructed to en-
force more strictly the provision in article
98, Civil Service Regulations, that privilege
leave vacancies should be filled as a rule by
officers on the spot.
Heads (a) and (6) of the question are covered by
the orders of 1901 to which I have nothing to add.
As regards (c), according to the accepted method of
calculation by which the India Civil Service is re-
cruited, the reserve for deputation, leave and training
is the difference between the actual number of
superior and inferior posts and the strength of the
Service as deduced from the number of superior posts.
Thus supposing the number of superior and inferior
cadre posts in Bengal to be (87 + 35 ) 122 and the
Service strength to be 175, the reserve for the above
purposes is 175—122=53. ■ These 53 officers are
provided for in the lowest grade of the Service. It
is not possible to distribute them over different
grades. The only way in which the reserve can be
increased is by adding to the number of superior
posts. If for example a new grade of Joint Magis-
trates on Rs. 1,200 a month were created, and one
such officer were posted to every district, the number
of transfers arising from short leave vacancies might
be greatly reduced. To increase the number of
inferior appointments, without making a correspond-
ing addition to the superior, would produce a serious
block of promotion.
45408*. Are you in favour of any limitation of the
present rights of appeal to the Government of India
and the Secretary of State («) on administrative
matters ; (5) on questions personally affecting officers
of the Public Service ?—I do not understand what is
meant by head («.) of this question. As to (6), I agree
with the proposals made in the note of 7th November
1907 by the preliminary Committee on Decentraliza-
tion. The draft rules appended to that note would,
in my opinion, save much waste of power on the part
of highly placed officials, and would afford ample
security against injustice. They would, of course,
not debar the appellate authorities from intervening
in particular cases of hardship.
45409*. Are you in favour of the enhancement of
the powers of («) Presidency Municipalities, (5) dis-
trict municipalities, and (c) Sub-divisional Boards?—■
Looking to the important commercial and imperial
interests liable to be affected by the administration of
Presidency Municipalities, and the international obli-
gations connected with their sanitary arrangements,
I doubt whether there is much room for the enhance-
ment of the powers of these bodies. Whatever may
be the form of the municipal constitution, Govern-
ment will, in the last resort, be held responsible for the
administration of the great cities of India, and, there-
fore, must reserve to itself some right of intervention
and control only to be exercised in grave emergency.
In Calcutta and Madras, however, I think the provision
requiring the previous sanction of the Local Govern-
ment to any project costing one lakh or more might
be relaxed and the Municipality allowed to sanction
works up to a higher limit. On the other hand, I do
not agree with the suggestion that the control of
Government over the appointment of Health Officer
should be surrendered. Experience both in India and
in England seems to me to show that it is very neces-
sary to strengthen the position of the Health Officer
t Vide Appendix XI.
EVIDENCE :
and to give him adequate security against arbitrary
dismissal.
In the case of most district municipalities, where
the population does not approach the scale of a city,
the interests at stake are not so important, and I
think the committees might be given a freer hand
than they have at present. Minute supervision
destroys their sense of responsibility and detracts from
the value of self-government as a test of the capacity
of the educated classes to manage local business and
to care for the interests of the uneducated masses.
If the Commissioner of the division were given
ample power to intervene in cases of gross mismanage-
ment, I think it would be possible to dispense with
the minute and rather vexatious supervision of
municipal budgets which is exercised under sections
74 to 80 of Bengal Act III of 1884, and the powers
of the committees under section 61 might be extended.
This would be a very popular concession, and if it
were made I think the powers conferred on the
Local Government by section 9 need not be depen-
dent on the recommendation of the committees them-
selves.
As regards Sub-divisional Boards, which I under-
stand to mean the Local Boards of the Bengal Self-
Government Act of 1885, my view is that the
machinery of Local Government in the more ad-
vanced provinces ought to be remodelled so as to
consist of-
(1) Elective Committees for groups of villages.
(2) Elective Committees for Sub-divisions.
(3) A District Committee or Board of moderate
dimensions consisting of delegates elected by
the Local Boards with the District Magis-
trate as Chairman.
The District Committee should exercise only those
general functions which cannot be delegated to the
Local Boards, such as the distribution of funds
among the Local Boards, the settlement of disputes
between them, the allotment of the duties of the
District Engineer, &c. The Local Board should be
the chief working unit, and election to it should be
arranged so as to secure the representation of impor-
tant classes and interests.
45410*. Is it desirable to dissociate the Collector
from the Chairmanship of the District Board or any
other local body, and should such separation affect the
contribution now made from Government revenues to
District Board funds ? Were the Collector so dis-
sociated from the direct conduct of local affairs, what
view would you take of a proposal to associate special
representatives from municipalities and other local
bodies in a Standing Committee to discharge, under
the presidency of the Collector, functions of outside
control over such bodies which are at present reserved
to Government or its local agents?—In my opinion it
is not desirable, in the interests of the development of
local self-government, to dissociate the Collector from
the Chairmanship of the District Board. Under
modern conditions these Boards deal with very large
revenues, and their administration extends to a wide
range of public business affecting all parts of a con-
siderable area and embracing a great variety of sub-
jects. The head of their executive ought to te a good
man of business, with considerable administrative ex-
perience, intimately acquainted with all parts of the
district and familiar with the machinery of Govern-
ment and the methods of official correspondence. He
must in short be a professional administrator. Only
an exceptionally gifted amateur would be capable of
carrying on the work, and we cannot count upon find-
ing such men in sufficient numbers to render it possible,,
as a general rule, to entrust the business of a District
Board to an elected non-official Chairman which I pre-
sume is the change contemplated. To do so would
be to invite conspicuous failure which would be liable
to discredit the elective principle and would positively
retard progress. It is one thing to make the Board
largely or entirely an elective body, and to confer
upon them very extensive powers ; it is quite another
thing to deprive them of their most capable adviser
and to leave them without a competent executive.
There is another point to which I attach considerable
importance. If the Collector ceases to be Chairman
of the District Board, official control over that body
must be exercised, from outside, by him, or at bis
instance. This puts the Collector in what I consider
entirely wrong relations to the leading people of his
Risley.
1 Apr.. 1908.
160 MINUTES or
results of the discussion were embodied in the Home
Department Resolution Nos. 224-240, dated the 25th
January 1901, of which I hand in a copyf. By that
Resolution various measures were adopted, and various
suggestions were made to the Local Governments
and Administrations with the object of materially
reducing the number of transfers. These may be
summarised as follows :—
(1) The leave rules were modified to the extent
set forth in paragraph 4 of the Resolution.
(2) It was suggested that the provisions of
articles 197 and 211, Civil Service Regula-
tions, should be strictly enforced.
(3) It was laid down that transfers must not
be made to meet the private wishes of
officers.
(4) The practice of giving acting promotions by
seniority was condemned.
(5) Local Governments were instructed to en-
force more strictly the provision in article
98, Civil Service Regulations, that privilege
leave vacancies should be filled as a rule by
officers on the spot.
Heads (a) and (6) of the question are covered by
the orders of 1901 to which I have nothing to add.
As regards (c), according to the accepted method of
calculation by which the India Civil Service is re-
cruited, the reserve for deputation, leave and training
is the difference between the actual number of
superior and inferior posts and the strength of the
Service as deduced from the number of superior posts.
Thus supposing the number of superior and inferior
cadre posts in Bengal to be (87 + 35 ) 122 and the
Service strength to be 175, the reserve for the above
purposes is 175—122=53. ■ These 53 officers are
provided for in the lowest grade of the Service. It
is not possible to distribute them over different
grades. The only way in which the reserve can be
increased is by adding to the number of superior
posts. If for example a new grade of Joint Magis-
trates on Rs. 1,200 a month were created, and one
such officer were posted to every district, the number
of transfers arising from short leave vacancies might
be greatly reduced. To increase the number of
inferior appointments, without making a correspond-
ing addition to the superior, would produce a serious
block of promotion.
45408*. Are you in favour of any limitation of the
present rights of appeal to the Government of India
and the Secretary of State («) on administrative
matters ; (5) on questions personally affecting officers
of the Public Service ?—I do not understand what is
meant by head («.) of this question. As to (6), I agree
with the proposals made in the note of 7th November
1907 by the preliminary Committee on Decentraliza-
tion. The draft rules appended to that note would,
in my opinion, save much waste of power on the part
of highly placed officials, and would afford ample
security against injustice. They would, of course,
not debar the appellate authorities from intervening
in particular cases of hardship.
45409*. Are you in favour of the enhancement of
the powers of («) Presidency Municipalities, (5) dis-
trict municipalities, and (c) Sub-divisional Boards?—■
Looking to the important commercial and imperial
interests liable to be affected by the administration of
Presidency Municipalities, and the international obli-
gations connected with their sanitary arrangements,
I doubt whether there is much room for the enhance-
ment of the powers of these bodies. Whatever may
be the form of the municipal constitution, Govern-
ment will, in the last resort, be held responsible for the
administration of the great cities of India, and, there-
fore, must reserve to itself some right of intervention
and control only to be exercised in grave emergency.
In Calcutta and Madras, however, I think the provision
requiring the previous sanction of the Local Govern-
ment to any project costing one lakh or more might
be relaxed and the Municipality allowed to sanction
works up to a higher limit. On the other hand, I do
not agree with the suggestion that the control of
Government over the appointment of Health Officer
should be surrendered. Experience both in India and
in England seems to me to show that it is very neces-
sary to strengthen the position of the Health Officer
t Vide Appendix XI.
EVIDENCE :
and to give him adequate security against arbitrary
dismissal.
In the case of most district municipalities, where
the population does not approach the scale of a city,
the interests at stake are not so important, and I
think the committees might be given a freer hand
than they have at present. Minute supervision
destroys their sense of responsibility and detracts from
the value of self-government as a test of the capacity
of the educated classes to manage local business and
to care for the interests of the uneducated masses.
If the Commissioner of the division were given
ample power to intervene in cases of gross mismanage-
ment, I think it would be possible to dispense with
the minute and rather vexatious supervision of
municipal budgets which is exercised under sections
74 to 80 of Bengal Act III of 1884, and the powers
of the committees under section 61 might be extended.
This would be a very popular concession, and if it
were made I think the powers conferred on the
Local Government by section 9 need not be depen-
dent on the recommendation of the committees them-
selves.
As regards Sub-divisional Boards, which I under-
stand to mean the Local Boards of the Bengal Self-
Government Act of 1885, my view is that the
machinery of Local Government in the more ad-
vanced provinces ought to be remodelled so as to
consist of-
(1) Elective Committees for groups of villages.
(2) Elective Committees for Sub-divisions.
(3) A District Committee or Board of moderate
dimensions consisting of delegates elected by
the Local Boards with the District Magis-
trate as Chairman.
The District Committee should exercise only those
general functions which cannot be delegated to the
Local Boards, such as the distribution of funds
among the Local Boards, the settlement of disputes
between them, the allotment of the duties of the
District Engineer, &c. The Local Board should be
the chief working unit, and election to it should be
arranged so as to secure the representation of impor-
tant classes and interests.
45410*. Is it desirable to dissociate the Collector
from the Chairmanship of the District Board or any
other local body, and should such separation affect the
contribution now made from Government revenues to
District Board funds ? Were the Collector so dis-
sociated from the direct conduct of local affairs, what
view would you take of a proposal to associate special
representatives from municipalities and other local
bodies in a Standing Committee to discharge, under
the presidency of the Collector, functions of outside
control over such bodies which are at present reserved
to Government or its local agents?—In my opinion it
is not desirable, in the interests of the development of
local self-government, to dissociate the Collector from
the Chairmanship of the District Board. Under
modern conditions these Boards deal with very large
revenues, and their administration extends to a wide
range of public business affecting all parts of a con-
siderable area and embracing a great variety of sub-
jects. The head of their executive ought to te a good
man of business, with considerable administrative ex-
perience, intimately acquainted with all parts of the
district and familiar with the machinery of Govern-
ment and the methods of official correspondence. He
must in short be a professional administrator. Only
an exceptionally gifted amateur would be capable of
carrying on the work, and we cannot count upon find-
ing such men in sufficient numbers to render it possible,,
as a general rule, to entrust the business of a District
Board to an elected non-official Chairman which I pre-
sume is the change contemplated. To do so would
be to invite conspicuous failure which would be liable
to discredit the elective principle and would positively
retard progress. It is one thing to make the Board
largely or entirely an elective body, and to confer
upon them very extensive powers ; it is quite another
thing to deprive them of their most capable adviser
and to leave them without a competent executive.
There is another point to which I attach considerable
importance. If the Collector ceases to be Chairman
of the District Board, official control over that body
must be exercised, from outside, by him, or at bis
instance. This puts the Collector in what I consider
entirely wrong relations to the leading people of his