DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.39769#0419
THE EIGHTH LECTURE.
393
comments on the Sutras are found in-*his book. The
translations by Colebrooke are, however, not very
clear. Colebrooke is further mistaken in taking the
word Guru which stands for Guru Prabhakara as
meaning the venerable author.
Vijnaneshwa-ra argues from the above that according
to Jaimini, the conception of property is essentially a
matter of popular, recognition. He says the objector
and the final decisionist admit this proposition. The
only difference between them is this. The objector
says that a breach of the ShasGas as to acquisi-
tion of property, makes the property, acquired by
such breach unfit for an efficacious sacrifice, while
the decisionist denies this. Jimutavahana does not
controvert the general proposition that a mere moral
precept, such as Purusha dharma is, does not override
the Vyavahara law as settled more or less by popular
recognition. What’ he denies is, that* the conception
of property is void of ethical considerations and con-
sist of physical acts merely. According to him popular
recognition is no doubt a factor of the conception
of property, but t it must be such as to be ultimately
justifiable by the consciousness of Dharma (duty)
as enjoined by the , command ‘Swarga kamo yajeta.'
The chief factor of the conpeption of property, in his
view, is the ethical factor. He supports this view by
referring to the case in which right of property accrues
to the priest in the remnants of offerings, not because
the priest accepts them, but because the votary offered
them to the gods with pious devotion. He points out
that here the worldly part of the thing is the appro-
priation by the priest, but that is .not the cause of the
50
Conception
of property
according to
Yijnaneswa-
ra and Ji-
mutavahana.
393
comments on the Sutras are found in-*his book. The
translations by Colebrooke are, however, not very
clear. Colebrooke is further mistaken in taking the
word Guru which stands for Guru Prabhakara as
meaning the venerable author.
Vijnaneshwa-ra argues from the above that according
to Jaimini, the conception of property is essentially a
matter of popular, recognition. He says the objector
and the final decisionist admit this proposition. The
only difference between them is this. The objector
says that a breach of the ShasGas as to acquisi-
tion of property, makes the property, acquired by
such breach unfit for an efficacious sacrifice, while
the decisionist denies this. Jimutavahana does not
controvert the general proposition that a mere moral
precept, such as Purusha dharma is, does not override
the Vyavahara law as settled more or less by popular
recognition. What’ he denies is, that* the conception
of property is void of ethical considerations and con-
sist of physical acts merely. According to him popular
recognition is no doubt a factor of the conception
of property, but t it must be such as to be ultimately
justifiable by the consciousness of Dharma (duty)
as enjoined by the , command ‘Swarga kamo yajeta.'
The chief factor of the conpeption of property, in his
view, is the ethical factor. He supports this view by
referring to the case in which right of property accrues
to the priest in the remnants of offerings, not because
the priest accepts them, but because the votary offered
them to the gods with pious devotion. He points out
that here the worldly part of the thing is the appro-
priation by the priest, but that is .not the cause of the
50
Conception
of property
according to
Yijnaneswa-
ra and Ji-
mutavahana.