DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.39769#0480
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THE TENTH LECTURE.
rana,' the 3rd Adhikarana of the third chapter of the first
Book of Jaimini, a corrupt reason invalidates a
Vidhi, and not an indifferent far less a good reason.
I have also shcfwn to* you that by the Hetubad-
nigada Adhi karana, the reason stated is not to be
taken as a condition precedent of the Vidhi, it is
to be' treated no more than as a mere recital.
Thus the proposition prohibiting the adoption of
an orfly .son cannot be treated as a'nullity because a
reason ifs stated for it. The question* however, yet
remains, whether the particular character of the reason
stated in this case for the exception does not reduce
,to a nullity the exception itself. The reason stated
is ‘ that an only son is required to continue the line
of ancestors of the family in which he has been born)’,
this reason is not corrupt reason within the mean-
ing of the Drishtahetu Adhikarana. It has, however,
beeiVheld in the judgment of their Lprdships, that the
whole of the proposition prohibiting the giving or
taking in adoption of an only son is a mere religious
or moral prohibition, and has not the force of positive
law.
You have seen that according to* the Mimansa
writers as well as the 'digest writers, such as,
Jimutavahana and Vijnanestcara, there are certain
Tixed and defined principles by which a proposition,
which 'is apparently a Vidhi or exception, can be
ignored as being merely a moral or religious precept.
If this point had been left witHout any fixed
principles to guide, it would have been a source of
great uncertainty. Happily, not only Jaimini but both
Vijnaneswara and Jimutavahana have laid down dis-
I
N
l
THE TENTH LECTURE.
rana,' the 3rd Adhikarana of the third chapter of the first
Book of Jaimini, a corrupt reason invalidates a
Vidhi, and not an indifferent far less a good reason.
I have also shcfwn to* you that by the Hetubad-
nigada Adhi karana, the reason stated is not to be
taken as a condition precedent of the Vidhi, it is
to be' treated no more than as a mere recital.
Thus the proposition prohibiting the adoption of
an orfly .son cannot be treated as a'nullity because a
reason ifs stated for it. The question* however, yet
remains, whether the particular character of the reason
stated in this case for the exception does not reduce
,to a nullity the exception itself. The reason stated
is ‘ that an only son is required to continue the line
of ancestors of the family in which he has been born)’,
this reason is not corrupt reason within the mean-
ing of the Drishtahetu Adhikarana. It has, however,
beeiVheld in the judgment of their Lprdships, that the
whole of the proposition prohibiting the giving or
taking in adoption of an only son is a mere religious
or moral prohibition, and has not the force of positive
law.
You have seen that according to* the Mimansa
writers as well as the 'digest writers, such as,
Jimutavahana and Vijnanestcara, there are certain
Tixed and defined principles by which a proposition,
which 'is apparently a Vidhi or exception, can be
ignored as being merely a moral or religious precept.
If this point had been left witHout any fixed
principles to guide, it would have been a source of
great uncertainty. Happily, not only Jaimini but both
Vijnaneswara and Jimutavahana have laid down dis-
I
N