DOI Page / Citation link:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.67375#0089
CHARLES V. AND PHILIP H.
59
even went out to meet the French, and welcomed them as
friends; while the Spanish viceroy, Don Ugo de Mongada,
imputed no treachery to the barons who raised the French
standard in Naples itself. Capua and other cities yielded
to Lautrec, and he proceeded to blockade Naples on the
east. Thus far all was well with the army of Francis I.
But now the Prince of Orange, Captain-General of the
Imperial Roman Army, appeared on the scene. He forti-
fied the heights of S. Martino, which, with the monastery
and the castle of S. Elmo, commanded the city and shut off
all enemies from the west. Moncada and Orange disagreed
in a way that might have resulted in the advantage of the
French, had not the former fallen in a battle at Capo
d’ Orso.
The siege was prolonged; the heat of midsummer engen-
dered fevers; the soldiers died by thousands, and Lautrec
himself fell a victim to disease in the middle of August.
All thought of the conquest of Naples was abandoned, and
under the command of the Marquis of Saluzzo, the miser-
able remnant of the French troops reached A versa, where
they encountered the Prince of Orange. Most of the
French officers, as well as the Italians who had joined
them, were made prisoners of war. Many soldiers were
slain, others fled to the Abruzzi and escaped; but after a
few days no Frenchman could be found in the Neapolitan
peninsula.
Philibert of Orange was viceroy for a single year; but in
that time he so divided the properties of the Angevines
between the Aragonese whom he favored, that it required
the extinction of but one more family, the Sanseverini of
Salerno, to complete the final destruction of the Angevine
element, and make Naples the absolute possession of Spain.
Thus it resulted that when Don Pedro de Toledo — the
greatest viceroy of them all — assumed his place, in 1532,
no such questions as had troubled his predecessors, con-
59
even went out to meet the French, and welcomed them as
friends; while the Spanish viceroy, Don Ugo de Mongada,
imputed no treachery to the barons who raised the French
standard in Naples itself. Capua and other cities yielded
to Lautrec, and he proceeded to blockade Naples on the
east. Thus far all was well with the army of Francis I.
But now the Prince of Orange, Captain-General of the
Imperial Roman Army, appeared on the scene. He forti-
fied the heights of S. Martino, which, with the monastery
and the castle of S. Elmo, commanded the city and shut off
all enemies from the west. Moncada and Orange disagreed
in a way that might have resulted in the advantage of the
French, had not the former fallen in a battle at Capo
d’ Orso.
The siege was prolonged; the heat of midsummer engen-
dered fevers; the soldiers died by thousands, and Lautrec
himself fell a victim to disease in the middle of August.
All thought of the conquest of Naples was abandoned, and
under the command of the Marquis of Saluzzo, the miser-
able remnant of the French troops reached A versa, where
they encountered the Prince of Orange. Most of the
French officers, as well as the Italians who had joined
them, were made prisoners of war. Many soldiers were
slain, others fled to the Abruzzi and escaped; but after a
few days no Frenchman could be found in the Neapolitan
peninsula.
Philibert of Orange was viceroy for a single year; but in
that time he so divided the properties of the Angevines
between the Aragonese whom he favored, that it required
the extinction of but one more family, the Sanseverini of
Salerno, to complete the final destruction of the Angevine
element, and make Naples the absolute possession of Spain.
Thus it resulted that when Don Pedro de Toledo — the
greatest viceroy of them all — assumed his place, in 1532,
no such questions as had troubled his predecessors, con-