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Minutes of evidence taken before the Royal Commission upon Decentralization in Bengal, volume 4 — [London?]: [House of Commons?], 1908

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https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.68025#0021
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ROYAL COMMISSION UPON DECENTRALIZATION.

15

27 Dee., 1907,

The Hon.
Mr. E. A.
Gait.

when he expresses an opinion adverse to a scheme, the
Local Government should have an opportunity of
knowing what he has said before the Government of
India pass orders. When cases go up to the Govern-
ment of India, which are within the department of
these officers, their opinions are noted on the file ; they
have the last word and there is always a danger that
the Government of India may accept their opinions
and decide accordingly, without giving due weight to
the views of the Local Government.
14558. What, briefly, is the general principle under-
lying the revised rules as to appeal ?—The general
principle is that in the case of inferior servants, that
is to say, in the case of men whose pay is Rs. 10, or
less, a month, there should be only one appeal ; that
in the case of other people there should be two appeals,
subject to the condition that, with a man whose pay is
less than Rs. 50, there should be no appeal against the
order of the Commissioner, or Head of Department,
or Board of Revenue.
14559. Under that practice what is the maximum
number of appeals that can be made ?—There can be
two appeals in practice ; the appointing officer would
dismiss and there would be an appeal to the Com-
missioner and an appeal to the Board.
14560. Broadly, can the man who appoints dismiss ?
—Yes, that is the rule.
14561. Speaking from the point of view of the
public, the function of appointment' is just as im-
portant as the function of dismissing?—Except, of
course, that there is no appeal in the case of a refusal
to appoint.
14562. Should a man who is capable of appointing
be capable of dismissing ?—Yes, subject to appeal.
14563. Do you not think one appeal is enough ; why
do you want more than one?—We only allow one for
subordinates, but in the case of a man with better
pay I think it as well he should have an opportunity
of appealing twice. I think a man has a sort of feel-
ing that there is safety in a second appeal. I mean
that a ministerial officer, liable to dismissal, feels more
secure in his appointment when he has a right of
second appeal. Supposing he is in a sub-division and
is dismissed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, he would
feel more secure with two appeals.
14564. Is not the result of having more than one
appeal to keep inefficient members in the Service who
ought to be turned out of it ?—I do not think there
is very much risk of that. Of course one has known
cases of men being put back, who, one thinks, ought
not to have been put back.
14565. Does it not prevent the officer who would
dismiss taking action, because the procedure is so
tedious and cumbrous ?—I do not think so, and after
all it gives no more trouble to the officer who origi-
nally dismisses a man if that man appeals a second
time, because he has no fresh report to write.
14566. But there is the additional risk of his
decision being upset ?—Yes, but I do not think that is
a great thing.
14567. (Mr. Meyer.) With reference to your evidence
with regard to the interpretation of the Civil Service
Regulations, all financial powers are delegated powers ?
—I suppose they are.
14568. Under the Act of Parliament of 1858 the
control of expenditure is vested in the Secretary of
State ?—I am not sure.
14569. The Secretary of State delegates the powers
to the Government of India, and then, in turn, they
are delegated to the Provincial Governments. Are not
these Civil Service Regulations intended to set forth
the limitations of the powers thus delegated?—From
a theoretical point of view, it may be so.
14570. Would it not be dangerous to allow Local
Governments to be themselves the judges as to the
limits which should be imposed upon them ?—We are
not suggesting that we should be the judges ; we are
suggesting that the Government of India might give
us further powers.
14571. It is suggested in certain cases that you may
tell the Accountant General to stand aside ; for in-
stance, that you are to settle what a recurring honora-
rium means, and what it does not mean ?—Yes, that
is a question of fact which we know.

very well dealt with under the present system. It is
mainly a matter for experts, and I am not aware that
it has given rise to any marked difference of opinion.
14549. Have you any suggestion to make with
regard to the class of regulations that should be left to
the Local Government and the class which should be
called general ?—It would perhaps be easiest to answer
by quoting a particular case in connection with the
Local Self-Government Act. We proposed to amend
it in such a way as to ear-mark the Road Cess for
Public Works and sanitation. The Road Cess was
originally levied under an Act, a section of which laid
down that the cess was to be spent on communications
and sanitation, but afterwards that section was repealed,
and for some years the Road Cess was spent partly on
other items, such as education. Then the Indian press
agitated about it, charged us with a breach of faith in
devoting the Road Cess to objects for which it was not
intended, and so forth. There was a great deal of
dissatisfaction, and we, therefore, proposed to revive
the old section and ear-mark the Road Cess as before ;
but the Government of India, while agreeing with us
that the Road Cess should be spent on the objects for
which it was originally intended, said it was inexpedient
to tie ourselves down by legislation. I think that is a
case which the Local Government ought to have power
to deal with. The principle was accepted, and the only
objection was that it would be inconvenient to tie
ourselves down.
14550. With regard to Inspectors-General, would it
be advisable if the Local Government consulted them
before submitting any scheme to the Government of
India ?—I do not think it is desirable ; the Local
Government consults its own experts, and I think
any further consultation would cause unnecessary
delay.
14551. Is not one of the main purposes of these
Imperial Officers to advise ?—-Yes, they do advise.
14552. Then surely, in a big scheme it is not
advisable that they should be consulted ?—They
collect information and they advise the Head of the
Local Department ; for instance, the Director of
Agriculture gets a good deal of information and advice
from the Inspector-General of Agriculture, but I do
not think the Local Government should submit its
schemes to a man of that standing before sending
them up to the Government of India.
14553. Not necessarily the Local Government, but
the officers responsible for preparing such a scheme ?
In the case of a large sanitary scheme, for instance,
would it not be advisable that it should be submitted
to an authority which had already discussed such
matters ?—Yes, I think so.
14554. Could you not apply that system generally,
and say, if Inspectors-General are there for the purpose
of giving advice, before a scheme was submitted, that
the Local Government should see at any rate what
these officers’ views were ?—I think the tendency
would be to bring the local officers more under the
control of the Inspector-General, and to weaken the
control of the Local Government ; this is what 1
apprehend would be the result if the local officers had
to obtain the approval of the Government of India
expert.
14555. I do not suggest that they should obtain his
approval, but his opinion. Is there likely to be less
friction if that is done first than if the scheme is
submitted after the local officer has given his approval,
and then a difference of opinion occurs ? Is not the
local officer more likely to be convinced before
definitely committing himself to a scheme on paper
than he would be afterwards ?—I think that with such
a system there would be a tendency for the man with
the Government of India to have more power than he
should have, and that due weight would not be given
to the diversity of local conditions.
14556. Is that your ob jection to it ?—That is my
objection. The local officer would know that what
the Inspector-General approved would be more likely
to receive sanction, and he might thus be persuaded to
recommend things which were not suitable to local
conditions.
14557. Do you object to the Inspector-General
acting as the adviser to the Government of India?—I
do not object to his acting as an adviser ; but I think
 
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