DOI Artikel:
Jetter, Nuria: Unknown premises of iconology?: A critical review of Panofsky’s proposal for a solution to the problem of historicity
DOI Seite / Zitierlink: https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.59426#0086
Folia Historiae Artium
Seria Nowa, t. 19: 2021/PL ISSN 0071-6723
NURIA JETTER
Universität Witten, Herdecke
UNKNOWN PREMISES OF ICONOLOGY?
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF PANOFSKY’S PROPOSAL
FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF HISTORICITY1
When Panofsky introduced a three-step scheme of inter-
pretation in his 1932 German essay On the Problem of De-
scribing and Interpreting Works of the Visual Arts, he posed
it against the danger of arbitrariness.2 This is why correc-
tive principles of interpretation are named in this scheme.
As he put it in a later summary, “our identifications and
interpretations will depend on our subjective equipment,
and for this very reason will have to be supplemented and
corrected by an insight into historical processes the sum
total of which may be called tradition.”3 This text, and the
ones he later derived from it in exile in America, are seen
as the introduction of a method.4 However, they can also
be read as an answer to a philosophical question. In ex-
plaining that the method he suggests is necessary because
1 This essay is a slightly altered version of what I presented at the
Iconologies. Global unity or/and local diversities in art history con-
ference in Kraków, 23-25 May 2019. Its claims are a condensed
version of thoughts I developed in connection with my PhD proj-
ect, in which I examined the concepts of perception and interpre-
tation in Hans Sedlmayrs methodological writings and checked
their relation to Panofsky and historicism. The model of the her-
meneutic circle in Panofsky I have presented has benefitted great-
ly from my discussions with Friedrich Haufe.
2 E. Panofsky, ‘On the Problem of Describing and Interpreting
Works of the Visual Arts’, trans. J. Elsner, K. Lorenz, Critical In-
quiry, 38, 2012, no. 3, pp. 467-482, here p. 480. In German: “Will-
kür” (idem, ‘Zum Problem der Beschreibung und Inhaltsdeutung
von Werken der bildenden Kunst’, Logos, 21, 1932, pp. 103-119,
here p. 117).
3 Idem, ‘Iconography and Iconology: An Introduction to the Study
of Renaissance Art’, in idem Meaning in the Visual Arts. Papers in
and on Art History, New York, 1955, pp. 26-54, here p. 39.
4 A recent book-length account is A. Efal, Figural Philology. Pan-
ofsky and the Science of Things, London, 2016 (= Bloomsbury
Studies in Continental Philosophy).
the inner vantage point of a contemporary interpreter
needs to be adjusted to that of former centuries, he im-
plicitly proposes a solution to the problem of historicity.
That is, he answers the question of whether it is possi-
ble to approximately overcome the historical difference of
mentalities and recover the original meaning of a work of
art.5 In the following, I will examine this proposal and ask
which underlying conditions it is logically dependent on.
I will argue that, in order to share Panofsky s conviction
that this goal can be reached, two presuppositions must
also be shared: Panofsky s attempt is, more or less implic-
itly, based on the assumption of a non-historical nature
both of man and of vision. Therefore I do not aim to criti-
cize his instruction to take historical documents into ac-
count: it is not a method (in the sense of a pathway) which
is at stake here. Rather, I point to the fact that we need
either to share these presuppositions or to conclude that
Panofsky s method does not actually lead to the goal his
texts had suggested they would. The latter means that we
would have to give another account of what an interpreta-
tion using Panofsky s methodical tools can aim towards.
THE GOAL OF INTERPRETATION
According to Panofsky, a proper interpretation realizes
the meaning the work of art had - be it conscious or un-
conscious - in the moment of its creation. The task is “to
re-create the creations”6 as closely as possible. In order to
5 This particular goal of Panofsky s method is described by A. Efal,
Figural Philology (as in note 4). However, she does not question
the possibility of reaching it.
6 E. Panofsky, ‘The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline’, in
The Meaning of the Humanities, ed. T. M. Greene, Princeton, 1938,
pp. 91-118, here p. 106.
Publikacja jest udostępniona na licencji Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 PL).
Seria Nowa, t. 19: 2021/PL ISSN 0071-6723
NURIA JETTER
Universität Witten, Herdecke
UNKNOWN PREMISES OF ICONOLOGY?
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF PANOFSKY’S PROPOSAL
FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF HISTORICITY1
When Panofsky introduced a three-step scheme of inter-
pretation in his 1932 German essay On the Problem of De-
scribing and Interpreting Works of the Visual Arts, he posed
it against the danger of arbitrariness.2 This is why correc-
tive principles of interpretation are named in this scheme.
As he put it in a later summary, “our identifications and
interpretations will depend on our subjective equipment,
and for this very reason will have to be supplemented and
corrected by an insight into historical processes the sum
total of which may be called tradition.”3 This text, and the
ones he later derived from it in exile in America, are seen
as the introduction of a method.4 However, they can also
be read as an answer to a philosophical question. In ex-
plaining that the method he suggests is necessary because
1 This essay is a slightly altered version of what I presented at the
Iconologies. Global unity or/and local diversities in art history con-
ference in Kraków, 23-25 May 2019. Its claims are a condensed
version of thoughts I developed in connection with my PhD proj-
ect, in which I examined the concepts of perception and interpre-
tation in Hans Sedlmayrs methodological writings and checked
their relation to Panofsky and historicism. The model of the her-
meneutic circle in Panofsky I have presented has benefitted great-
ly from my discussions with Friedrich Haufe.
2 E. Panofsky, ‘On the Problem of Describing and Interpreting
Works of the Visual Arts’, trans. J. Elsner, K. Lorenz, Critical In-
quiry, 38, 2012, no. 3, pp. 467-482, here p. 480. In German: “Will-
kür” (idem, ‘Zum Problem der Beschreibung und Inhaltsdeutung
von Werken der bildenden Kunst’, Logos, 21, 1932, pp. 103-119,
here p. 117).
3 Idem, ‘Iconography and Iconology: An Introduction to the Study
of Renaissance Art’, in idem Meaning in the Visual Arts. Papers in
and on Art History, New York, 1955, pp. 26-54, here p. 39.
4 A recent book-length account is A. Efal, Figural Philology. Pan-
ofsky and the Science of Things, London, 2016 (= Bloomsbury
Studies in Continental Philosophy).
the inner vantage point of a contemporary interpreter
needs to be adjusted to that of former centuries, he im-
plicitly proposes a solution to the problem of historicity.
That is, he answers the question of whether it is possi-
ble to approximately overcome the historical difference of
mentalities and recover the original meaning of a work of
art.5 In the following, I will examine this proposal and ask
which underlying conditions it is logically dependent on.
I will argue that, in order to share Panofsky s conviction
that this goal can be reached, two presuppositions must
also be shared: Panofsky s attempt is, more or less implic-
itly, based on the assumption of a non-historical nature
both of man and of vision. Therefore I do not aim to criti-
cize his instruction to take historical documents into ac-
count: it is not a method (in the sense of a pathway) which
is at stake here. Rather, I point to the fact that we need
either to share these presuppositions or to conclude that
Panofsky s method does not actually lead to the goal his
texts had suggested they would. The latter means that we
would have to give another account of what an interpreta-
tion using Panofsky s methodical tools can aim towards.
THE GOAL OF INTERPRETATION
According to Panofsky, a proper interpretation realizes
the meaning the work of art had - be it conscious or un-
conscious - in the moment of its creation. The task is “to
re-create the creations”6 as closely as possible. In order to
5 This particular goal of Panofsky s method is described by A. Efal,
Figural Philology (as in note 4). However, she does not question
the possibility of reaching it.
6 E. Panofsky, ‘The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline’, in
The Meaning of the Humanities, ed. T. M. Greene, Princeton, 1938,
pp. 91-118, here p. 106.
Publikacja jest udostępniona na licencji Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 PL).