Himalayan Times (1962)

Decembers), 1362 Himalayan Times

WHY SEPTEMBER 1 LINE I

By SAMPATHI

Why does India insist
on Cbine6B withdrawal to
the September 8, 1962
line on the entire India-
China border before she
can agree to any talks ?

As Prime Minister Nehru
pointed out in bis letter
to Mr. Chou En-lai dated
November 14, 1962, the
basic fact is that till
September 8 no Chinese
forces had- crossed the
border between India and
China in the eastern sec-
tor (NEFA) along the
highest Himalayan ridge.
It was on September 8
that Chinese forces for
the first time came this
side of the Thag La ridge,
which marks the boundary
and threatened the Indian
frontier post at Dhola.

A seemingly simple
question which is often
asked is: India insists on
tiie Chinese withdrawing
to the September 8, 1962
line, whereas China is
offering to withdraw even
to the November 7. \i)5i>
"line of actual control".
Why does India not ac-
cept this generous offer?
That looks reasonable
enough, but there is a
catch.

Just what is this
November 7, 1959 line ?
The mystery now deepens.
For the Chinese have never

defined what the Novem-
ber 7, 1959 f'line of ac-
tual control" precisely
means.

Take the Eastern Sec
tor, in his letter ri'ited
November 4. 1962 to Prime
Minister Nehru, Mr. Chou
En -lai says that in the
eastern Bector the line of
actual control coincides 'in
the main' with the McMa-
hon Line. Murk the words.-
(*in the main." Characte.
riatically, the Chinese re-
fuse to be specific.

While at some places
China accepts the highest
Himalayan ridge as the
natural boundary, which
is the principle underlying
the McMahon Line, she is
not prepared to acoept it
at other places. She cin-
not have it both ways.

To a simple question
which India has repeatedly
asked, Peking provides no
answer The question is: If
the position on November
7, 1959 was the Bame
as today, as claimed by
the Chinese, why was it
necessary for China to
mount massive attacks to
gain further Indian terri-
tory involving the loss of
so many lives ? Not for
fun alone I

There- is a catch in
the Chinese "line of ac-
tual oontrol." What it

Five

precisely means must re-
main wrapped up in de-
ceptive ambiguity, to be
interpreted as China may
wish from time to time.
Clarity at this stage would
be fatal to their game
of double talk.

The three point Chinese
proposal, on which their
cease fire is also based,
involves a 20 Kilometre
( 12J miles ) withdrawal
from the McMahon Lines
as understood by tkem by
both sides. This would
leave Chinese in possesion
of the vital mountain
passes, leaving the Indian
frontier defenceless for all
time to oome, at the
tender mercies of the
Chinese.

What India desires is
simply this: Whatever the
Chinese notions about the
McMahon Line, they were
clearly no where south of
the highest Himalayan
ridge in the eastern sector
on September 8, 1962.
Let them withdraw beyond
it and then we will talk
about a settlement. There
is no ambiguity about
this demand.

What has been said
above about the eastern
Bector holds true in the
case of the middle sector
too. The Chinese have-
never been here south of
the highest Himalayan
ridge, the accepted na-
tural boundary, and were
to the north of it on

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