DOI Artikel:
Szczerski, Andrzej: Art history as art criticism?
DOI Seite / Zitierlink: https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.19069#0119
of the theory is blind, too. To ąuote Venturi again "if a fact referred to is not
considered as a function of judgement, it is perfectly useless; if a judgement
does not rest upon a knowledge of the historical facts, it is completely false"2.
Finally, giving judgement such a crucial role in art history Ventun said "the
history of art is a function of the criticism of art"3.
Venturi's ideas turn our eyes to a crucial sphere in art history and should
be re-examined. Above all they remind us of the role of the judgement in our
discipline. Since the end of art history was declared art history has defmitely
changed its status and the scalę of the problems it is willing to tackle. Even
if some might find this development inappropriate it should be said that the
new ideas enriched art history to unexpected degree. However, if we are to
seriously benefit from these changes, we need to ask for the judgement related
to them. If art history is to expand and include new areas of study we need to
know if the fields it expands to are of any value. Even if we see the field of
our study as a space for multiple occupancy, we need to distinguish between
the occupants and their contributions to the field. Otherwise we could easily
get a meaningless cacophony of no importance where the crucial proposals
go hand in hand with worthless suggestions. The pluralism of interpretations
should not mean that all of them are eąually viable. Such eclecticism would
then signify support for society without values or, worse, eventually for soci-
ety dominated by one value alone.
We know very well that judgements are conditioned by various contexts,
besides the social one, and cannot claim to be absolute. But at the same time
they cannot be ignored. This applies to art history as a discipline as well as to
the artwork, which does speak for itself. As Erie Fermę observed "the expen-
ence of works of art can be overwhelming to the extent that it is necessary to
ask whether such powerful aesthetic responses could be summoned by any
image whatsoever, given only the right suggestions and regardless of any
characteristics of the object itself When such positive responses are produced
by particular pieces over generations it is reasonable to propose that this is due
at least in part to something in the works themselves"4.
Judgement in art history is valid for discussions of the past but it is also
valid for the present and for futurę developments. Since we have lost our be-
lief in complete objectivity we have to admit that art history is of a narrative
character. And as such it concentrates on the interpretation of facts, an inter-
2 Ibidem, p. 20.
3 Ibidem, p. 351.
4 E. Fernie, Quality in: Art History and Its Methods. A Critical Anthology. Part III Glossaiy
of Concepts, ed. E. Fernie, London 1996, p. 357.
116
considered as a function of judgement, it is perfectly useless; if a judgement
does not rest upon a knowledge of the historical facts, it is completely false"2.
Finally, giving judgement such a crucial role in art history Ventun said "the
history of art is a function of the criticism of art"3.
Venturi's ideas turn our eyes to a crucial sphere in art history and should
be re-examined. Above all they remind us of the role of the judgement in our
discipline. Since the end of art history was declared art history has defmitely
changed its status and the scalę of the problems it is willing to tackle. Even
if some might find this development inappropriate it should be said that the
new ideas enriched art history to unexpected degree. However, if we are to
seriously benefit from these changes, we need to ask for the judgement related
to them. If art history is to expand and include new areas of study we need to
know if the fields it expands to are of any value. Even if we see the field of
our study as a space for multiple occupancy, we need to distinguish between
the occupants and their contributions to the field. Otherwise we could easily
get a meaningless cacophony of no importance where the crucial proposals
go hand in hand with worthless suggestions. The pluralism of interpretations
should not mean that all of them are eąually viable. Such eclecticism would
then signify support for society without values or, worse, eventually for soci-
ety dominated by one value alone.
We know very well that judgements are conditioned by various contexts,
besides the social one, and cannot claim to be absolute. But at the same time
they cannot be ignored. This applies to art history as a discipline as well as to
the artwork, which does speak for itself. As Erie Fermę observed "the expen-
ence of works of art can be overwhelming to the extent that it is necessary to
ask whether such powerful aesthetic responses could be summoned by any
image whatsoever, given only the right suggestions and regardless of any
characteristics of the object itself When such positive responses are produced
by particular pieces over generations it is reasonable to propose that this is due
at least in part to something in the works themselves"4.
Judgement in art history is valid for discussions of the past but it is also
valid for the present and for futurę developments. Since we have lost our be-
lief in complete objectivity we have to admit that art history is of a narrative
character. And as such it concentrates on the interpretation of facts, an inter-
2 Ibidem, p. 20.
3 Ibidem, p. 351.
4 E. Fernie, Quality in: Art History and Its Methods. A Critical Anthology. Part III Glossaiy
of Concepts, ed. E. Fernie, London 1996, p. 357.
116