DOI article:
Jaźwierski, Jacek: "The Judgement of Hercules": Shaftesbury at the Crossroads of Art Theory
DOI Page / Citation link:https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.56525#0038
■‘THE JUDGMENT OF HERCULES”. SHAFTESBURY AT THE CROSSROADS OF ART THEORY
37
withal as great and comprehensive as he can make it. So that Particulars, on this occasion, must yield to the
general Design; and all things be subservient to that which is principal: in order to form a certain Easiness of
Sighf, a simple, clear, and united View, which woul’d be broken and disturb’d by the Expression of any thing
peculiar or distinct.”53 The fragment is based on Shaftesbury’s own translation from chapter VII of Poetics
where Aristotle discussed the qualities of the structure of events. Shaftesbury modified the text and applied
it to painting, especially Aristotle’s comparison of the proper extent of dramatic action to something visually
graspable as a whole. Despite superficial similarity to de Piles’ concepts, the source of Shaftesbury’s views
was Aristotle’s theory of tragedy. It is also Aristotle who bears responsibility for Shaftesbury’s definition of
tablature as a picture graspable in one view, contrary to a fresco which is apparently not.
The problem of interpreting the concept of the whole went hand in hand with understanding the role
of sight in responding to pictures. It was usually agreed that historical pictures required time for sequential
reading of the narrative, figure after figure and group after group, and for gradual understanding of the ex-
pressive actions of the figures, the intentions behind those actions, the use of symbols and emblems in order
to comprehend them into one meaningful whole. The main value of the picture was its intelligibility. Charles
Lebrun’s analysis of Nicolas Poussin’s The Gathering of the Manna (1637-1639, Louvre Museum, Paris)
was the model example of this kind of viewing which rewarded spectators with catharsis-like experience of
the story.54 But Lebrun also made use of the concept of the quick eye which grasped the mood expressed by
colours, lights and shadows at one glance. For Dufresnoy and de Piles, as we have seen, the visual effect of
the whole was graspable in one view. Throughout De arte graphica, they considered the eye as an ultimate
judge of the quality of pictures, even if it contradicted the consistency of narrative. “Let the Eye be satisfy’d
in the first place, even against and above all other reasons.”55
Shaftesbury spoke of both these ways of looking at pictures, sequential and momentary, as if they were
two modes of viewing the same picture: “When the Ordonnance is such, that the Eye not only runs over with
ease the several Parts of the Design, (reducing still its View each moment to the principal Subject on which
all turns) but when the same Eye, without the least detainment in any of the particular Parts, and resting, as it
were, immovable in the middle, or centre of the Tablature, may see at once, in an agreeable and perfect Cor-
respondency, all which is there exhibited to the Sight.”56 The problem is that immovable contemplation of the
whole had no real object in Shaftesbury’s picture because everything that appeared in it was subordinated to
the clarity of the subject-matter. Moral meaning of the narrative could not be comprehended by contemplating
distribution of the figures.57 Shaftesbury linked together the sight with moral sense of the story by means of
the concept of “judicious eye”58 which he must have borrowed from Junius.59 “Judicious eye” was controlled
by the moral expectations of reason rather than any visual effect for which the sensual eye would be sufficient.
Thus the eye, encompassing the whole of the picture, became an instrument of reason which comprehended
the story, controlled emotional response to actions and made moral sense of the picture. Shaftesbury’s con-
cept of judicious eye was consistent with academic ideal of a peintre sęarants, most fully described by Andre
Félibien who equalled art with rational knowledge.60 In the same spirit, perhaps also encouraged by Junius,
53 Shaftesbury, An Essay on the Freedom, [in:] Characteristics, vol. 1, London 1711, pp. 142-143.
54 Ch. Le Bran, Les Israelites recueillant la manne dans le desert par Nicolas Poussin, [in:] H. Jouin, Conferences de I Académie
Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture, Paris 1883, pp. 48-65; English translation: Ch. Le Brun, Sixth Conference, [in:] Art in Theory 1648
1815. An Anthology of Changing Ideas, eds. Ch. Harrison, P. Wood, J. Gaiger, Malden, MA-Oxford-Carlton 2000, pp. 123-131.
55 Du Fresnoy, The Art of Painting, p. 60.
56 Judgment of Hercules, p. 39.
57 Diyden rightly doubted that painting may reveal its moral meaning in one view: “I must say this to the advantage of Painting, even
above Tragedy, that what this last represents in the space of many Hours, the former shows us in one Moment. The Action, the Passion, and
the manners of so many Persons as are contain’d in a Picture, are to be discern’d at once, in the twinkling of an Eye; at least they would be so,
if the Sight could travel over so many different Objects all at once, or the Mind could digest them all at the same instant or point of time.” Du
F r e snoy, The Art ofPainting, p. xxv. De Piles thought that the object of contemplation is visual order of the picture which “infinitely delights
the Eyes, which thereby contemplate the Work with more repose.” R. de Piles, Observations on the Art of Painting, [in:] Du Fresnoy, The
Art of Painting, p. 132.
58 Judgment of Hercules, p. 29.
59 Junius wrote about “learned eyes” C eruditos oculos") which meant not only the sensous eye but the whole apparatus of percep-
tion, including an eye, imagination and judgment, trained to be able to see beauties that only painters could see. F. Junius, The Literature of
Classical Art. I. The Painting of the Ancients, ed. by K. Aldrich, Ph. Fehl, R. Fehl, Berkeley, Los Angeles-Oxford 1991, p. 66.
60 A. Félibien, Conferences de I Académie Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture, London 1705, Preface: “Et cette connoissance que
1’on acquiert, & dont 1’on fait des regies, est à mon avis ce que Ton peut nominer Ait [... ] Comme l’instraction & le plaisir qu’on reęoit des
ouvrages des Peintres & Sculpteurs ne vient pas seulement de la science du dessein, de la beante des couleurs, ni du prix de la matiere, mais
37
withal as great and comprehensive as he can make it. So that Particulars, on this occasion, must yield to the
general Design; and all things be subservient to that which is principal: in order to form a certain Easiness of
Sighf, a simple, clear, and united View, which woul’d be broken and disturb’d by the Expression of any thing
peculiar or distinct.”53 The fragment is based on Shaftesbury’s own translation from chapter VII of Poetics
where Aristotle discussed the qualities of the structure of events. Shaftesbury modified the text and applied
it to painting, especially Aristotle’s comparison of the proper extent of dramatic action to something visually
graspable as a whole. Despite superficial similarity to de Piles’ concepts, the source of Shaftesbury’s views
was Aristotle’s theory of tragedy. It is also Aristotle who bears responsibility for Shaftesbury’s definition of
tablature as a picture graspable in one view, contrary to a fresco which is apparently not.
The problem of interpreting the concept of the whole went hand in hand with understanding the role
of sight in responding to pictures. It was usually agreed that historical pictures required time for sequential
reading of the narrative, figure after figure and group after group, and for gradual understanding of the ex-
pressive actions of the figures, the intentions behind those actions, the use of symbols and emblems in order
to comprehend them into one meaningful whole. The main value of the picture was its intelligibility. Charles
Lebrun’s analysis of Nicolas Poussin’s The Gathering of the Manna (1637-1639, Louvre Museum, Paris)
was the model example of this kind of viewing which rewarded spectators with catharsis-like experience of
the story.54 But Lebrun also made use of the concept of the quick eye which grasped the mood expressed by
colours, lights and shadows at one glance. For Dufresnoy and de Piles, as we have seen, the visual effect of
the whole was graspable in one view. Throughout De arte graphica, they considered the eye as an ultimate
judge of the quality of pictures, even if it contradicted the consistency of narrative. “Let the Eye be satisfy’d
in the first place, even against and above all other reasons.”55
Shaftesbury spoke of both these ways of looking at pictures, sequential and momentary, as if they were
two modes of viewing the same picture: “When the Ordonnance is such, that the Eye not only runs over with
ease the several Parts of the Design, (reducing still its View each moment to the principal Subject on which
all turns) but when the same Eye, without the least detainment in any of the particular Parts, and resting, as it
were, immovable in the middle, or centre of the Tablature, may see at once, in an agreeable and perfect Cor-
respondency, all which is there exhibited to the Sight.”56 The problem is that immovable contemplation of the
whole had no real object in Shaftesbury’s picture because everything that appeared in it was subordinated to
the clarity of the subject-matter. Moral meaning of the narrative could not be comprehended by contemplating
distribution of the figures.57 Shaftesbury linked together the sight with moral sense of the story by means of
the concept of “judicious eye”58 which he must have borrowed from Junius.59 “Judicious eye” was controlled
by the moral expectations of reason rather than any visual effect for which the sensual eye would be sufficient.
Thus the eye, encompassing the whole of the picture, became an instrument of reason which comprehended
the story, controlled emotional response to actions and made moral sense of the picture. Shaftesbury’s con-
cept of judicious eye was consistent with academic ideal of a peintre sęarants, most fully described by Andre
Félibien who equalled art with rational knowledge.60 In the same spirit, perhaps also encouraged by Junius,
53 Shaftesbury, An Essay on the Freedom, [in:] Characteristics, vol. 1, London 1711, pp. 142-143.
54 Ch. Le Bran, Les Israelites recueillant la manne dans le desert par Nicolas Poussin, [in:] H. Jouin, Conferences de I Académie
Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture, Paris 1883, pp. 48-65; English translation: Ch. Le Brun, Sixth Conference, [in:] Art in Theory 1648
1815. An Anthology of Changing Ideas, eds. Ch. Harrison, P. Wood, J. Gaiger, Malden, MA-Oxford-Carlton 2000, pp. 123-131.
55 Du Fresnoy, The Art of Painting, p. 60.
56 Judgment of Hercules, p. 39.
57 Diyden rightly doubted that painting may reveal its moral meaning in one view: “I must say this to the advantage of Painting, even
above Tragedy, that what this last represents in the space of many Hours, the former shows us in one Moment. The Action, the Passion, and
the manners of so many Persons as are contain’d in a Picture, are to be discern’d at once, in the twinkling of an Eye; at least they would be so,
if the Sight could travel over so many different Objects all at once, or the Mind could digest them all at the same instant or point of time.” Du
F r e snoy, The Art ofPainting, p. xxv. De Piles thought that the object of contemplation is visual order of the picture which “infinitely delights
the Eyes, which thereby contemplate the Work with more repose.” R. de Piles, Observations on the Art of Painting, [in:] Du Fresnoy, The
Art of Painting, p. 132.
58 Judgment of Hercules, p. 29.
59 Junius wrote about “learned eyes” C eruditos oculos") which meant not only the sensous eye but the whole apparatus of percep-
tion, including an eye, imagination and judgment, trained to be able to see beauties that only painters could see. F. Junius, The Literature of
Classical Art. I. The Painting of the Ancients, ed. by K. Aldrich, Ph. Fehl, R. Fehl, Berkeley, Los Angeles-Oxford 1991, p. 66.
60 A. Félibien, Conferences de I Académie Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture, London 1705, Preface: “Et cette connoissance que
1’on acquiert, & dont 1’on fait des regies, est à mon avis ce que Ton peut nominer Ait [... ] Comme l’instraction & le plaisir qu’on reęoit des
ouvrages des Peintres & Sculpteurs ne vient pas seulement de la science du dessein, de la beante des couleurs, ni du prix de la matiere, mais