DOI Seite / Zitierlink:
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.649#0068
THE PEASANGA-MADHYAMIKA SCHOOL. 43
by causal connexion, Samvriti: in order not to fall into
extremes. For, not to say of what has never existed,
to be; and of the truly existing, not to be; this is
to take a middle way, Madhyama.' This dogma is
formulated as follows:—"By denying the extreme of ex-
istence is also denied, in consequence of conditional
appearance, the extreme of non-existence, which is not
in Paramartha." The arguments in proof of this thesis
are most circumstantial; the following most curious syl-
logisms occur in Jam yang shadpa's work:—
1. If the plant grew by its own specific nature, it
would not be a composition, Tenbrel; it is de-
monstrated, however, that it is a composition.
2. If anything in nature were self-existent, we should
certainly hear and see it; for the sensation of
seeing and hearing would in this case be abso-
lutely identical.
8. The quality of being general would not be pe-
culiar to many things, because it would be an
indivisible unity, as such a unity we should be
obliged to take the ego, if there were an ego.
4. The plant would not be compelled to grew anew,
because it would continue to exist.
5. If any Skandha,2 as sensation, were self-existent,
1 They are also called, on account of this theory, "those who deny ex-
istence (nature)," in Tibetan, Ngovonyid medpar mraba.
2 The Buddhists enumerate five essential properties of sentient existence,
which are styled Skandhas, or Sllaskandhas, in Tibetan, Tsulkhrim kyi
phungpo, "the aggregates of morals." They are: 1. The organized body;
2. Sensation; 3. Perception; 4. Discrimination; 5. Consciousness. See Bur-
nouf, Index, voce Skandha; Hardy's Manual of Buddhism, pp. 388, 3',(!)-424.—
For the Tibetan designations of the five Skandhas see "Buddhistisehe
Triglottc," by A. Schiefner, leaf 9.
by causal connexion, Samvriti: in order not to fall into
extremes. For, not to say of what has never existed,
to be; and of the truly existing, not to be; this is
to take a middle way, Madhyama.' This dogma is
formulated as follows:—"By denying the extreme of ex-
istence is also denied, in consequence of conditional
appearance, the extreme of non-existence, which is not
in Paramartha." The arguments in proof of this thesis
are most circumstantial; the following most curious syl-
logisms occur in Jam yang shadpa's work:—
1. If the plant grew by its own specific nature, it
would not be a composition, Tenbrel; it is de-
monstrated, however, that it is a composition.
2. If anything in nature were self-existent, we should
certainly hear and see it; for the sensation of
seeing and hearing would in this case be abso-
lutely identical.
8. The quality of being general would not be pe-
culiar to many things, because it would be an
indivisible unity, as such a unity we should be
obliged to take the ego, if there were an ego.
4. The plant would not be compelled to grew anew,
because it would continue to exist.
5. If any Skandha,2 as sensation, were self-existent,
1 They are also called, on account of this theory, "those who deny ex-
istence (nature)," in Tibetan, Ngovonyid medpar mraba.
2 The Buddhists enumerate five essential properties of sentient existence,
which are styled Skandhas, or Sllaskandhas, in Tibetan, Tsulkhrim kyi
phungpo, "the aggregates of morals." They are: 1. The organized body;
2. Sensation; 3. Perception; 4. Discrimination; 5. Consciousness. See Bur-
nouf, Index, voce Skandha; Hardy's Manual of Buddhism, pp. 388, 3',(!)-424.—
For the Tibetan designations of the five Skandhas see "Buddhistisehe
Triglottc," by A. Schiefner, leaf 9.