Notae Numismaticae - Zapiski Numizmatyczne (7.2012)

PROBLEMS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARCHAIC GREEK COINAGE

to understand power distributions; network theory to tracę the organization of in-
formation and loyalties; and theories of political and economic institutions to ap-
preciate how actors and agents shape institutions and are shaped by them.38 Such
a framework would allow for sustained work on the basie ąuestions facing coin
producers: e.g., why do we need coinage; how much should we produce; where
do we procure monetary metal and what kind; what weight standard and denomi-
national system do we use; what should appear on the coins? But the framework
will also demand greater nuance: for example, how did governing structures affect
outeomes; how did the actors implement and enforce their decisions; how effkient
was the outeome?
A methodology that integrates detailed numismatic study within frameworks
derived from economic sociology and political theory would offer a rich analysis
of archaic coinage. In the remainder of this section, I review a number of particular
problems in archaic coinage that might benefit from this approach.
We are aware of differing regime types—tyrannies, oligarchies, democracies
- in many of the archaic poleis that produced coins, yet beyond stereotypes (e.g.,
tyrants are self-serving elites so of course grace their coins with chariot scenes)
there is little discussion of how the structure or “culture” of each regime type might
affect decisions to coin. Although we lack direct evidence in all these cases, we
can infer that there were different institutional structures within each regime that
would have a bearing on the decision processes. Democratic institutions like the
Athenian Boule and Ekklesia, for example, would, because of their scalę, present
a different set of collective action problems when compared to the tyrant and his
group of advisors, or a restricted group of oligarchs. Similarly, because democratic
governing culture is different from that of tyrannies, we might expect democratic
decision makers, among other things, to perceive coins as a public good, to be
produced in large ąuantity, in a large rangę of denominations, bearing generally in-
offensive designs. Conversely, oligarchs might regard coinage as a club good, de-
signed to appeal to and circulate among elite peers.39 These expectations are worth

38 The literaturę on collective action theory, bargaining theory, and network theory, as well as related theo-
ries like rational choice, is vast. Key texts include: collective action: M. OLSON, The Logic of CoIlective Action:
Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge 1965; D.C. MUELLER, Public choice III, Cambridge 2003;
bargaining theory: G. DORON, I. SENED, Political bargaining: theoiy, practice andprocess, London 2001;
network theory: M. GRANOVETTER, “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness”,
American Journal of Sociology’ 91.3, 1985, pp. 481-493; W. W. POWELL, “Neither market nor hierarchy: net-
work forms of organization”, Research in Organizational Behavior 12, 1990, pp. 295-336. J. OBER, Democracy
and knowledge: innovation and learning in classical Athens, Princeton 2008 is an excellent example of how many
of these theoretical approaches can be productively applied to the study of ancient Greek politics.
39 Public goods are those that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous, like national defense; club goods, on
the other hand, are those that are non-rivalrous, but excludable, like private parks. See MUELLER, Public choice
III, pp. 11-13.

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