DOI issue:
Artykuły / Articles
DOI article:Van Alfen, Peter G.: Problems in the political economy of archaic greek coinage
DOI Page / Citation link:https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.22230#0029
PROBLEMS IN THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARCHAIC GREEK COINAGE
suer, but this information would be easily lost as the coins migrated away from the
group, or would be irretrievable in a sea of similarly designed coins. Regardless of
the significance of the signed Lydian and Ephesian issues noted above, the uncer-
tain types indicate either that a smaller number of monopoly holders did not care
to “brand” their products in distinctive ways, thus undermining their control, or
that there were a larger number of unregulated producers. Either case raises serious
ąuestions about coining and centralized control at this time, and who was making
coining decisions. It also forces us to ask whether monopolies over coinage were
bom at the same moment as the first coins.43
Saying no, and positing instead a movement from dispersed to centralized
authority would seriously disrupt several models for the development of archaic
coinage and monetization,44 which depend on the notion of a centralized authority
aggressively enforcing fiduciarity. But it may help to explain both the develop-
ment of the widespread trust necessary to make coinage function as a monetary
instrument, and the hundreds of uncertain issues. If, for example, we imagine
the social networks accruing around individual elites, including peers and cli-
ents, as well as the interrelationships between all the networks within the larger
community, we can see how the ties within and between the networks provide
a readymade bed in which monetary trust could grow.45 We can further imag-
ine individual elites, who would have the resources and need to produce coins,
presenting them to their followers or peers in order to fulfill social and other
obligations, including liturgy-like obligations, without the expectation that the
coins would be accepted as coins beyond the immediate circle of trust. Larger pat-
terns of circulation could develop as individuals with close ties to other networks
passed the coins on vouching for their value.46 This operation would be analogous
to other forms of private money, like tokens and scrip, that “go viral,” not so much
because the issuing authority is recognized across the community, but because of
the degree of trust between the parties to the transaction and the fact that the coin
or bill serves a real monetary need.47
4' In P.G. VAN ALFEN, “Public benefactor or profiteer?...”, I study the problem of early coin monopolization.
44 e.g. LE RIDER, La naissance de la monnaie...', R. WALLACE, “The origin of electrum coinage”, AJ A
91. 1987, pp. 385-397.
4- M.J. PRICE, "Thoughts on the beginning of coinage”, [in:] C.N.L. BROOKE ET AL. (eds.), Studies in
numismatic methodpresented to Philip Grierson, Cambridge 1983, pp. 1-10, posited the development of early
electrum coinage within smaller groups of elites and their dependents. For trust networks see C. TILLY, Trust and
Rule, Cambridge 2005.
46 The notion of coinage originated with individual elites is not new; I add the idea of networks facilitating
the spread of coinage.
4 G. SELGIN, Good money: Birmingham button makers, the Royal Mint, and the beginnings of modern
coinage, 1775—1821, Ann Arbor 2008 describes similar operations with privately produced token coinages in
late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century England.
suer, but this information would be easily lost as the coins migrated away from the
group, or would be irretrievable in a sea of similarly designed coins. Regardless of
the significance of the signed Lydian and Ephesian issues noted above, the uncer-
tain types indicate either that a smaller number of monopoly holders did not care
to “brand” their products in distinctive ways, thus undermining their control, or
that there were a larger number of unregulated producers. Either case raises serious
ąuestions about coining and centralized control at this time, and who was making
coining decisions. It also forces us to ask whether monopolies over coinage were
bom at the same moment as the first coins.43
Saying no, and positing instead a movement from dispersed to centralized
authority would seriously disrupt several models for the development of archaic
coinage and monetization,44 which depend on the notion of a centralized authority
aggressively enforcing fiduciarity. But it may help to explain both the develop-
ment of the widespread trust necessary to make coinage function as a monetary
instrument, and the hundreds of uncertain issues. If, for example, we imagine
the social networks accruing around individual elites, including peers and cli-
ents, as well as the interrelationships between all the networks within the larger
community, we can see how the ties within and between the networks provide
a readymade bed in which monetary trust could grow.45 We can further imag-
ine individual elites, who would have the resources and need to produce coins,
presenting them to their followers or peers in order to fulfill social and other
obligations, including liturgy-like obligations, without the expectation that the
coins would be accepted as coins beyond the immediate circle of trust. Larger pat-
terns of circulation could develop as individuals with close ties to other networks
passed the coins on vouching for their value.46 This operation would be analogous
to other forms of private money, like tokens and scrip, that “go viral,” not so much
because the issuing authority is recognized across the community, but because of
the degree of trust between the parties to the transaction and the fact that the coin
or bill serves a real monetary need.47
4' In P.G. VAN ALFEN, “Public benefactor or profiteer?...”, I study the problem of early coin monopolization.
44 e.g. LE RIDER, La naissance de la monnaie...', R. WALLACE, “The origin of electrum coinage”, AJ A
91. 1987, pp. 385-397.
4- M.J. PRICE, "Thoughts on the beginning of coinage”, [in:] C.N.L. BROOKE ET AL. (eds.), Studies in
numismatic methodpresented to Philip Grierson, Cambridge 1983, pp. 1-10, posited the development of early
electrum coinage within smaller groups of elites and their dependents. For trust networks see C. TILLY, Trust and
Rule, Cambridge 2005.
46 The notion of coinage originated with individual elites is not new; I add the idea of networks facilitating
the spread of coinage.
4 G. SELGIN, Good money: Birmingham button makers, the Royal Mint, and the beginnings of modern
coinage, 1775—1821, Ann Arbor 2008 describes similar operations with privately produced token coinages in
late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century England.