DOI issue:
Artykuły / Articles
DOI article:Van Alfen, Peter G.: Problems in the political economy of archaic greek coinage
DOI Page / Citation link:https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.22230#0030
PETER VAN ALFEN
If the initial production and use of coinage lay within smaller social networks,
a (gradual?) change took place whereby those in political power began to make de-
cisions restricting others’ abilities to produce coinage. By c. 500 BCE every coin-
producmg polis, as far as we can tell, had adopted similar restrictive policies, some
perhaps learning from the example of others, or perhaps acting in competition with
others. How and why this all took place is a complex problem, and may be a func-
tion of many other changes occurring in the poleis, including the development of
public treasuries and new methods of taxation, the development of new types of
public expenditure (e.g., festivals, navies, monumental architecture), the develop-
ment law codes and an acute sense of citizenship, the expansion of market activity,
and so forth. Even so, it is not immediately elear why those in power would iden-
tify a need to monopolize coin production, rather than simply adding their coinage
to the existing mix, or how much force they would need to reset preexisting mon-
etary practices. Economic motivation, especially the profit motive, ranks high as
a probable answer, but this response can seem crude. It is not difficult to imagine,
for example, a stereotypical tyrant and his cronies deciding to impose a restrictive
system that would aid in filling their entertainment coffers at the expense of the
subjects, but whether this would also keep the peace and aid their political longev-
ity is ąuestionable. Again, we might frame this problem with greater subtlety.
If generating fiscal revenue and maintaining political support were primary
motivations, achieving the compliance of the community at large was necessary,
and this might be done by finding ways to work together to shift some of the fiscal
burden outside of the community, or at least away from those voicing the loudest
opposition.48 Aligning interests to that goal would also reąuire the support of any
private producers, who would be forfeiting their independent ability to coin. But,
by working to recalibrate indigenous coinage from a collection of club goods to
a single public good, the community could take advantage of addition benefits of
coin use it was not able to previously: for example, the creation of a closed monetary
zonę with a single currency would force those coming into the zonę to exchange or
re-mint their foreign coins for a fee; the creation of a successful trade or export coin-
age could also generate revenue through demand driven pricing or exchange fees.
By positing a process of intemal coordination and alignment that projects some
functions of coinage to the edge of the community or beyond, we can also see how
coinage might become morę closely associated with the identity of a community,
and how the success of the endeavor would encourage the continued monopoliza-
tion of coin production, both at home, and as an example for neighbors to follow.
48 For further discussion of the tensions that might arise between the need for political stability and revenue
generation in archaic coin production see VAN ALFEN, “Public benefactor or profiteer?...”.
If the initial production and use of coinage lay within smaller social networks,
a (gradual?) change took place whereby those in political power began to make de-
cisions restricting others’ abilities to produce coinage. By c. 500 BCE every coin-
producmg polis, as far as we can tell, had adopted similar restrictive policies, some
perhaps learning from the example of others, or perhaps acting in competition with
others. How and why this all took place is a complex problem, and may be a func-
tion of many other changes occurring in the poleis, including the development of
public treasuries and new methods of taxation, the development of new types of
public expenditure (e.g., festivals, navies, monumental architecture), the develop-
ment law codes and an acute sense of citizenship, the expansion of market activity,
and so forth. Even so, it is not immediately elear why those in power would iden-
tify a need to monopolize coin production, rather than simply adding their coinage
to the existing mix, or how much force they would need to reset preexisting mon-
etary practices. Economic motivation, especially the profit motive, ranks high as
a probable answer, but this response can seem crude. It is not difficult to imagine,
for example, a stereotypical tyrant and his cronies deciding to impose a restrictive
system that would aid in filling their entertainment coffers at the expense of the
subjects, but whether this would also keep the peace and aid their political longev-
ity is ąuestionable. Again, we might frame this problem with greater subtlety.
If generating fiscal revenue and maintaining political support were primary
motivations, achieving the compliance of the community at large was necessary,
and this might be done by finding ways to work together to shift some of the fiscal
burden outside of the community, or at least away from those voicing the loudest
opposition.48 Aligning interests to that goal would also reąuire the support of any
private producers, who would be forfeiting their independent ability to coin. But,
by working to recalibrate indigenous coinage from a collection of club goods to
a single public good, the community could take advantage of addition benefits of
coin use it was not able to previously: for example, the creation of a closed monetary
zonę with a single currency would force those coming into the zonę to exchange or
re-mint their foreign coins for a fee; the creation of a successful trade or export coin-
age could also generate revenue through demand driven pricing or exchange fees.
By positing a process of intemal coordination and alignment that projects some
functions of coinage to the edge of the community or beyond, we can also see how
coinage might become morę closely associated with the identity of a community,
and how the success of the endeavor would encourage the continued monopoliza-
tion of coin production, both at home, and as an example for neighbors to follow.
48 For further discussion of the tensions that might arise between the need for political stability and revenue
generation in archaic coin production see VAN ALFEN, “Public benefactor or profiteer?...”.