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Hochschule für Industrielle Formgestaltung [Hrsg.]
Designtheoretisches Kolloquium — 16.1995

DOI Artikel:
Krupinski, Janusz: Imaginality and irreality of our world on image-object relation
DOI Seite / Zitierlink: 
https://doi.org/10.11588/diglit.31840#0113

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Janusz Krupinski

Imaginality and irreality of our
world on image-object relation

Directly, we live only in the world of images.

C.G. Jung, "Geist und Leben",
in: Seelenprobleme der Gegenwart

The title-question of the conference,
"VIRTUALITÄT contra REALITÄT?", expresses
an anxiety: will the new digital media deprive
our world of reality? Are we about to live in
and on the as-if world, ALS-OB world? Those
questions assume that until now mankind has
enjoyed the reality -the life in the real world.
But can we take this ontological thesis for
granted? Let's engage in ontology. (Ontology
course in thirty minutes.)

1. The words "real", "reality" derive
from the latin "res", thing. Realism makes the
being of things the ideal of all being. Things
have being with substance. Hence the realist's
ideal is: to exist on the way things exist. For a
realist this way of being is only one genuine,
true.

(Realism consists in substance ontology.)

2. Anything what is real is itself, AN SICH
- it has being-itself, ANSICHSEIN. For the real
being is of no matter if someone is looking
at it or is not, if one is seeing it or not etc.
The objective cognition of a thing tends to
get knowledge of it as it is itself - when
nobody is looking at it.

The objective knowlegde brings
about no change in the seen (in the known),
everything what is of the real mode of being
should remain indifferent to whether it is
seen (known) or not. The objective cognition
is expected to give us an image (a picture) of
the real which shows only its being itself,
which adds nothing to its being, which is
transparent. This image is to be wiped of all
subjective coloring, is to represent only real
features of a thing, nothing more.

3. An image - transparent or not trans-
parent - an image of the object is unremo-
vable from its experience, from its perception.
Between the subject and the object always
there is a third part of their relation: object's
image.

SeeN. Hartmann, Grundzüge einer Metaphy-
sik der Erkenntnis, Berlin 1949

It is not true that: "Wir haben Bilder in Köp-
fen" (There is someone in your head who
looks at images?). The image, like object (like
its object) is always in front of you. E.g. the
landscape is what you are facing (The german
language has not this ontological insight
which the English, the French, the Polish or
the Japanese has. Instead landscape, paysage,
or krajobraz you would have to say in
german: LANDSCHAFTSBILD.)

Where is seeing and the seen there
are images. For this reason every design
theory which denies or neglects the role of
objects image must fail.

Instead to use the term "image" some phi-
losophers prefer to use other terms e.g.
appearance, imagination, phenomenon,
form, VORSTELLUNG, ERSCHEINUNG, AN-
SICHT ...

4. The paradox of seeing (of perception
in general): inspite of the presence of an
mediating image the intention of seeing is
directed directly towards an object. One
becomes conscious of the image prescence
rather only at the moment when he dis-
covered that he has had experienced a de-
ception.

Hegel pointed on this paradoxical
nature of perception and spoke on VERMIT-
TELTE UNMITTELBARKEIT, mediated imme-
diacy.

Naive realism is so widely spread very
likely because of this paradoxical nature of
perception.

5. The naive realism believes that our
cognition grasps things directly, in a non-
mediated way. The naive realist does not
realize that always between him and an
object he looks at there is this third, unre-
movable part, an image. For this reason nai-
ve realist is likely to believe that things are
exactly as he sees them, what they seem to
be.

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